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Although there have long been black lawyers in South Africa,
during apartheid only a handful joined the ranks of the country's
large commercialfirms. Now, in the post-apartheid period, these
firms are keenly aware of a range of economic and political in-
centives to hire black attorneys, and most are doing so at a
record pace. Very few black attorneys, however, are enduring the
path to partnership in these firms. Based on more than seventy-
five interviews conducted in South Africa in 1999 and 2000, this
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Article both documents and critically examines the reasons for
black attrition. While firms' incentives to integrate include com-
mercial ones associated with clients' newfound attention to the
racial diversity of their vendors, such incentives apparently have
not yet outweighed the forces impeding integration-some of
those forces being incidental to the country's history and poli-
tics, some attributable to the institutional characteristics of law
firms, others to the acts of individuals within those institutions.
Although the underrepresentation of blacks in these firms is fre-
quently attributed to blacks' own failings or choices, Professor
Pruitt argues that the lack of integration is also the result of dis-
criminatory actions of white individuals and the institutions they
run. Still building on the descriptive platform she has laid,
Professor Pruitt goes on to construct a model of efficient dis-
crimination with respect to South Africa's elite legal sector,
arguing that firms are able to survive in the new marketplace,
even absent retention of black attorneys, because the power of
the incentives to integrate does not match the rhetoric around it.
In addition, because no firm is achieving integration and thereby
taking advantage of existing incentives, no firm is raising the
integration quotient, which would presumably challenge other
firms to do the same.
INTRODUCTION
The emerging black business elite will be looking for black
firms. The white firms will adapt [and] offer black practitioners
partnerships. There will be African names in partnerships of
large firms. You find no one in this country who ever supported
apartheid. Firms are behaving with the ostensible zeal of new
converts.
-Judge, High Court of South Africa'
Tomorrow is Another Country,2 the title of one of the popular books
about South Africa's transition to democracy, denotes the country's rapid
move from apartheid to majority rule over the course of a few years in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. "Tomorrow" however, has not proved to
be "another legal profession" there. The pace of change and racial
1. Interview No. 41, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 17, 1999) (colored male, Judge,
High Court of South Africa) (transcript on file with author).
2. ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SOUTH
AFRICA'S ROAD TO CHANGE (1995).
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integration of many sectors of South African society has been relatively
swift during the post-apartheid era. Those referred to in South Africa as
blacks-including indigenous Africans, mixed-race individuals called
coloreds, and South African Indians 3-are entering the legal profession
at a record pace. Integration is proceeding slowly, however, in the
country's large commercial law firms, which are located primarily in
3. I follow the practice of many South African and non-South African academics before
me who have used the word "black" as most South Africans do to refer to all persons who are
not white. I also use the phrase "persons of color" to refer to them collectively. When desig-
nating race more specifically, I use the South African labels: African, colored, and Indian. See,
e.g., KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW xvi-xvii (2000); Christopher Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Iden-
tity in American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1953, 1957 n.10 (1996).
This labeling scheme is problematic because it does not, for example, acknowledge that
many white South Africans, whose families immigrated to South Africa literally centuries ago,
consider themselves "African." Although "black" commonly has been used to refer to mem-
bers of all ethnic groups who are not white, it does not do justice to the complexity of South
Africa's racial politics to view these groups homogenously. The strictures of apartheid handi-
capped and limited the opportunities of each of the three groups differently. The somewhat
more privileged position of Indians and coloreds has carried over into post-apartheid South
Africa, sometimes resulting in resentment by Africans, whom some employers apparently tend
to prefer less than other non-white groups. See, e.g., Interview No. 31 in Johannesburg, S. Afr.
(Mar. 19, 1999) (37-year-old African male candidate attorney at top-tier firm speculating that
employers will seek to achieve diversity by hiring Indians and white women rather than by
hiring Africans) (transcript on file with author); Interview No. 14, in Johannesburg, S. Afr.
(June 29, 1999) (26-year-old African female professional assistant, noting the social divisions
among Indians, coloreds, and blacks, stating that while Indians "have been disadvantaged ...
the system has treated them better than coloreds, blacks") (transcript on file with author).
Others highlight the cultural difference between the two white groups, English-speaking
and Afrikaans, arguing that the cultural barrier between them is significant and that each group
views the other with prejudice. Interview No. 55, in Sandton, S. Afr. (Apr. 6, 2000) (white
male partner) (transcript on file with author); Interview No. 15, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (June 18,
1999) (white female partner) (transcript on file with author); E-mail from Daniel Steenkamp,
white attorney and author of Steenkamp, infra note 7, to Lisa R. Pruitt (Apr. 24, 2002,
10:16:50 PST) (on file with author). The relationships among these groups no doubt have
implications for the legal profession, but those issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
Recent studies of the attitudes of persons of different races toward one another have
strayed from the South African practice of referring to Africans, Indians, and coloreds simply
as "blacks.' One study, which explored the attitudes among the races following the work of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, treated each race grouping as distinct for purposes
of determining their attitudes toward one another. James L. Gibson & Helen Macdonald,
Truth-Yes, Reconciliation-Maybe: South Africans Judge the Truth and Reconciliation
Process 3-4 (2001) (unpublished study, on file with author). The study found, for example,
that about half of whites, Asians, and coloreds said that they did not understand Africans. Id.
at 33; see also S. Afr. Inst. of Race Relations, Between a Rainbow and a Hard Place: Threats
and Opportunities in Racial Reconciliation in South Africa (Dec. 2001) (dividing survey
respondents not only into African, Indian, and colored, but also into Afrikaans-speaking
whites and English-speaking whites), at http://www.sairr.org.za/publications/pub/ff/200112/
rainbow.htm (copy on file with author).
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Johannesburg and Pretoria, what is now Gauteng Province.4 This Article
describes the changing opportunities black attorneys have both within
and outside these elite law firms in post-apartheid South Africa to
theorize why so few black attorneys are succeeding and remaining in
commercial law firms there.
A dearth of published information and analytical literature exists on
the South African legal profession. There is also a real scarcity of data on
its demographics and other features. For example, no official statistics on
the race of those currently admitted to practice or of those being admit-
ted to practice are kept, leaving one to rely on partial and unofficial
statistical accounts. To date, the academic literature on the South African
legal profession has primarily been comprised of descriptions of actual
or proposed changes to legal education or to the regulation of the profes-
sion,5 as well as some commentary on the role of law and lawyers in
perpetuating and, alternatively, ending apartheid.6 Very little information
4. The conurbation of Johannesburg, Pretoria, and the cities between them comprises
the vast majority of the geographically, small but densely populated Gauteng Province, the
country's hub of commerce. Gauteng Province is part of what was formerly the Transvaal
Province, a much larger area that also included the current Mpumalanga, Northern, and
Northwest Provinces. Transvaal is the Afrikaaner name given to the part of the country that the
Afrikaaners claimed, north of the Vaal River, following their trek into the country's interior. A
map of the former provincial distributions can be viewed at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/
africa/safrica_provinces_95.jpg (last visited Apr. 7, 2002). The map at that site which purports
to show current provincial distributions does not show the names of the new provinces. An
accurately labeled map is available at http://www.aha.co.za/images/samapnew.gif (last visited
May 7, 2002).
5. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, The Future of Legal Education: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (1992) (arguing that three basic perspectives-the human
rights perspective, the access-to-justice perspective, and the transnational perspective-have
the potential to bring much needed change and leadership to legal education); Philip F. Iya,
Reform of Legal Education in South Africa: Analysis of the New Challenge of Change, 31 L.
TCHR. INT'L J. LEGAL EDUC. 310, 310-25 (1997) (analyzing strengths and weaknesses of the
reform process and focusing on the impact on legal education of the Legal Practitioners
Amendment Bill of 1997).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994, at 1-6 (1995); DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES,
JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER 25-35
(1998) (exploring the role of judges within the post-apartheid legal system with an account of
three days at South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission); HEINZ KLUG, CONSTI-
TUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION
46-47 (2000) (describing a fundamental division within the legal community between estab-
lished bodies and anti-apartheid factions); Geoff Budlender, On Practicing Law, in ESSAYS ON
LAW AND SOCIAL PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 319, 325 (Hugh Corder ed., 1988) (promoting
group interests is a crucial duty for lawyers in promoting social justice); Stephen Ellmann,
Lawyers Against the Emergency, 6 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 228 (1990); Philip F. Iya, Legal Edu-
cation, Legal Practice and Reconstruction in South Africa, presented at Into the 21 st Century:
Reconstruction and Reparations, Cape Town, S. Afr. (Jan. 4-6, 2001) (analyzing the recon-
struction of the legal profession using legal education and legal practice as case studies)
(manuscript on file with author).
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is on record about the profession's social structures or about law firms in
particular.7
This Article seeks to partially fill this void by presenting information
gained through more than seventy-five interviews, conducted almost ex-
clusively in South Africa between March 1999 and July 2000. While the
majority of those interviewed were black South African law graduates
who were up to seven years into their careers, attorneys of all races and
at all stages in their professional careers were interviewed, along with
law students, legal educators, and judges.8 Interviews were not con-
ducted using a set list of questions. Nevertheless, the interviews
generally proceeded along the same format, beginning with a discussion
7. Two post-apartheid studies have explored issues of race and gender in the profession.
The first, conducted by the University of Cape Town's Law, Race, and Gender Research Unit,
in 1995 and 1998, surveyed final-year law students about their experiences interviewing for
candidate attorney positions. Claire Barclay, Joining the Profession Project: 1998, An Analysis
of the Impact of Race and Gender on the Recruitment of Candidate Attorneys 1-2, 4 (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
The second study, commissioned by the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) and con-
ducted by the Human Rights and Advocacy Project of the National Association for
Democratic Lawyers (Nadel), was completed in 2000. In the study, 185 firms were sent sur-
veys inquiring about such matters as their policies on considering race and gender in hiring
and promotion; 55 firms responded to the survey. The researchers also conducted 25 inter-
views with attorneys, the majority of whom were white males. Of those interviewed, 18 were
either partners or directors of firms. Only one candidate attorney and one professional assis-
tant were interviewed. The great difficulty in collecting systematic information about the
South African attorneys' profession was illustrated by the experience of the researchers who
noted that, in spite of the study's endorsement by the Law Society of South Africa, many at-
torneys' firms declined to supply the information sought, and a number expressed hostility
toward the enterprise. One responded that the study was worthless and "should be used as
toilet paper." Fairuz Mullagee & Irvine Kinnes, The South African Attorneys' Profession:
Issues of Race and Gender 1-7 (Sept. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
Research Report: A Mere 'Snapshot' into the Profession, DE REBUS, Jan. 2001, at
http://www.derebus.org.za/archives/200lJan/news/research.htm (discussing the findings of
Mullagee & Kinnes' study on race and gender issues) (copy on file with author).
One comprehensive study of the attorneys' profession was undertaken during the latter
years of apartheid. In his 1996 doctoral dissertation, Daniel Steenkamp examined multiple
aspects of the profession, including education requirements and the structure of the legal sys-
tem. The responses to his 1987 survey questions regarding race and the legal profession are
particularly relevant to this Article. Daniel J. Steenkamp, The Attorney's Profession in South
Africa: With Special Reference to the Education and Training of Candidate Attorneys (1996)
(unpublished LL.D. thesis, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, (on file
with Potchefstroom Christian University Library, Potchefstroom, S. Afr.).
8. Demographic information about those interviewed is provided in Appendix A. Addi-
tional details are not provided because they would jeopardize the anonymity of those
interviewed. Interviewees were identified according to what sociologists and ethnographers
call the snowball effect: the use of existing contacts to identify additional contacts or interview
subjects, and the use of those contacts to identify still more. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT
G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 9-10 (1996).
When an interviewee was quoted in his or her official capacity and when that person
agreed to be identified, the interviewee's name and role are included in the citation.
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of the subject's personal and educational background, followed by a dis-
cussion of her career trajectory and professional experiences, including
the perceived impact of race, if any, on those experiences.9 This Article
thus represents "legal journalism"' in which common themes and ex-
periences of those interviewed reveal what is happening within the firms,
as well as in the larger labor market. The result is a snapshot of the South
African attorneys' profession at the turn of the 21st century.
The interview data collected, which serve as the foundation for this
Article, provide the first-ever comprehensive look at the elite commer-
cial segment of the South African legal profession, offering an insider's
perspective on the opportunities blacks have within the country's elite
law firms and the obstacles to partnership and true integration that re-
main in their paths. It considers critically the economic and other
incentives firms have to hire and retain blacks, as well as how firms are
responding to these incentives. It examines how firms recruit, train, and
promote attorneys with a view to understanding how the firms' institu-
tional features, along with the actions of individuals who comprise those
institutions, shape the experiences black attorneys have there. Those ex-
periences, in turn, often drive black attorneys' decisions to remain with
the firms or to pursue professional opportunities elsewhere.
Using this descriptive background, this Article theorizes about the
dynamics of racial discrimination in these large elite firms. In a com-
parative vein, the analysis draws on David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu
Gulati's scholarship on race and the legal profession in the United
States" to construct a theory of "efficient discrimination" in relation to
9. Interviewees were not asked to complete a questionnaire or to put anything in writ-
ing, as doing so might have had a chilling effect on what they were willing to disclose. To
foster the most candid disclosures possible, interviewees were given the option of declining to
have their interviews audio-recorded. Detailed notes were taken of those interviews that were
not audio-recorded.
10. I borrow this term from Albert Alschuler, who used it to describe his studies of the
roles of defense attorneys and prosecutors in plea bargaining. See Albert Alschuler, The
Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (1975). He explained:
The utility of this kind of study seems to me to lie primarily in its ability to guide
analysis and to permit an evaluation of the inherency of the problems that it sug-
gests. Most of what I report is hearsay, and individual stories and observations may
therefore be suspect. Even unverified gossip may be valuable, however, when it
"makes sense"-when reflection indicates that our current system of criminal jus-
tice would inevitably lead to behavior of the sort described in more than a few
cases. Moreover, the hearsay tends to become credible when similar observations
are reported by persons with different and opposing roles ....
Id. at 1181; see also Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 50, 52 (1968).
11. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers:
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms,
84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of
Spring 2002]
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South Africa's elite commercial firms. Specifically, it explains how firms
are able to survive with only token black attorneys, few or none of them
partners, even when the market purports to value diversity and when
South African attorneys tout the commercial value of "having black
names on the letterhead." In sum, this model posits that institutional
structures help conceal the discriminatory acts of individuals, preventing
these firms from being reputed-much less proved-to be racist. The
model further posits that these firms are able to survive in spite of dis-
criminatory behavior and policies that disadvantage black attorneys, in
part because none of the elite firms is achieving the vaunted integration
and the business advantage purportedly associated with it.
This Article begins with a brief overview of South Africa's recent
social and political history, followed in Parts II and III by two descriptive
snapshots of the legal profession, the first during apartheid and the sec-
ond in the post-apartheid era. It then reviews, in Part IV, the relevant
literature on large law firms and the economics of discrimination as a
prelude to discussing Wilkins and Gulati's germinal work on race in elite
law firms in the United States. In Part V, it returns to a fuller discussion
of South Africa's commercial law firms. It discusses both the forces driv-
ing racial integration in this elite legal sector, as well as how firms are
responding with their hiring and training efforts. Finally, in Part VI, it
theorizes why these firms are failing to achieve integration and how they
Lawyers]; David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996) [hereinafter
Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?]. The lack of integration of blacks
into elite law firms in the United States is well documented. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Law
Firms Are Slow in Promoting Minority Lawyers to Partnerships, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at
A 1, available at http://www.nytimes.cort/2001/08/07/business/07LAW.html (minority lawyers
accounted for only 3.4% of all U.S. law firm partners in 2000); Jeffrey Ghannam, Making
Diversity Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2001, at 58; Alan Jenkins, Losing the Race, AM. LAW., Oct.
2001, at 90 (story of Cleary, Gottlieb's hiring of 30 African-American associates between
1989 and 1996, of whom none remain with the firm); Wendall Lagrand, Getting There,
Staying There, NAT'L B. Ass'N MAG., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 28 (commenting on black attrition
from predominantly white firms); James Podgers, Losing Numbers: Poor Retention Bogs
Down Law Firms' Diversity Efforts, A.B.A. J., July 2000, at 90 (ABA convened a gathering of
leading legal professionals to discuss diversity issues facing law firms).
U.S. scholars have also considered the relative career trajectories and success of black and
white law graduates. See Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Prac-
tice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 395 (2000); Richard 0.
Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: Answers to Methodological Que-
ries, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 585 (2000).
Scholarship on race and the legal profession in other countries is quite rare. One recent ef-
fort studies race in relation to the legal professions in Great Britain and Australia. Sumitra
Vignaendra, "Black" and "Asian" Lawyers in Britain and Australia: One Researcher's Trou-
blesome Questions and Observations, presented at Law and Society Association Conference,
Budapest, Hungary (July 4-7, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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are able to survive in the current market without it, thus articulating a
theory of efficient discrimination.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF 20TH CENTURY SOUTH AFRICA
Except for genuinely progressive persons ... no one acknowl-
edges race. No one will speak critically of pre-1994. It is as if by
ignoring it, they can pretend it never happened.
-Colored male attorney12
Historical and social context has everything to do with the current
state of the South African legal profession. Today's prevailing social and
political values have been shaped by a variety of historical factors, in-
cluding periods of colonialism, imperialism, and the subsequent system
of apartheid. 3 The Afrikaans word for "apartness,' ' 4 apartheid was the
dominant political and social institution of the second half of 20th cen-
tury South Africa.'" Pursuant to apartheid, the government pursued a
policy of "separate development" for whites and blacks.' 6
Apartheid's history and legacy tell tragic tales of the oppression of
the black majority population of South Africa. Under apartheid, State
policy sought to deny the black majority democratic and individual
human rights through an array of laws. Quintessential apartheid laws
included those that classified every South African citizen according to
12. Interview No. 54, in Johannesburg, S. Aft. (Mar. 16, 1999) (29-year-old colored male)
(transcript on file with author).
13. For example, even before apartheid, Europeans in South Africa had replaced African
political property relations and imposed colonial governance on the African majority. KLUG,
supra note 6, at 37. For a discussion of the legal legacy of the colonial, imperial, and apartheid
eras, see KLUG, supra note 6, at ch. 2.
14. THE 21ST CENTURY WEBSTER'S POCKET ENCYCLOPEDIA 106-07 (rev. ed. 2000) (list-
ing "apartness" as the English equivalent for the Afrikaans word "Apartheid").
15. For excellent discussions of the South Africa's transition from apartheid to democ-
racy, see PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE: THE END OF APARTHEID AND THE
BIRTH OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1997); KLUG, supra note 6.
16. A key aspect of this separate development was the establishment of so-called home-
lands:
The homeland policy formed the very foundation of the scheme known as Grand
Apartheid. Black Africans, or Bantus, as they were called by whites throughout
much of the era, were to live apart from other South Africans. The scheme envi-
sioned all blacks as citizens of independent homelands, or Bantustans, based upon
tribal groups. Once a Bantustan achieved independence, its tribe members would
officially become citizens of the homeland rather than citizens of the Republic of
South Africa. Four homelands were made independent: Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and
Bophuthatswana. Others resisted independence and the scheme eventually faltered.
BROUN, supra note 3, at 69 (citing an interview with Justice Moloto).
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race, 7 limited the day-to-day movement as well as longer term migration
of blacks," separated family members from one another, 9 dictated
blacks' educational and employment opportunities," and outlawed
political organizations.2' At one point during apartheid, sixty percent of
the nation's laws involved race in one way or another.22 The result was
socio-political, economic, and cultural deprivation for blacks, which
comprised between eighty-five and ninety percent of the country's
population of forty million during the latter years of apartheid.23 Whites
represented little more than one-tenth of the population but controlled
the vast majority of the country's wealth, by some estimates as much as
ninety percent of it.24 While there has been progress toward redistribution
of wealth during the post-apartheid period, the socio-economic disparity
between whites and persons of color continues to be enormous.25
17. Population Registration Act 30 of 1950.
18. See ABEL, supra note 6, at 22-65 (discussing the South African pass laws).
19. Id.
20. Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953.
21. Phillip E Iya, Legal Education for Democracy and Human Rights in the New South
Africa with Lessons from the LegalAid Movement, 12 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 211,212 (1988);
ABEL, supra note 6, at 17, 21 (speaking of the unbanning of all previously banned political
organizations in 1990, including the International Defence and Aid Fund, which had financed
anti-apartheid litigation).
22. See, e.g., Iya, supra note 6, at 311-12; see also KLUG, supra note 6, at 33-36 (noting
that courts could not challenge or strike lown these race-based laws made by Parliament). The
S. Aft. Inst. on Race Relations described the apartheid-era separation of races in this 1974
statement:
Discrimination is at the very heart of our society. It governs every facet of our lives
from the cradle to the grave-and even beyond, since even our cemeteries are ra-
cially segregated. It is enforced where we live, where we work, where we play,
where we learn, where we go when sick, and on the transport we use. Not only does
government condone it; it systematically pursues it, preaches it, practices it, and en-
forces it. It is enshrined in our constitution, written into our laws, and enforced by
our courts.
South African Institute of Race Relations, An Alternative to the Equality Bill (Nov. 18, 1999),
at http://www.pmg.org.za/equality/SAIRR.htm (internal quotes omitted) (quoting John Kane-
Berman, Director) (last visited May 9, 2002); see also Principal Laws Affecting Race Rela-
tions 1909 to 1948, at http://home.pix.za/el/e129/laws.htm (last visited May 9, 2002).
23. See Statistics South Africa, 2.6 Population Group by Province (Percentages), at
http://www.statssa.govemment.za/relatedlnverseSites/census96/HTMJCIB/Population/26.htm (last
visited May 9, 2002). Other sources dated 2000 showed blacks constituting 88% of the country's
43.5 million population. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2001, at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sf.html (last visited May 8, 2002). In 1989,
of a total population of 36.6 million, Africans were 75.2%; Asians, 2.6%; Coloreds, 8.6%; and
Whites 13.6%. S. AFR. INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS 1989/90, at 35 (Carole
Cooper et al. eds., 1990).
24. Bob Drogin, Ending Apartheid at Work, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at Al.
25. In South Africa, the share of personal income earned by whites fell from 71% in 1970
to 54% in 1990; the Africans' share rose from 20% in 1970 to 33% in 1990. This gap-
narrowing trend continues through today. John Grimond, Africa's Great Black Hope, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2001, at 71.
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This half-century of accelerated oppression under apartheid was fol-
lowed by its rather sudden dismantling and accompanying
transformation to majority rule. The scheme of apartheid, largely institu-
tionalized after World War II, began to unravel in the late 1980s and into
the early 1990s. Nelson Mandela was released from his prison home on
Robben Island in 1990 and elected President in the nation's first democ-
ratic elections in April 1994.26 As part of this transition to majority rule,
South Africa became a constitutional democracy, a republic in which a
written constitution became the supreme law of the land, complete with
a constitutional court to interpret it."
South Africa at the turn of the 21st century is a country awash in
transformation-or at least in rhetoric about "transformation" "empow-
erment," and the "new dispensation" Almost a decade on, the phrase
"the new South Africa" still rolls off the tongues of politicians and pri-
vate citizens alike and appears frequently in newspaper headlines. The
socio-economic empowerment of previously disadvantaged persons is
one aspect of the transformation which has received a great deal of atten-
tion. 8  While the government forcefully articulates commercial
The gap in South Africa is, for example, much wider than in the United States.
In the [United States], the median income of black families ($28,602) in 1997 was
only 61% of the median for white families. The gap in part reflects the much
smaller percentage of black (47%) than of white (81%) families maintained by mar-
ried couples. Among married couple families, the gap is much smaller: the median
income of black families ($45,372) was 87% of that for white families ($52,098).
This represents a substantial gain since 1967 when the median income of black-
married couple families was 68% of the median for comparable white families.
Cassandra Cantave & Roderick Harrison, Joint Center for Political & Economic Studies, Joint
Center DataBank (Aug. 1999), at http://www.jointcenter.org/DB/factsheet/famincm.htm (copy
on file with author).
While progress toward wealth redistribution in South Africa has been made since the end
of apartheid, some have criticized the African National Congress (ANC) for the slow pace of
redistribution. See generally Stephanie R. Nicolas, Privatizing South Africa's Industries: the
Law and Economics of a New Socialist Utopia, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 721 (1999) (not-
ing that the ANC's goals in privatization are to maximize social welfare and to reduce the
current wealth disparity by creating a competitive market economy).
26. See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 538 (1994).
27. See generally KLUG, supra note 6, at 139-59 (discussing the transformation to a con-
stitutional democracy as an aspect of apartheid's end).
28. See Ferial Haffajee, Fast-Tracking Black Economic Empowerment, FIN. MAIL, Jan.
28, 2000, at 36 (discussing that state procurement plays an important part in the development
of a "black bourgeoisie"), available at http://www.fm.co.za/00/0l28/currents/bcurr.htm (copy
on file with. author); Tami Sokuti, Dep't of Pub. Works, S. Afr., Integrating Public Sector
Procurement and Transparency: The South African Experience (discussing how public sector
procurement can make a critical contribution to the transformation and democratization of
South African society), at http://www.ippa.org.hk/download/TamiSokuto-paper.doc (copy on
file with author); see also Drusilla Menaker, Bringing Racial Fairness to S. African Economy
to Prove Difficult, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1994, at 5A (reporting that the
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arguments in support of a racially integrated labor force,29 post-apartheid
South Africa's workforce remains widely segregated. 30 The statistics are
telling: persons of color make up almost seventy-nine percent of the
economically active population in South Africa, 3' but as of mid-1990,
they held only sixteen percent of management positions there.32 Further,
in 1999 whites received seventy-four percent of all management promo-
tions and fifty-four percent of all skilled promotions.33 While black men
were most targeted for recruitment into commerce; forty-six percent of
managerial positions still went to white men. 34 As of early 2001, ninety-
government implicitly holds threats of mandatory quotas over private business as the new
government's trump card to force corporate action).
29. See User Guide to Employment Equity Act (2000), at http://www.labour.gov.za/
docs/legislation/eea/guide-sec0l.html (copy on file with author).
30. See Drogin, supra note 24, at A 1; Adrienne Roberts, Hellfor Blacks Too?, FIN. MAIL,
Feb. 21, 1997, at 18. In addition, a 1997 study indicated that almost 25% of South Africa's
black university graduates were jobless in 1997, while almost 98% of white graduates had
found work. Swapna Prabhakaran, Black Graduates Fail to Find Work, ELECTRONIC MAIL &
GUARDIAN, Dec. 23, 1997, at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97dec2/23dec-graduate.html
(copy on file with author). A U.N. Human Development 2000 Study found that since 1994,
South Africans had been absorbed into the economy at these rates: white males 68%, white
females 44%, black males 35%, and black females 22%. Itumeleng Mahabane, Rethinking
Affirmative Action, FIN. MAIL, Feb. 2, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fin. Mail File.
31. See Membathisi Mdladlana, Minister of Labour, Address at Media Launch of Chapter
Three of the Employment Equity Act (Nov. 23, 1999), at http://www.workinfo.comlfnc/
Sub_for_legres/Data/Equity/SpeechChpt3.html (copy on file with author).
32. Advertising, banking, mining, and research remained the most racially exclusive sec-
tors in the economy with more than 90% of managers being white, according to a report by
Cape Town University Graduate School of Business. Cape Town Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus.,
Breakwater Monitor Report, July, 1999. The report itself is unavailable online, although a
summary is available from Daily News Bulletin and S.A. Editorial Comment (Sept. 17, 1999),
at http://www.docuweb.calSouthAfrica/news/990921.html (last visited May 5, 2002). The
Breakwater Monitor Report, which evaluated progress on the implementation of employment
equity from 1997 to July 1999, found that white males continued to dominate senior manage-
ment positions while the percentage of blacks moving into management positions had
increased only 2% in the past 3 years. These results emerged from a survey conducted over a
3-year period among 186 companies across 17 key sectors. The percentage of Africans in
management positions increased from 6.18% in 1997 to 8.49% in 1999. The inclusion of col-
oreds and Indians would raise this 1999 figure to 15.58%, which represents a 3% increase
from 1997. Seventy percent of management positions are held by white males. White employ-
ees still receive 73% of management promotions while 66% of new management recruits are
white, with 46% being male. Of the 73% of white managerial promotions, 55% were white
males while 24% of managerial promotions involved women. Only 5% involved black
women. The sectors that recorded the highest rate of promotions for blacks in managerial
positions were fast-moving consumable goods, financial services, media, and mining. Id.
33. See id.
34. The problem is one of gender, as well as race. Men of all races hold 83% of manage-
ment positions. Id. As one South African jurist expressed her perception of the problem of
gender discrimination relative to that of race discrimination, "[i]n 20 years, gender will be the
issue. After all, patriarchy is the thing we [South African cultures] all share." Interview No. 30,
in Johannesburg, S. Aft. (Mar. 19, 1999) (white female) (transcript on file with author).
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five percent of the companies listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange
were white-owned 5
In spite of this continuing socioeconomic and professional disparity,
there has been relatively little public discussion of the racial composition
of the elite vocations. Even in the midst of the rhetoric around
transformation and empowerment following the end of apartheid, the
Mandela government, which lasted from 1994 to 1999, neither engaged
in nor fostered much explicit discussion of race.3 6 The relative scarcity of
race talk was probably attributable to several factors, one being
Mandela's role as a conciliator and another being the African National
Congress's (ANC) long-standing "non-racialist" party line. Because the
ANC had long advocated a color-blind society-one in which race
would not be a basis for governing37-much of the political rhetoric
35. Robert Gentle, Level Playing Fields Still Far Away, Bus. DAY, Jan. 19, 2001 (noting
that 80% of supervisory management in South Africa was still white), at http://
www.bday.co.za/bday/content/directl,3523,775490-6078-0,00.html (copy on file with au-
thor).
36. As John Kane-Berman, Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, said
shortly after Mandela's election, "There isn't a subject more taboo in this country than talking
about affirmative action in racial terms." Drogin, supra note 24, at AI0; see also Grimond,
supra note 25, at 74 (noting the then-recent claim that "South Africa had become a 'rainbow
nation' with a non-racial future before it' and that prominent blacks such as Mandela and
Archbishop Tutu, who had every reason to hold a grudge, appeared not to be holding one).
37. The African National Congress (ANC) was founded as the South African Native Na-
tional Congress in 1912, but did not become particularly effective until the 1940s when it
moved away from its ethnic roots and toward a policy of non-racialism. PHILLIP VAN NIEKERK
& BARBARA LUDMAN, A-Z OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS 1999: THE ESSENTIAL HANDBOOK 2
(1999). This transformation generated allies in colored, Indian, and white political organiza-
tions who allied with the ANC against the then-racist policies of the South African
government. Id. This attitude about race is embodied in the expression "rainbow nation" the
widely embraced and celebrated expression of the nation's post-apartheid character, a proud
proclamation of what South Africa has become. See, e.g., Grimond, supra note 25, at 74. The
design of the new South African flag, first displayed on April 27, 1994, following the coun-
try's first post-apartheid democratic elections, has been widely interpreted as representative of
the rainbow nation idea. The central design of the flag begins as a "V" and joins in the center,
extending as a single horizontal band to the outer edge, representing the convergence of di-
verse elements in South African Society, united in the road ahead. See Univ. of S. Afr., Int'l
Soc'y for Music Educ., The Rainbow Nation (displaying the image and discussing its mean-
ing), at http://www.unisa.ac.za/isme/flag.html.
In his autobiography, Nelson Mandela refers to the struggle for a democratic, nonracial
South Africa, and the need to persuade white South Africans that the new South Africa would
be a better place for all. He writes,
I knew that people expected me to harbor anger toward whites. But I had none. In
prison, my anger toward whites decreased, but my hatred for the system grew. I
wanted South Africa to see that I loved even my enemies while I hated the system
that turned us against one another ... I wanted to impress upon the reporters the
critical role of whites in any new dispensation. I have tried never to lose sight of
this. We did not want to destroy the country before we freed it, and to drive the
whites away would devastate the nation.
MANDELA, supra note 26, at 495.
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under the Mandela government implicitly ignored the race component of
the country's history, as well as its significance for the future. The
rhetoric was less oriented around governing and policymaking in
response to the country's history of racial oppression and more about
responding to the needs of "historically disadvantaged" communities and
individuals.38 As one young lawyer observed, "In the post-1994 South
Africa, only a brave few are willing to talk about race, even among
blacks. If you raise issues of race, you are seen as a trouble-maker,
taking us back to the old SA [South Africa], and we don't want to go
there."39
In part as a consequence of the political expedience of downplaying
race following the end of apartheid, statistical data on race are some-
times more scarce now than they were during that era. Many institutions,
including the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) and its composite
provincial organizations, the statutory body that governs the attorneys'
profession,4 have avoided tracking the race of their members because the
new South Africa is "color blind," and to keep records according to race,
I reminded people again and again that the liberation struggle was not a battle
against any one group or color, but a fight against a system of repression. At every
opportunity, I said all South Africans must now unite and join hands and say we are
one country, one nation, one people, marching together into the future.
Id. at 540.
38. See Grimond, supra note 25, at 14; Ford, supra note 3, at 1964 & n.40 (noting that
early documents discussed affirmative action in terms of previously disadvantaged persons,
rather than in terms of race). Since Thabo Mbeki's election as president in 1999, however, the
talk has reverted to more open discussions of race. Mr. Mbeki habitually speaks of South
Africa as two nations, one rich and white, the other poor and black. News Releases, S. Afr.
Inst. of Race Relations, Racism: Three Into One Won't Go (Aug. 25, 2000) (calling this the
"re-racialisation" of politics and arguing that the colorblind ideal of the "rainbow nation" is
being undermined by a new conception of racism wherein race-neutral policies
are seen as having a disparate impact on blacks), at http://www.sairr.org.za/wsc/
pstory.htx?storylD=176. The South African Institute of Race Relations is among the institu-
tions that have criticized what it calls the "new racism" and called for a return to the "colour
blind ideal" that founded the 1994 Constitution. See also News Releases, S. Afr. Inst. of Race
Relations, New Concepts of Racial Discrimination (Sept. 14, 2000) (stating that an absence of
"racist laws," such as the Employment Equity Act, and the presence of colorblindness are
needed for a society free of racism), at http://www.sairr.org.za/wsc/pstory.htx?storylD=171.
39. Interview No. 59, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 16, 1999) (African female) (tran-
script on file with author). Indeed, when race has been made an issue in South African politics,
it has been met with complaint from certain liberal sectors, including the Institute of Race
Relations. "'Skin colour politics; are ruining race relations and threatening our rights and
liberties-it's time we threw them overboard and became a mature society.'" Themba Sono,
Time to Graduate, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM, 4th Q. 1998, at http://www.sairr.org.za/
publications.pub/fof/1998q4/time.htm (copy on file with author).
40. Attorneys Act 53 of 1979; see also Constitution of the Law Society of South Africa
(LSSA) (incorporating the statutory bodies formed in the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 into an
"umbrella organization"), at http://www.lssa.org.za/home.asp?page=constitutionhtm.
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they say, would be "racist."' By the same token, the study of race rela-
tions in South Africa did not proliferate greatly in the first few years
after apartheid's end.42
Nevertheless, the few post-apartheid studies that are being com-
pleted and published now, a decade on, tend to confirm widely held
racial biases among South Africans. A 2001 survey of the Institute for
Justice and Reconciliation, for example, concluded that most Africans
and most whites do not understand each other.4 Among specific findings
41. See Jonathan Klaaren, Income Stratification and the Legal Profession in South Africa
7 n. 10 (1997) (noting the claim by some provincial law societies that keeping race-based sta-
tistics would be a "continuation of apartheid") (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
Du Bois, infra note 111 (Transvaal Law Society declined to provide race breakdown of its
members, calling itself "colourblind").
To give another example, the University of Witwatersrand Faculty of Law does not keep
records of the race of its graduates. Interview with Andrew Skeen, Dean of the Faculty of Law,
Oliver Schreiner School of Law, University of Witwatersrand, in Johannesburg, S. Aft. (Mar.
17, 1999) (transcript on file with author). The law faculty also does not track the job place-
ments of its graduates. Id. The University of Cape Town, on the other hand, has kept some
records on the race of its students and their job placements through the Unit on Race and
Gender's Joining the Profession project. See Barclay, supra note 7.
42. As one South African scholar has observed,
No country on earth has been associated in the popular imagination with the con-
cept of race to the same extent as South Africa has. And yet, there must be very few
places in which the academic community has actively neglected the study of race to
the same extent as in South Africa.
RAN GREENSTEIN, IDENTITY, RACE, HISTORY: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PAN-AFRICAN CON-
TEXT 5 (U. Witwatersrand Inst. Advanced Soc. Research, Working Paper No. 405, 1996). But
see Wits Inst. for Soc. & Econ. Research, Research Plan (discussing research projects to inves-
tigate effects of South Africa's transition from apartheid), at http://www.wits.ac.za/
wiser.reseach.htm (last visited May 30, 2002); Gibson & Macdonald, supra note 3, at 3 (sur-
veying more than 3,700 South Africans to determine if the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission had successfully achieved reconciliation among the races), discussed in Racist
Perceptions Cloud Rainbow Nation Poll, THE INDEPENDENT, June 1, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Foreign News File (copy on file with author).
43. See Gibson & Macdonald, supra note 3. Somewhat surprisingly, only about one-third
of blacks believed whites were racist, whereas 22% were uncertain and 43% believed they
were not. Id. at 34. More than half the Africans found it hard to imagine ever being friends
with a white person. Nineteen percent of whites found it hard to imagine being friends with a
black. Id. at 35. Less than 25% of blacks said they understand the customs or ways of whites.
Id. at 33.
The South African Institute on Race Relations has also measured reactions based on race
among all South Africans. See S. Aft. Inst. of Race Relations, supra note 3, at http://
www.saiir.org.za/publications/pub/ff/200112/rainbow.htm. Among other findings were that
Africans, and to a lesser extent coloreds and Indians, were more likely than whites to perceive
racism in employment settings. Id. Interestingly, whites and Indians were more likely than
Africans or coloreds to see racism in affirmative action and "empowerment policy." Id.; see
also S. Afr. Human Rights Comm'n, The National Conference on Racism-Final Report
(noting that "The TRC process helped South Africans to reflect on the fact that South Africans
(sic) society was so deeply divided for so long and atrocities committed in order to entrench
inequality"), at http://www.sahrc.org.za/concept-paper.html (Dec. 18, 2000); N. Rhoodie & C.
de Kock, Aspects of Group Relations (Whites, Indians, Coloureds), National Research
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of that study were that fifty-six percent of Africans believed whites were
untrustworthy, while one third of whites believed the same of Africans."
Fifty-six percent of Africans were willing to ascribe selfish motives to
whites, while forty-five percent of whites held similar views of Africans.
A startling eighty-one percent of Africans indicated that they had never
eaten a meal with a white person.4 ' Finally, just under one-fifth of each
racial grouping opined that South Africa would be a better place without
46the other race.
As reflected in the Constitution, the aspirations of the new South
Africa include healing the divisions of the past and establishing a society
based on democratic values, social justice, and fundamental human
rights.47 Transformation of the legal profession is considered a crucial
part of South Africa's greater political, social, and economic transforma-
tion. Indeed, one of the explicit goals of Justice Vision 2000, a 1994
policy document of the South African Department of Justice, is to make
the legal profession more representative of South African society.
48
Accomplishing that goal requires an understanding of what has been
achieved so far and what obstacles preclude or further delay progress
toward integration. One of the aims of this project is to analyze whether,
to what extent, and how well the country's commercial law firms are
achieving the goals of the "new South Africa." As a prelude to doing so,
various aspects of the legal profession, both during and following apart-
heid, are considered below.
Foundation, at http://www.nrf.ac.za/sada/ahdetails.asp?catalognumber=0063 (last visited June
11,2002).
44. Gibson & MacDonald, supra note 3, at 33.
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id. at 35.
47. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) pmbl.; see also Ford, supra note 3, at 1967-68.
48. Justice Vision 2000 identified two primary challenges: The first was to make the legal
profession more representative of South African society, and the second was to make the legal
profession more accessible to the general public. See Policy Unit, Dep't of Justice & Constitu-
tional Dev., Discussion Paper on Transformation of the Legal Profession § I (Sept. 1999), at
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/discuss/legaltransform.html [hereinafter Transformation of
the Legal Profession]. The Department of Justice's response to perceived needs is the Legal
Practice Bill. Id.
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II. THE LEGAL PROFESSION DURING APARTHEID
The law profession is the most conservative profession in the
country .... If one group of people can never feign ignorance
about this country's past, it is the lawyers.
-African partner in a newly established
black commercial law firm49
To appreciate the changes to the legal profession that have occurred
during South Africa's past decade of democratization requires a sense of
what the profession was like during apartheid. While there have long
been black lawyers in South Africa-Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo
had a practice in Johannesburg serving the needs of the black community
in the 1950s'°-the profession was always strictly divided along race
lines during apartheid.
Segregation based on race within the South African legal profession
is not the only long-standing division in the profession, however. A leg-
acy of the British colonial period, the South African profession features
two groups of legal practitioners: attorneys and advocates. Paralleling
the divide between solicitors and barristers in the English system, South
African attorneys interface with clients while South African advocates
appear in court.' Both qualifications have long required a period of pro-
fessional training, an apprenticeship of sorts, with an established
practitioner. Those becoming attorneys are required to complete a two-
year period as a "candidate attorney," formerly called "articles of clerk-
ship" and still often referred to in the legal community as "serving
articles.0 2 Attorneys, who practice in the elite commercial firms that are
49. Interview No. 34, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 16, 1999) (3 1-year-old African male)
(transcript on file with author).
50. Mandela and Tambo practiced in the central business district of Johannesburg in con-
travention of the pass laws. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 6, at 22-65. Theirs was the first
African law firm in South African history. WALDMEIR, supra note 15, at 87.
5 1. Advocates are considered a "referral profession:' meaning they neither have direct
contact with the public nor handle client funds. Rather, their role is to appear before the courts
and make arguments based on instructions received from attorneys. Historically, the educa-
tional requirements for becoming an advocate have been slightly higher than those for
becoming an attorney: becoming an advocate required the graduate LLB degree, whereas
becoming an attorney required only the undergraduate B.Proc. Transformation of the Legal
Profession, supra note 48, § 2(i).
52. Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 88. For those becoming advocates, this is called a pupil-
age and typically lasts four months. BROUN, supra note 3, at 249. Attorneys must also pass an
exam in order to be admitted to practice. Transformation of the Legal Profession, supra note
48, § 2(i). Advocates and attorneys have long been the only practitioners recognized by stat-
ute. Other practitioners, such as corporate counsel, public prosecutors, paralegals, notaries,
and conveyancers, while important to the practice of law, have not historically been recog-
nized or regulated by law. This lack of recognition and regulation has come to be seen as
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the subject of this study, are the legal practitioners with which this pro-
ject is concerned.
While official records documenting the race and gender of those
graduating from law schools and entering the legal profession were kept
neither during apartheid nor now, unofficial demographic data help pro-
vide a fuller picture of the profession. The earliest available figures are
from the early 1960s, when persons of color collectively represented one
and one-half percent of attorneys. To be more specific, of some 3,000
attorneys who were practicing in 1962, Africans numbered thirteen, In-
dians twenty-six, and coloreds five.53 By the mid-1980s, almost ten
percent of the country's 6,500 attorneys were persons of color,14 and by
1994, the percentage had risen to fourteen percent, with 1,178 persons of
color among the country's 8,368 attorneys.5 These statistics are illus-
trated in Figure A.
problematic in the case of paralegals because the population of paralegals, in sharp contrast to
that of attorneys and advocates, is representative of South African society in terms of race and
gender. Moreover, paralegals are also often the only legal practitioners available in disadvan-
taged communities. See id. § 3.3.
Attorneys have long been viewed as having the lower status of the two groups of legal
practitioners, and they have historically been more highly regulated than advocates. See
Justice K.R. McCall, Response to Discussion Paper on Transformation of the Legal Profession
(Nov. 1999) (describing attorneys' work in an almost disparaging tone), at http://
www.doj.gov.za/docs/info/responsenov99.htm (copy on file with author). Attorneys are
required to be members of a law society, whereas membership in the Bar Council is voluntary
for advocates. Transformation of the Legal Profession, supra note 48, § 2(j); see also Taryn
Lamberti, Launch of Law Society 'Is a Giant Step Forward', Bus. DAY, Mar. 17, 1998,
available at http://www.bday.co.za/98/0317/news/nl7.htm (copy on file with author)
[hereinafter Lamberti, Launch of Law Society]; Taryn Lamberti, Legal Practitioners to Debate
Overhaul of Governing Structures, Bus. DAY, Oct. 9, 1998, available at http://
www.bday.co.za/98/1009/news/n29.htrn (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Lamberti,
Legal Practitioners to Debate].
53. ABEL, supra note 6, at 19. Thus, 99.5% of all attorneys were white. Only two non-
whites achieved the distinction of becoming senior advocates. The legal profession is not the
only one in which blacks are grossly underrepresented, as about 200 blacks are among the
country's 20,000 chartered accountanis. E-mail from Theresa A. Hammond, Ernst & Young
Research Fellow in Diversity Studies, Boston College, to Lisa R. Pruitt (Feb. 1, 2002,
16:58:16 EST) (on file with author). Hammond is the author of A White-Collar Profession:
African American Certified Public Accountants Since 1921 (2002), and she is currently
researching race and the South African accounting profession.
54. ABEL, supra note 6, at 19.
55. Steven Keeva, Defending the Revolution, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at 50, 53 (noting also
that of 1,253 advocates in 1994, 95 were persons of color; among senior advocates, all but 5
were white).
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FIGURE A
RACE OF SOUTH AFRICAN ATTORNEYS 1962-1998
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The provision of separate educational opportunities for blacks and
whites was an important feature of apartheid. The so-called "Bantu edu-
cation scheme" was aimed at maintaining blacks as an underclass. 6
Based on the belief that blacks had no place in South Africa except as
certain forms of labor, curricula for black students were aimed at educat-
ing semi-literate manual laborers and domestic servants, not attorneys or
other professionals.57 As a consequence, few blacks were equipped by
their secondary education for a rigorous university experience," which
was perversely appropriate because the only universities that most blacks
were permitted to attend failed to provide such rigorous training. When
the segregated education scheme was extended to tertiary institutions in
56. BROUN, supra note 3, at 50 (explaining the Bantu Education Act of 1953 as a major
step in the development of Grand Apartheid or "separate development").
57. See generally Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953. Under the Bantu education scheme,
whites were educated in what were called Model C schools, and blacks in lesser-equipped,
lesser-resourced schools following a less advanced curriculum.
58. The South African Institute of Race Relations Annual Race Relations Survey pro-
vides per capita state expenditure figures on black, Indian, and white schools, as well as
teacher-to-pupil ratios. S. AFR. INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1989/90,
at 814-27 (1990). For 1988-1989, the per capita expenditure for the school year for Africans
in white-designated areas was 10.3% of the total, 18.3% for colored students, 30% for Indian
students, and 41.5% for white students. Id. at 795. In addition, the standards for white teachers
were considerably higher than those for black teachers. In white schools, most teachers had a
professional qualification. The minimum qualification for a teacher was a post-standard teach-
ers' certificate or diploma. However, 46% of teachers in African schools (in white-designated
areas only), 29% of teachers in colored schools, and 0.3% of teachers in Indian schools were
not adequately qualified. Id. at 839. For example, in 1988, 6.3% of teachers in African schools
and 1.5% of teachers in colored schools had no professional qualification and had achieved
only a Standard 8 or lower education. Id. at 839, 841.
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1959,'9 the educational experience provided by its so-called "Bush
Colleges"-now referred to as "historically disadvantaged universities,"
or HDUs-was undermined by the lower caliber of staffing and re-
sources.' Frequent strikes, boycotts, and political disruptions fomented
by the students also took their toll.
61
Universities offered a range of degrees in law during apartheid. Like
their white counterparts, the HDUs offered the four-year B.Proc (Bacca-
laures Procurationis) degree, an undergraduate qualification in law
which was the minimum educational requirement for becoming an attor-
ney.6' A few HDUs, like their white counterparts, also offered the
59. Extension, of University Education Act 45 of 1959. Four black universities (Univer-
sity of the North at Turfloop, University of Zululand, University of Boputhatswana, and
University of Transkei), one colored university (University of the Western Cape), and one
Indian university (University of Durban-Westville) were established. MURIEL HORRELL, LAWS
AFFECTING RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 363 (1978). One existing de facto black uni-
versity was transformed into an additional "Bush College" (University of Fort Hare). Id.
60. These universities were staffed primarily by white, Afrikaans-speaking faculty who
reputedly cared little for the students or their possibility of success. BROUN, supra note 3, at
61; LEONARD THOMPSON & ANDREW PRIOR, SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS 113 (1982).
In Daniel Steenkamp's 1987 survey, four participating groups (law faculty deans, candi-
date attorneys, junior attorneys, and senior attorneys) were asked if they agreed or disagreed
with the statement, "The educational standard of law graduates from traditionally white uni-
versities is higher than that of law graduates from traditionally non-white universities."
Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 145. Steenkamp concluded that the "deans" group was neutral,
indicating that they neither strongly agreed nor disagreed with the statement. Id. at 146.
Among the candidate attorney participants, black respondents agreed with the proposition
whereas the non-black response was almost neutral. Id. Eighty-three percent of junior attor-
neys and 76% of senior attorneys agreed with the statement, with no meaningful difference
between black and non-black respondents. Id.
Illustrating the poor education provided to blacks, one attorney interviewed for this study
told of initially not qualifying for university because his matriculation scores-the equivalent
of a final high school exam-were not high enough. Interview No. 21, in Johannesburg, S.
Afr. (June 28, 1999) (30-year-old African male) (transcript on file with author). He noted that
his classes met only 4-5 months each year, and that there were no math or science classes
until the end of the year. Following his matriculation in 1985, he studied at the College of
Education in Tzaneen and then taught for one year in an all-black school in Mpumalanga
province. Id. There, the matriculation success rate was lower than the province-wide average,
which was less than 50%. Id. He noted that there were many disruptions, including books not
being delivered. Id.
61. See generally BROUN, supra note 3, at 61. See also S. AFR. INST. OF RACE RELA-
TIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1993/94, at 692-94 (1994) (stating that "education in black
schools in 1993 was characterized by widespread teacher strikes, pupil boycotts and vio-
lence"); S. AFR. INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1997/98, at 170 (1998)
(stating that various higher education institutions continued to face disruptions in post-
apartheid South Africa, often accompanied by violence); Lewis Machipisa, South Africa:
Affirmative Action Under Threat from Illiteracy, Inter Press Service, Aug. 1, 1995, LEXIS,
News Library, INPRES File (describing the impact of anti-government activism of the apart-
heid era, as school boycotts and protests prevented many African children in South Africa's
townships from acquiring elementary-level educations).
62. § 15(1)(b)(iii) of Attorneys Act 53 of 1979, discussed in Steenkamp, supra note 7, at
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graduate LLB (Baccalaures Legum) degree. Because of their economic
circumstances, however, relatively few blacks studied for the LLB; most
terminated their educations with the B.Proc degree. 63 To the extent that
elite commercial firms preferred candidates with the graduate degree,
this multiple degree scheme was a barrier to black entry.64
The legacy of the Bantu education scheme is proving to be an endur-
ing one, and it continues to influence the face of the legal profession at
the turn of the 21st century, less than a decade after its dismantling.
65
Even in the post-apartheid period, when some whites have begun to at-
tend HDUs and more blacks are attending the traditionally white
universities, large-scale de facto segregation remains. 66 Furthermore, vir-
tually all black attorneys in the prime of their profession were educated
pursuant to the Bantu education scheme, as were the great majority of
junior attorneys of color. As a consequence, most do not compete on a
level playing field with their white counterparts.
Like the disparity in educational opportunities, the requirement of
serving articles has also been considered a bottleneck blocking access to
the profession for many blacks.67 While not facially discriminatory, the
63. In 1994, 58.4% of all candidate attorneys had earned LLB degrees, while only 12.2%
of black candidate attorneys had earned the LLB degree. Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 85. The
LLB took from two to five years to complete. Id. at 77. Students with units from legal course-
work from undergraduate programs (e.g., B.Com, B.Jur) could apply those units toward the
LLB degree, reducing the period of study to as little as two years. Students with no prior legal
course work took up to five years to complete the LLB. Id.
64. Steenkamp offered the following reasons why the holder of an LLB degree had a bet-
ter chance than the holder of a B.Proc degree of obtaining a candidate attorney position: the
surplus of those seeking candidate attorney positions in comparison to the number of positions
available (3,800 law graduates for 1,500 positions in 1994); that the LLB holder is better edu-
cated by virtue of having studied longer at a university; that the LLB holder has the choice of
becoming an advocate or an attorney; that the B.Proc is seen as a "soft option" compared to an
LLB; and, until 1989, only candidate attorneys with the LLB could appear in magistrates'
courts. Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 81.
One attorney told of having the top-tier firm where he did articles call attention to the fact
that he was one of few in the firm without a graduate (LLB) or honors degree. Interview No.
40, in Sandton, S. Afr. (Mar. 20, 2000) (Indian partner in top-tier firm) (transcript on file with
author). He had responded, "'if you put your whites in [an HDU] with all the distractions, see
how they do in their studies.' I said, 'I am not being immodest, but you cannot ignore our past
... my community has had additional challenges. How would [whites] get cum laudes with
the disruptions and inadequate lecturers we had?'" Id.
65. Some respondents to a 2000 study believed that black law graduates of HDUs
"needed additional mentorship and a longer period of articles to compete fairly with their
white counterparts." Others expressed concern that "universities were lowering their entry
requirements to accommodate" historically disadvantaged people, indicating that this would
negatively impact professional standards. Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 10.
66. See, e.g., Barclay, supra note 7, at 2 (whites constituted 57% of the law graduates of
the University of Cape Town in 1998).
67. See Nano Matlala, Programme for the Upliftment of the Black Attorney, 6 AFR. L.
REV., Dec. 1995, at 43, 45-46 (proposing that bonds (loans) be made available to blacks seek-
ing articles in order to enable "Blue Chip White attorneys' firms" to employ them at no
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requirement has been seen as having a disparate impact on people of
color, as well as on white women. 68 For example, difficulties persons of
color and white women have experienced in obtaining articles of clerk-
ship are often attributed to the racism and sexism of admitted attorneys,69
upon whom the opportunity to qualify for admission as an attorney has
expense, thus making it easier for blacks to secure articles); Elvis Hobyana, Letter to the
Editor, Candidate Attorneys Need Conducive Conditions, DE REBUS, Aug. 2001 (suggesting
the low pay for candidate attorneys is an economic hardship which is more challenging
for black, poor, young graduates), at http://www.derebus.org.za/archives/200lAug/letters/
conditions.htm; Krishnan Naidoo, Letter to the Editor, Where Are Your Morals, Principles and
Values, Principals?, DE REBUS, May 2001 (asserting an oversupply of law graduates and an
unequal demand for candidate attorneys to be registered with practicing law firms), at http://
www.derebus.org.za/archives/2001 May/letters/mor.htm.
68. See, e.g., Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 150-5 1. In a written survey, Steenkamp asked
169 candidate attorneys why black law graduates have more difficulty than white graduates
finding articles. Sixty-six respondents said that there were too few black-owned attorney firms
to accommodate the black law graduates. Six respondents stated that white firms prefer white
candidate attorneys. Twenty-six said that black law graduates cannot express themselves ade-
quately in English or Afrikaans; 29 said that the education of black law graduates is inferior to
that of white law graduates; 19 stated white superiority; 6 stated that black firms are not eco-
nomically strong enough to employ candidate attorneys; 5 said white clients prefer white
attorneys. Steenkamp discounted 12 "inconsistent" responses, which he was unable to inter-
pret. Steenkamp also observes that if the race of an employer is the same as that of the
candidate attorney he trains, black attorneys would have to train proportionally more black
candidate attorneys to bring the racial make-up of the attorney population into line with that of
the South African population. Given the small number of black attorneys, "it must be clear
that a bottleneck exists for the training of black attorneys" Id. at 212; see also Iya, supra note
5, at 312 (asserting the majority of black men and women law graduates are unable to find
clerkships and, therefore, never qualify as attorneys); Rethinking Affirmative Action, supra
note 30 (asserting that 90% of white law graduates are able to secure articles, while only 5%
of blacks are able to do so); Justice Kate O'Regan, Producing Competent Graduates: The
Primary Social Responsibility of Law Schools, Address at the Annual Congress of the Society
of Law Teachers of Southern Africa (Jan. 23, 2002) (on file with author) (explaining that de-
spite "an ever-increasing number of black graduates ... there is no doubt that there are many
law graduates who are not finding work"; of 2,500 law graduates in 2000, only 1,848 were
registered as candidate attorneys) [hereinafter O'Regan, Producing Competent Law Gradu-
ates]. Contra Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 11-12 (concluding that as of 2000, there is
no shortage of candidate attorney positions available for any race group).
Several interviews from Kenneth Broun's book also support Steenkamp's assertion that
black principals are in high demand. "[W]hite firms have now opened up to blacks, but the
number of available positions is small compared to the number of lawyers seeking to qualify.
There are so few black attorneys that the opportunities for articles with them is very limited."
BROUN, supra note 3, at 249. lsmael Semenya, director of the Black Lawyers Association
(BLA) Legal Education Centre when Broun interviewed him in 1996, stated, "'The BLA is
now sitting with more than a hundred African law graduates who can't find placement in arti-
cles or in pupillage or even in industry. This is a vital human resource that needs to be
harnessed to empower democracy.'" Id. at 205.
69. See Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 150. Steenkamp discusses his survey of candidate at-
torneys in which 66 of 169 responded that the primary reason black law graduates have greater
difficulty than whites in securing articles of clerkship is that there are "too few black-owned
attorney firms to accommodate the black law graduates." Id.
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typically depended." White attorneys have usually trained white candi-
dates, while black attorneys have trained black candidates. Because
relatively few black attorneys were admitted to practice at any given time
and because an attorney may train only two candidates at a time, the
number of blacks being admitted to practice was naturally limited.7'
70. Currently, those seeking admission may fulfill one year of the two-year candidacy re-
quirement by completing a course called Practical Legal Training though a program of the
Law Society of South Africa. See § 15(l)(b)(iv)(A) of Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. Candidate
Attorneys are required to take one of two practical courses to qualify for admission to the
profession. § 15(l)(b)(iv)(A) of Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. The "short course" is the minimal
formal training that a candidate attorney may choose, comprising two full-time weeks of study
in the beginning of an article year, and three weeks full-time study in the second half of the
year. Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 106-08. This "sandwich model" consists mainly of lectures
and homework, and alternates periods of full-time work in a firm with periods of full-time
study over the course of a year. Id. at 110. In some locations, a part-time course and night
classes are also offered. Id. at 106. The Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 was amended in 1980 to
allow for the temporary absence of a candidate attorney from the workplace so that she could
receive training at a practical school. § I of Attorneys Amendment Act 76 of 1980. The "full-
time law school course" comprises five months of study, and gives a candidate attorney credit
for one year of articles or community service. Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 110. The full-time
course minimizes lecture teaching and groups candidate attorneys together into "firms" that
simulate litigation under the supervision of experienced practitioners. These "firm" simula-
tions are practiced completely with bookkeeping departments as well as managerial tasks. Id.
The Association of Law Societies almost wholly funds formal vocational training in South
Africa. Id. at 108.
The pass rate for candidate attorneys taking the practical examination, which is the final
hurdle before entering the profession, is only 40-50% for those taking it the first time. Id. at
114. However, the pass rate for those who attended full-time Practical Legal Training was
approximately 20% higher than for those who did not. Id. Such additional training frequently
makes an aspiring attorney a more desirable candidate for a final year of articles with a prac-
ticing attorney. Some of the black attorneys interviewed had completed the full-time Practical
Legal Training course, which they believed had made them more marketable when they were
applying to firms to complete their second year of the candidacy requirement. See Interview
No. 29, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (June 22, 1999) (African female) (transcript on file with au-
thor); Interview No. 47, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Mar. 19, 1999) (28-year-old African female
professional assistant) (transcript on file with author) (both noting the benefits of the Practical
Legal Training School, completion of which they believed had helped them obtain one year of
articles); see also Interview with Esme du Plessis, Co-Chairperson of the Law Society of
South Africa, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (June 18, 1999) (lauding the Practical Legal Training course,
which she said admits blacks preferentially over whites) (transcript on file with author). In
addition, some respondents to Mullagee and Kinnes's study found that the School for Practical
Legal Training was perceived to offer graduates a good opportunity to gain practical experi-
ence. Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 11.
71. For example, in 1994, 17% of candidate attorneys were black, but only 10% of
admitted attorneys were black. If one assumes racial alignment between candidates and
principals, there are insufficient principals to train black candidate attorneys, and a backlog of
black candidate attorneys may exist for some time. See Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 152. In
response to this problem, there has been much talk in recent years about shortening the period
of candidacy or eliminating the requirement altogether. See Transformation of the Legal
Profession, supra note 48, at § 3.1.2. Indeed, since 1993, law graduates have had the option of
serving a period of community service in lieu of serving articles. See Cape Town State
Attorney Introduces Candidate Attorney Training Programme, DE REBUS, Mar. 2001, at http://
www.derebus.org.zalarchives/200IMar./news/cpt.htm (discussing a recent program for
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In addition to being saddled with second-rate educations and lim-
ited opportunities for serving articles, black attorneys during apartheid
had severely circumscribed employment opportunities. One dichotomy
U.S. scholars use to classify the roles of lawyers is between those who
serve individual clients, and those who serve institutional clients.72
Black lawyers in South Africa historically served individual clients,
while whites tended to serve institutional clients.73 Indeed, because
blacks generated very little commercial legal work, such work was
scarce for black lawyers and, as a result, black attorneys never gained
significant commercial legal expertise .
candidate attorneys from disadvantaged backgrounds). Community Service is defined as full-
time service at a law clinic or on behalf of the Legal Aid Board. See Steenkamp, supra note 7,
at 102-03 (discussing Attorneys Amendment Act 115 of 1993).
72. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982), discussed in MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNA-
MENT OF LAWYERS I (1991).
73. In fact, the alignment was and is not quite so tidy, as a number of white attorneys in
solo and very small practices serve the needs of farmers and other individual clients in rural
communities. Interview No. 35, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (June 10, 1999) (white male partner); E-
mail from Daniel Steenkamp, supra note 3.
74. Discussing the shortage of skilled black corporate law practitioners, the senior partner
of an elite commercial firm Edward Nathan & Friedland Inc., stated, "Previously, blacks were
largely shut out of the legal system, so skilled corporate law attorneys are now at a premium."
Accountants & Attorneys: A Change of Game, FIN. MAIL, Apr. 23, 1999, at http://
www.fin.co.za/reportl/accadd/main.htm (copy on file with author) [hereinafter A Change of
Game]; see also Matlala, supra note 67. at 43 (noting black attorneys' lack of long-standing
clients and the difficulty they have in attracting institutional clients). Dullah Omar, Justice
Minister under Mandela and Minister of Transport under Mbeki, summarized the situation in a
1996 interview:
We have had very little exposure to areas of law and practice involving company
law, commercial law, or maritime law. Even in the field of property law, blacks have
only recently been meaningfully involved ... Since the passing of the 1913 Land
Act .... black Africans .. . were not allowed to own land in any of the urban areas
of South Africa. Their occupation of land was restricted ... [to] ... the homelands
or Bantustans ... (which constituted 13% of the country.) Since blacks were not al-
lowed to buy property, property transactions, registration of mortgage bonds, all
work relating to property was outside the reach of black practitioners. Coloured and
Indian lawyers were allowed to own land.... Most of us started off doing criminal
work.... Most black lawyers in our country have relied on a criminal practice in
order to survive.... [Miost black lawyers would not have got much work in the
field of administration of estates . . . blacks had nothing to leave to their families
when they died.... Very little [intellectual property] work came to black lawyers.
So we had very restricted experience in legal practice.
BROUN, supra note 3, at 237-38.
Black attorneys have historically been and continue to be-associated with the practice of
criminal defense law. As the Executive Director of the Black Lawyers Association expressed
it, "The market for legal services in the black community is criminal defense." Interview with
Sibusiso Gamede, Executive Director of the Black Lawyers Association, in Johannesburg, S.
Afr. (June 17, 1999) (transcript on file with author); see also Matlala, supra note 67, at 43
(black attorneys have not had the opportunity to be exposed to those areas of practice open to
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Attorney practices during apartheid, as well as now, might be clus-
tered into three tiers, from the smallest to the largest. 75 Eighty percent
of South African attorneys practice in firms with four or fewer partners,
and this has long been the case. 76 Black attorney practices historically
fell into this, the least prestigious of the three clusters. These small
firms, whether black or white, rural or urban, typically served individ-
ual clients, as well as very small commercial enterprises.
A second tier of firms includes those firms ranging in size from
perhaps ten to forty partners, each firm having as many as 100 total fee
earners. While many of these firms have the capacity to perform a wide
range of work for both individual and institutional clients, the bulk of
their work has been commercially oriented, although not necessarily of
a highly sophisticated nature. It has included, for example, the drafting
of leases or contracts, but rarely, if ever, public offerings on the Johan-
nesburg Stock Exchange. These firms typically have very good
reputations for excellence and service. The Pretoria firms specializing
in intellectual property, as well as other boutique firms, fall within this
group. Most such firms have traditionally been overwhelmingly white,
and the majority of their clients have been medium-to-large, white-
owned and managed South African businesses, including banks andinsurnce • 77
insurance companies. While very few blacks have historically been
white firms); Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 14, 17 (black candidate attorneys com-
plained about being expected to do most criminal work coming into their firms; black firms
indicated that they felt restricted to criminal work).
Steenkamp's research also indicates that criminal defense is an important aspect of black
law practices. Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 156. His survey results indicated that practices with
black clients rated criminal law as the most important legal field,, while practices with white
clients rated it as least important. Id. Firms with black clients rated commercial law work 5 on
a scale of I to 8, with I being the most important type of work; firms with white clients rated
commercial law work 2 on the same scale. Id. at 154; see also Research Report: A Mere
'Snapshot' into the Profession, DE REBUS, Jan. 2001, (reporting that the general view among
practitioners who responded to a survey commissioned by the Law Society of South Africa
was that "black practitioners were better suited to criminal law work, and not areas such as
commercial law because [blacks] could communicate better with the accused"), at http://
www.derebus.org.za/archives/200 I Jan/news/research.htm (copy on file with author).
75. While this taxonomy is my creation, it facilitates easier reference to the types of prac-
tices that existed during apartheid and which remain during the post-apartheid period.
76. Interview with Esme du Plessis, supra note 71. According to a 1997 report, the vast
majority of 5,000 attorneys firms in South Africa have fewer than 10 partners; see also A
Tough Nut to Crack, THE LAWYER, Sept. 2, 1997, at 16.
77. Some predominantly white firms, usually those also engaged in some human rights
work, represented black institutional clients during apartheid. Cheadle, Thompson & Haysom,
one of the more liberal white firms, represented the labor unions, most of whose members
were black. See Interview No. 50, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 18, 1999) (40-year-old white
female partner) (transcript on file with author); Interview No. 59, supra note 39. Bell, Dewar
& Hall represented the Bafokeng tribe in matters related-to their platinum rights. See Interview
No. 23, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 15, 1999) (Indian male former candidate attorney)
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involved in such practices, a growing number of all-black or predomi-
nantly-black mid-sized firms have been established in the post-
apartheid period. These black firms are now vying for the type of
commercial work associated with firms of this size.7"
In the top echelon, both during the latter years of apartheid and now,
are the firms sometimes referred to in the Johannesburg legal community
as the "top-five" or "big five."79 In greater Johannesburg, 0 these firms
included Bowman Gilfillan, Inc.,8 Edward Nathan & Friedland,8' Deneys
(transcript on file with author); Interview No. 49, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar 20, 1999) (26-
year-old African female candidate attorney) (transcript on file with author).
78. Black firms in Gauteng Province include: in greater Johannesburg, Matlala, Inc., Ma-
kume & Associates, and Chuene, Kwinana, Motsatse, Inc.; in Pretoria and greater Gauteng,
Maponya, Inc., Seriti, Mavundla & Partners, Phalene Tan & Ramapuputla, and Maluleke
Msimang & Associates. World Legal Forum, Guide to Law Firms in South Africa, at
http://www.worldlegalforum.co.uk/southafrica/surveys/19991001886.html (last visited June
30, 2001) (on file with author). Interestingly, this web site lists black firms separately under
the heading "Guide to Black Law Firms in South Africa." The list does not purport to be ex-
haustive and does not list, for example, the notable firm of Moseneke & Partners. See A
Change of Game, supra note 74 (noting the establishment of black commercial firms, a phe-
nomenon driven in part by government policy of favoring joint ventures between black firms
and white ones).
79. See A Change of Game, supra note 74 (referring to greater Johannesburg's "major five or
six [law] firms" indicating that these firms are seen as a sector apart from other attorney practices);
see also A Tough Nut to Crack, supra note 76 (observing that "an elite top tier of four or five South
African firms has developed").
80. Greater Johannesburg includes the northern suburb of Sandton, where several of the larger
firms are now based, having abandoned their central Johannesburg locations when crime became a
greater problem there. See generally Ferial Haffajee, Jo'burg-"To Let," ELECTRONIC MAIL &
GUARDIAN, Mar. 27, 1997 (discussing how crime is driving "big money" out of Johannesburg, the
city which in 1991 contributed almost one-third to the country's gross domestic product and noting
that Sandton is now seen as the commercial heart of the city because mining houses, law firms,
insurance companies, and accounting firms are moving north to Sandton, often following their cli-
ents who started the migration to the northern suburbs). See also Grimond, supra note 25, at 70
(noting that only a few large companies are still headquartered in Johannesburg's city center, where
property values have collapsed).
81. The firm was formed through the merger of Findlay & Tait, established in 1889, Bowman
Gilfillan Hayman Godfrey, established in 1902, and John & Kemick, established in 1923. As of
September 9, 2001, the firm described itself as being one of the largest law firms in South Africa
with 60 partners. See Bowman Gilfillan, Inc., About Us: Our Background, at http:/
www.bowman.co.za (last visited Sept. 9, 2001) (on file with author).
82. Edward Nathan & Friedland, About Us, at http://www.enf.co.za.html (last visited Oct. 9,
1999) (on file with author). As of October 1, 1999, the firm reported having 97 fee earners, includ-
ing 33 partners. World Legal Forum, Guide to Law Firms in South Africa, supra note 78, at
http://www.worldlegalforum.co.uk/southafrica/surveys/19991001887.html. Edward Nathan &
Friedland (ENF) was purchased by Nedcor Investment Bank (NIB) in 1999 and is no longer a law
firm, but rather is a division of Nedbank. NIB paid ZAR 400 million ($65.5 million) for ENF's
corporate and commercial law business and merged them with NIB's corporate advisory services.
Regarding the overlap of merchant banks' activity and lawyers' merger and acquisition activity, ENF
senior partner Michael Katz said South Africa's brain drain and skill shortage meant that Edward
Nathan was finding many of its best people were leaving immediately following their articles to join
merchant banks, where they could get higher salaries and share incentives. Hilary Joffe & Made-
leine van Niekerk, NIB to Buy Stake in Leading Law Firm: New Trend Expected with Banks and
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Reitz, Inc., 3 Webber Wentzel Bowens,84 and Werksmans, Inc. 5 Two other
firms, Bell, Dewar & Hall and Hofmeyr Herbstein & Gihwala, Inc., have
also sometimes been considered to be on par with these top five in terms
of prestige and client base, but they are somewhat smaller.8 6 Each of the
five largest firms has more than forty partners, including salaried and
equity, and more than 100 total professional staff. In addition to the
partners, non-partner professional staff in these firms include candidate
attorneys and professional assistants. Professional assistants are
equivalent to associates in U.S. law firms. Professional staff may also
include a tier of attorneys called associates or associate partners, which
typically refers to salaried partners. Several of these well-established
firms are more than a century old, and collectively they have long
monopolized the sophisticated commercial legal work of large national,
Professional Service Groups Merging, Bus. DAY, Oct. 29, 1999. As one attorney noted, "If you've
spent two years doing corporate work at Edward Nathan, you're considered tops" and are likely to
be recruited away by investment banks. Hilary Joffe, Law Firms' Partners Sell Practice to Match
Rivals, Bus. DAY, Nov. 1, 1999.
In the second deal of its kind, merchant bank Brait SA acquired Rabin, van den Berg & Pelko-
witz, a Johannesburg boutique commercial law firm specializing in competition law and some
transactional work. Partner Derek Rabin commented, "In the South African context, it is one thing
to attract good lawyers and another to keep them. Being part of the corporate world gives them an
added incentive" Belinda Anderson, Brait Buys Highly Rated Law.Firm, Bus. DAY, May 11,2000.
83. As of September 2001, the firm had total staff of 359, including 175 total professional
staff, with 69 directors in three offices. Deneys Reitz, Home, at http://
www.deneysreitz.co.za.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2001) (on file with author). In 1999, they reported
149 fee earners, including 58 partners. World Legal Forum, supra note 78, at
http://www.worldlegalforum.co.uk/southafrica/surveys/l9991001887.html.
84. Webber Wentzel Bowens (WWB) was established in 1868. As of September 2001, the
firm had more than 150 professionals. Webber Wentzel Bowens, About WWB: General Infor-
mation, at http://www.wwb.co.za.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2001) (on file with author).
85. The firm was established in 1917. As of September 2001, the firm boasted "a profes-
sional staff complement of over 90, including 42 partners." Werkmans Attorneys, Home, at
http://www.werksmans.co.za.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2001) (on file with author). As of Oc-
tober 1, 1999, the firm reported 68 fee earners, including 34 partners. World Legal Forum,
supra note 78, at http://www.worldlegalforum.co.uk/southafrica/surveys/19991001887.html.
86. In 2001, Bell, Dewar & Hall had 24 partners, four associate partners, and II profes-
sional assistants. HORTOR's LEGAL DIARY 167 (98th ed. 2001). In 1999, the firm reported 20
partners out of 41 fee earners. World Legal Forum, supra note 78, at http://www/
worldlegalforum.co.uk/southafrica/surveys/19991001887.html. In 1999, Bell, Dewar & Hall
became a member of Landwell, an international network of law firms associated with Price
Waterhouse Coopers. Hilary Joffe, Bell, Dewar & Hall lies Up with 'Big Five' Firm, Bus.
DAY, Nov. 23, 1999 (describing the firm's work as 80% corporate and commercial, with 15%
of that for multinational clients and stating the firm then had 17 partners and 44 other "fee
earners").
As of January 2002, Hofmeyr Herbstein's website indicated that it had 24 partners, 6 as-
sociate partners, 5 professional assistants, and 2 consultants. See Attorneys Hofmeyr Herbstein
& Gihwala, Our Attorneys, at http://www.hofmeyr.com.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2002) (on file
with author).
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multinational, and international clients. 7 It is firms in these two tiers of
larger firms, especially those in the top tier, with which this project is
primarily concerned.
The demographics of the larger, more prestigious commercial law
firms reveals a situation even less representative of the country's popula-
tion than the demographic profile of the broader profession. While these
firms have long employed black messengers, mail clerks, and tea ladies,
black secretaries and clerical staff have been more rare, and black pro-
fessionals nearly non-existent.
As early as the late 1970s, some of the largest elite commercial firms
tended to hire one or two black candidate attorneys each year.88 These
firms apparently hired blacks more as a public interest gesture to provide
training and some commercial law exposure to a few blacks rather than a
serious effort to retain these blacks as professionals who would ascend to
partnership. Nevertheless, a few persons of color did become salaried
partners during that period, although apparently never equity partners.89
Those few who remained long enough to become salaried partners in
these firms sometimes left shortly after achieving that milestone. Thus,
there has always been a revolving-door phenomenon in South Africa's
large commercial firms, with a few blacks moving in, but then quickly
out, of these elite, white institutions.
87. The exception is intellectual property work, which is dominated by specialist or bou-
tique intellectual property firms. Most of these firms are based in Pretoria in order to be close
to the Patents and Trademark Office. These firms include, most prominently, Adams & Adams
and Spoor & Fisher. Adams & Adams, Home, at http://www.adamsadams.co.za.htm
(last visited July 1, 2002) (on file with author); Spoor & Fisher, Home, at http://
wwwspoor.co.za.html (last visited July 1, 2002) (on file with author). By some accounts,
Adams & Adams is as large as several of the top five firms. In 1999, one of the partners indi-
cated that the firm had 51 partners, although it is not clear how many of these were salaried
partners, or "associates" and how many were equity partners. See infra note 217 and accom-
panying text. In addition to its intellectual property practice, Adams & Adams also has a large
general commercial practice.
88. See BROUN, supra note 3, at 151. Most such blacks had been educated at Bush Col-
leges rather than at white universities. The "black ghetto" in these firms in terms of practice
area, has been labor law. The firms apparently found it helpful to have black faces to assist
with or handle labor matters for their management-side clients. See, e.g., Interview No. 44, in
Johannesburg, S. Afr. (June 30, 1999) (40-year-old African male former partner in top-tier
firm had studied law at the University of the North) (transcript on file with author); Interview
No. 40, supra note 64,
89. Interview with Sibusiso Gamede, supra note 74.
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1II. THE POST-APARTHEID LEGAL PROFESSION
[These prominent black lawyers] were not well known to us
then, to me. That's what has been wonderful-getting to know
people who've worked, lived in this country for decades. That
colleagues like us would have had no contact with each other is
the greatest tragedy of our house.
-Esme du Plessis, former Co-Chairperson
of the Law Society of South Africa 0
A decade after the dismantling of apartheid began and more than
seven years after the first democratic elections, the impact of apartheid's
systems and structures on all aspects of South African civil society, in-
cluding the legal profession, still looms large. The demographic
composition of the profession is not at all reflective of the population's
diversity, nor do the profession's governance structures fully reflect the
egalitarian values of the "new South Africa." While steps are being taken
to address this problem, whether these interventions have been or will be
successful is less clear.
A. Reform in Legal Education and
Regulation of the Profession
White colleagues used to joke about the life expectancy of a black
attorney being 10 years-so many get struck from the rolls in less
time ... Some [black attorneys] have been deviant. Many others
have been victimized unfairly: Any grouping in a society like ours,
with a charged racial situation-if all governance of the profes-
sion is dominated by a particular group, that is a problem.
-African male attorney9'
90. Interview with Esme du Plessis, supra note 71. Du Plessis was also the first female
patent attorney in South Africa.
91. Interview No. 20, in Kempton Park, S. Afr. (June 28, 1999) (58-year-old African male
partner in black attorneys firm) (transcript on file with author). Indeed, the issue of black at-
torneys being struck from the rolls for using clients' funds being held in trust has been the
subject of much discussion among attorneys in South Africa in recent years. Some see it as
unfair persecution of black practitioners; others see it as strictly a matter of ethics. See Inter-
view with Sibusiso Gamade, supra note 74 (calling for a moratorium on striking black
attorneys from the rolls); Interview No. 64, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 18, 1999) (African
male partner in predominantly white firm disagreeing with the proposed moratorium on strik-
ing black attorneys from the rolls and arguing that using client funds is not a race issue, but
rather is about right and wrong) (transcript on file with author); Interview No. 40, supra note
64 (scoffing at the argument that it is racist to strike black attorneys from the rolls when they
misuse client funds). One white attorney offered this explanation for the phenonomen of black
attorneys more often running afoul of regulations regarding the handling of client funds: "I
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Since the end of apartheid, the South African government has made
changes to both legal education and the governance of the legal profes-
sion. It has done so in an effort to lower the barriers to participation
these arenas had presented to persons of color. Legal education programs
were harmonized in 1997, eliminating the B.Proc degree. Every law fac-
ulty in the country now offers a four-year undergraduate LLB degree
following a standardized curriculum. Although many faculties still offer
advanced degrees in law, including the LLM, the LLB is now the only
degree required to become an attorney or advocate. 92
Legislation has also been aimed at achieving racial integration of the
governance structures of the profession. The Law Society of South Af-
rica was launched in 1998, replacing the Association of Law Societies
and bringing together attorneys previously divided along provincial
lines.93 The new division of responsibilities between the national body
and regional bodies was finalized in the Attorneys Amendment Act 115
of 1998. Two organizations, the Black Lawyers Association (BLA),94 and
suspect that given often inferior training [black attorneys] applied what was referred to as
'struggle accounting' and had neither the applied knowledge nor the resources to run proper
books and resultantly fell foul of (inadvertently or negligently) dipping into trust monies." E-
mail from Daniel Steenkamp, supra note 3.
92. Qualifications of Legal Practitioners Amendment Act of 1997; see also
TRANSFORMING SOUTH AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES (Philip F. Iya et al. eds., 2000). Formerly, a
prospective attorney needed only to have a B.Proc degree, or the equivalent, to be admitted as
an attorney. § 15(l)(b)(iii) of Attorneys Act 53 of 1979, discussed in Steenkamp, supra note 7,
at 70; see also Reform Advocated in Admission Examination Assessment Methods, DEREBUS,
Feb. 10, 1999 (explaining Durban advocate Robin Palmer's recommendations for revising the
attorney's admission examination), at http://www.derebus.org.za/scripts/derebus-s.pl?ID
=34734&index= 19902_news&hitlD=O&original=yes.
93. The new organization, comprised of representatives from the four provincial law so-
cieties, the Black Lawyers' Association (BLA), and the National Association of Democratic
Lawyers (Nadel) ended the existence of the Association of Law Societies, which had func-
tioned as a national umbrella body for 60 years. Lamberti, Launch of Law Society, supra note
52. Until 1998, South African attorneys were organized into four provincial law societies, one
representing each of the four apartheid-era provinces: Transvaal, Natal, Cape, and the Orange
Free State. Together, these formed the Association of Law Societies. These institutions were
rarely progressive. Indeed, the Transvaal Law Society moved to strike Nelson Mandela from
the roll of admitted attorneys--effectively to disbar him-when he was convicted of organiz-
ing a defiance campaign in 1952. Transvaal v. Mandela 1954 (3) SA 102(T); ABEL, supra note
6, at 19.
In May 2001, the Law Society of Transvaal changed its name to the Law Society of the
Northern Provinces. Transvaal Law Society Changes Name to Law Society of Northern
Provinces, DE REBUS, Apr. 2001, at http://www.derebus.org.za/archives/200lApr/news/
namechange.htm (on file with author). The renaming was driven by the same considerations
that drove the renaming of the Transvaal Province following the 1994 elections. See supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
94. The organization was founded in 1977. ABEL, supra note 6, at 21.
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the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (Nadel),9' previously
existed as activist organizations associated, respectively, with the black
consciousness movement96 and the ANC idea of "non-racialism."97 These
organizations played no role, however, in regulating the profession. Fol-
lowing the 1998 amendments, the Law Society's rules now permit BLA
and Nadel Council members to be appointed to the Law Society Board
and to provincial councils. 98 Responding to these changes and to pressure
from the Minister of Justice, each of the four provincial law societies
reconstituted its governing counsel to reflect the agreed representation
scheme: half provincial, one-quarter BLA, and one-quarter Nadel.99 Dis-
ciplinary structures and power remain with the provincial law
societies. "o
In addition, policy makers and politicians have proposed and
debated various other changes to the regulation of the profession that
would ease access and increase black representation in its governance
structures.10 The Department of Justice's comprehensive response to
perceived needs is a much-debated Legal Practice Bill, which for almost
two years has been working its way through numerous rounds of
95. The organization was founded in 1983. Interview with Mohammed Husain, Vice
President of Nadel, in Sandton, S. Afr. (Mar. 20, 2000) (transcript on file with author).
96. Black consciousness, also referred to as "black power" is the ideology associated
with Steven Biko and with the Azanian People's organization. See, e.g., STEVE BIKO, I WRITE
WHAT I LIKE (Aelred Stubbs C.R. ed., 1978). Its tenets include recognition of black agency,
non-reliance upon whites and black resistance to assimilation into white culture. One slogan
associated with it is "black man you're on your own." Interview No. 27, in Johannesburg, S.
Afr. (June 21, 1999) (28-year-old African male attorney) (transcript on file with author); see
also BOUNDS OF POSSIBILITY: THE LEGACY OF STEVE BIKO AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS (N.
Barney Pityana et al. eds., 1991); GAIL M. GERHART, BLACK POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF AN IDEOLOGY (1978).
97. ABEL, supra note 6, at 21; see also supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing non-racialism).
98. See Taryn Lamberti, Legal Practitioners to Debate, supra note 52.
99. New Representative Law Society Councils Take the Reins, DEREBUS, Jan. 1999, at
http://www.derebus.org.zalarchives/l1999Jan/news/reins.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2002);
Transvaal Law Society Opts to Revamp Council, Bus. DAY, Jan. 18, 1999 (of the other ten
members on the council, four were from Gauteng and two each from Northern, Northwest,
and Mpumalanga provinces), available at http://www.bday.co.za/99/0118news/nl2htm (on
file with author); see also Philip van der Merwe & Barbara Whittle, All For One and One For
All, DEREBUS, Apr. 1998, at http://www.derebus.org.za/archives/1998Apr/news/all4one.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2002).
100. §§ 71-74, 76 of Attorneys Act 53 of 1979.
101. Among other reforms, the ANC has pressed for compulsory community service for
law graduates, a policy aimed at alleviating the great shortage of legal aid providers. See ANC
Wants Student Services for a Year, Bus. DAY, Nov. 25, 1997, available at http://
www.bday.co.za/97/1125/news/n8.htm (copy on file with author); see also Taryn Lamberti,
Shake-Up of Legal Aid Welcomed, Bus. DAY, July 15, 1998, available at http://
www.bday.co.za/98/0715/news/n 13.htm (on file with author). Such a change could shorten or
replace the two-year period, working as a candidate attorney and/or attending Practical Legal
Training School, which is now required of those seeking admission to the profession. Id.
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drafting, toward parliamentary consideration. The Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs initially formed a task team of various
stakeholders, including members of the LSSA, to draft the bill.'0 2 After
serious differences emerged between LSSA and other task force
members, LSSA representatives decided to draft their own bill to present
to the Minister alongside that of the majority task force.' 3 The two
drafts, submitted to the minister of Justice in April 2002,'14 agree on a
formerly divisive point: the new Legal Practice Council will include
members from outside the legal profession.' 5 They also agree that once
an attorney is admitted and enrolled by the Legal Practice Council, she
will be able to practice as either an attorney or an advocate; similarly,
advocates will be able to work as attorneys.' °6 Among remaining
differences between the two bills are the LSSA's narrower definition of
"legal practice," which would preclude non-attorneys and non-advocates
from providing legal services.' 7 The Minister of Justice will choose




We are changing our complexion from lily white to light brown.
-White male partner on the transformation of his firm' 9
While attorneys of color made up only fourteen percent of all attor-
neys in 1994, the year of the first democratic elections,"0 they have since
been moving into the profession at a remarkable pace. Unofficial statis-
102. Legal Practice Bill Historical Agreement, DE REBUS, Mar. 25, 2002, available at
http://www.derebus.org.za/current/between/press.htm (on file with author).
103. Id.
104. The Bills Are in the Minister's Court, DE REBUS, May 2002, available at
http://www.derebus.org.za/scripts/derebus-s.pi?ID=96336+index=currentnews+hitlD=4 (on
file with author).
105. LSSA Gears Up for Battle of the Bills, Mar. 2002, at http://www.lssa.org.za/
mainbills.asp (on file with author). One contentious issue has been the permissibility and
regulation of attorneys in multi-disciplinary practices. The task force draft would allow regis-
tered companies with shareholders who are not legal practitioners so long as company
directors are legal practitioners. The task force would also recognize paralegals and permit
them to charge fees for their services. Id.
106. Id. However, those initially admitted as advocates will be required to pass an ex-




109. Interview No. 13, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 24, 2000) (white male partner in
top-tier firm) (transcript on file with author).
110. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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tics indicate in 1998 approximately one-quarter of all South African at-
torneys were persons of color, ' representing a seventy-nine percent
increase in only four years. In the same year, blacks comprised forty-
seven percent of candidate attorneys."12 Three of the four provinces were
able to report the race of the vast majority of their admitted attorneys
that year, as well as that of all their candidate attorneys. With the provin-
cial bodies for the Free State, Natal, and the Cape of Good Hope"3
reporting, 5,097 of a total of 5,881 admitted attorneys indicated their
race. Of these 5,097 attorneys, eight percent were African, three and one-
half percent were colored, fourteen and one-half percent were Indian,
and seventy-four percent were white." 4 This is illustrated in Figure B.
FIGURE B







With The Orange Free State, Natal, and Cape of Good Hope Law Societies reporting
Among a total of 1,657 candidate attorneys registered with these three
provincial law societies, twenty-one percent were African, seven percent
were colored, nineteen percent were Indian, and fifty-three percent were
white.'"5 Figure C illustrates these statistics.
11l. With the Free State, Natal, and Cape of Good Hope Law Societies reporting, 1,328
blacks and 3,764 whites comprised the total 5,092 admitted attorneys. Francis du Bois, Law,
Race & Gender Research Unit: Law Societies (1998) (unpublished study, on file with author).
Seven hundred eighty blacks and 877 whites comprised the 1,657 candidate attorneys. Id.
Figures for the Transvaal Law Society were unavailable.
112. Id.
113. This included the current Western, Eastern, and Northern Cape Provinces, as well as
the former homelands of Transkei and Ciskei. Id.
114. Id. The Indians numbered 399; Africans, 174; coloreds, 738; and whites, 3,764. Id.
115. Id. Specifically, 344 were African, 118 were colored, 318 were Indian, and 877
were white. Id.
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FIGURE C








With The Orange Free State, Natal, and
Cape of Good Hope Law Societies reporting
The former Transvaal Law Society, renamed the Law Society of the
Northern Provinces in 2001,"6 refused to provide a breakdown of race
and gender among its admitted attorneys, stating that the organization
was "colour blind" and did not keep such records."
7
While the LSSA publicly acknowledged in 1999 the need for reli-
able statistics about race and gender in the legal profession," 8 it has yet
to begin keeping records documenting the race of admitted attorneys."9
Nevertheless, the Law Society in 1999 sanctioned a study of the South
African attorneys' profession. The stated objectives of the study were to
provide statistical information on race and gender for law students and
law firms and to investigate obstacles white females and persons of color
face in the profession.2 In fact, due to a poor response rate from firms
surveyed, one can draw from it few reliable conclusions about the
116. Id. The Society governs 6,980 attorneys in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, the Northwest,
and Northern Provinces. See also Transvaal Law Society Changes Name, supra note 93 (dis-
cussing the renaming of the Transvaal Law Society in 2001).
117. Id.
118. Questions of Race and Gender: Should You Take Offense, DE REBUS, July 2000, at
http://www.derebus.org.za/archives/200OJuly/editorial/questions.htm (on file with author).
119. As of September 2000, the LSSA was unable to provide any breakdown of admitted
attorneys according to race, but did provide a gender breakdown. Telephone Interview with
Gail Mason, LSSA (Sept. 26, 2000). Of the more than 13,000 admitted attorneys in the coun-
try, 2,946 were female, 10,323 were male. Id.
120. Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 3.
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placement and experiences of attorneys of color. Released in January
2001, the study indicates a considerable growth in the number of blacks
graduating from South African universities with law degrees. Persons of
color had comprised only 24.6% of law graduates from South African
universities in 1991; that number had nearly doubled by 1998, to
45.8%.l2 Furthermore, contrary to widespread expectations, the study
tentatively concluded that all law graduates, whatever their race, were
being absorbed into candidate attorney positions, indicating that obtain-
ing articles is no longer a significant impediment to access to the legal
profession for persons of color.'
2
C. Elite Law Firms
How can you have a country where seventy percent of the peo-
ple are black and not have one black law partner? You know, and
law is not rocket science, frankly.
-African attorney at a black commercial firm'
23
The taxonomy of attorney practices during the apartheid period
remains relevant in the post-apartheid legal marketplace. The sizes of
most firms have remained relatively stable since the end of apartheid.
The five largest apartheid-era firms in Johannesburg remained the five
largest until 1999, when Edward Nathan & Friedland was purchased by
Nedcor Investment Bank.'24 The attorneys at Edward Nathan & Friedland
now market themselves as consultants and corporate law advisers,' 2 but
121. Id. at 8-9.
122. According to the report, "The rate of absorption into the profession [by securing ar-
ticles] appears to come significantly close to the rate of graduates." Id. at 12. If Mullagee and
Kinnes' conclusion is indeed accurate, then many black attorneys must be completing their
candidate attorney periods with white attorneys as principals, contrary to indications that this
was uncommon in the past. In addition, many are likely fulfilling part of their qualification by
attending the Practical Legal Training School. See supra note 70.
123. Interview No. 56, in Sandton, S. Afr. (June 28, 1999) (black male professional as-
sistant) (transcript on file with author).
124. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the attorneys at Edward
Nathan & Friedland are no longer subject to regulation by the Law Society of South Africa.
However, in connection with the firm of Knowles Husain, Inc., they do help train candidate
attorneys. While the majority of attorneys with Edward Nathan & Friedland at the time of the
purchase joined ENF (Pty) Ltd., the new entity, the former firm's litigators became Knowles
Husain, Inc. See Edward Nathan & Friedland, About Us, supra note 82, at http://
www.enf.co.za/about-us/about-us.asp.
125. The firm's website says: "Not practicing as attorneys has enabled the firm to estab-
lish a multidisciplinary professional practice, combining its legal expertise with other
corporate advisory services to provide its clients with truly unique and highly specialized
solutions." Edward Nathan & Friedland, About Us, supra note 82, at http://www.enf.co.za/
about-us/about-us.asp.
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nevertheless still compete with the top-tier attorneys' firms for a limited
but highly lucrative segment of business. In 1995, the international law
firm of White & Case opened an office in Johannesburg.'26 It remains the
only non-indigenous firm in the country. 27 While the firm's professional
staff includes primarily South African trained attorneys, the managing
partner is a white U.S. attorney. The firm competes for only a limited
range of sophisticated commercial legal work, primarily public finance
and privatization work.'28
Information on the numbers of attorneys of color now practicing in
the two tiers of larger law firms is even more limited than the informa-
tion available on practitioners of color generally. While the data are
incomplete and unofficial, two things are clear: more persons of color
than ever are being hired by these firms, but very few in proportion to the
increased intake are remaining with the firms. 29 According to the re-
search of Justice Kate O'Regan of the South African Constitutional
Court, in 1997, eighty-eight percent of the partners in large law firms
were white males, six and one-half percent white females, 5.2% males of
color, and a tiny 0.29%-one quarter of one percent-females of color.30
A survey of recent Hortor's Legal Diary listings'3 ' indicates that none of
126. See White & Case LLP, Johannesburg Office of White & Case LLP, at http://
www.whitecase.com/johannesburg-.office.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with
author).
127. Bowman Gilfillan, Inc., does have an office in London, however. See Bowman Gil-
fillan, Inc., Contact Details, at http://www.bowman.co.za/contacts.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2001) (on file with author).
128. Interview with Ron Goodman, Managing Partner, White & Case, Johannesburg, in
Sandton, S. Afr. (Apr. 6, 2000) (white male) (transcript on file with author); see also White &
Case, Johannesburg Office of White & Case LLP (stating that the Johannesburg office of the
firm does work in capital markets, sovereign representation in privatization, infrastructure, and
project finance, and banking and foreign exchange controls, mergers and acquisitions, and
joint ventures, among other areas), supra note 126, at http://www.whitecase.com/
johannesburg-office.html.
129. See generally Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 15; A Change of Game, supra
note 74 (stating that many black attorneys who take their clerkships in large white firms, leave
shortly after becoming admitted attorneys). One black attorney reported that a partner in an
elite white firm suggested the firm is "training blacks to go be in black firms." Interview No.
21, supra note 60.
130. Justice Kate O'Regan, Partners in Large Law Firms (1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). According to research by the Unit on Law, Race & Gender at the
University of Cape Town, in 1998, 70.5% of all partners in attorneys firms in the Cape and
Natal were white, while 29.5% were black. Du Bois, supra note 11, at Table 2.
131. Hortor's Legal Diary is an annual publication that lists all legal practitioners and
law firms in South Africa. It is the South African equivalent of Martindale Hubbell. Indeed,
some provincial law societies share their membership lists with Hortor's. Klaaren, supra note
41, at 5. In their Hortor's entries, firms typically list all partners and associate partners. Profes-
sional assistants are listed by some firms, but candidate attorneys are not listed. Some law
firms also indicate the universities attended and degrees held by each of their attorneys.
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the large, elite Gauteng firms currently has more than ten percent black
professional staff, and typically no firm, even among Johannesburg's
largest firms with upwards of fifty partners each, has had more than five
partners of color at any given time.' Some firms have only one or two
non-white partners, and many of those are quite junior because they have
been elevated to the ranks of partnership only in the post-apartheid pe-
riod. Of these younger black partners, many were educated at
historically white universities; which became more racially mixed in the
late 1980s and early 1990s.' 3 According to the BLA, as of July 1999 no
African partner in any of these elite firms was an equity partner; rather,
While these lists are not completely precise indicators of the numbers of partners and pro-
fessional assistants in each firm, or of the ethnicity of the persons in the firm, they are the best
information available for most firms. Galanter and Palay similarly noted they were forced to
resort to use of Martindale-Hubbell listings in order to determine the size of each of the law
firms they studied. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 72, at 22 nn. 14-15. They noted that the
chronic problem with this source was in the underreporting of associates in these listings. Id.
It is often possible to determine, based on a given attorney's name, if the attorney is
African or Indian. African attorneys with both African and European-given names typically
include both in their Hortor's listing. However, one can less often discern the ethnicity of an
attorney with a name that is not obviously African or Indian. Indeed, the fact that many col-
ored persons, especially from the former Cape province, have Afrikaans surnames undermines
any effort to determine ethnicity on that basis.
132. HORTOR's LEGAL DIARY 162-89, 198-215, 242-45 (96th ed. 1999) (Johannesburg,
Pretoria, and Sandton listings, respectively); HORTOR'S LEGAL DIARY 166-92, 204-24, 251-
55 (97th ed. 2000) (Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Sandton listings, respectively).
133. See, e.g., Interview No. 26, in Sandton, S. Afr. (Mar. 18, 1999) (African partner had
completed his LLB at the University of Witwatersrand (Wits) in 1994, following his comple-
tion of an undergraduate degree at another white university) (transcript on file with author);
Interview No. 42, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (July 12, 1999) (3 1-year-old African male partner at
top-tier firm had completed his B.A. at Wits in 1988 and his LLB there in 1991) (transcript on
file with author).
Of course, many black candidate attorneys and professional assistants are also graduates
of historically white universities. See, e.g., Interview No. 23, supra note 77 (Indian male fin-
ished degree at Witwatersrand in 1990); Interview No. 25, in Sandton, S. Afr. (June 21, 1999)
(30-year-old colored male finished his LLB at Witwatersrand in 1992) (transcript on file with
author); Interview No. 33, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (June 15, 1999) (African male said he was
one of ten black LLB students at the University of Witwatersrand between 1991 and 1994)
(transcript on file with author); Interview No. 34, supra note 49 (African man who finished
law degree at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1992); Interview No. 53, in Johannes-
burg, S. Afr. (Mar. 16, 1999) (Indian female graduate of University of Natal, Durban)
(transcript on file with author); Interview No. 68, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 16, 1999)
(black female graduate of the University of Cape Town) (transcript on file with author). In
addition, many young black lawyers have degrees from both an HDU and a historically white
university. See Interview No. 14, supra note 3 (28-year-old African female professional assis-
tant had earned a B.Proc at the University of the North in 1993 and an LLB at the University
of Natal-Durban in 1995); Interview No. 22, in Sandton, S. Afr. (June 18, 1999) (African fe-
male professional assistant had earned B.Proc at Durban-Westville in 1993 and LLB at the
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg in 1995) (transcript on file with author); Interview No.
27, supra note 96 (B.Proc from University of the North, LLB at Witwatersrand); Interview No.
29, supra note 71 (B.Proc at University of the North, LLB at University of Pretoria).
Spring 2002]
Michigan Journal of International Law
all black partners were merely salaried. 3 4 Since then, at least one African
attorney has become an equity partner in one of the big five firms.'
Based on these statistics, one might conclude blacks are not grossly
underrepresented in the junior ranks of the profession to which they have
only in the past decade enjoyed greater access. Considerable progress
has been made toward bringing persons of color into the profession so
that while they represent only twenty-six percent of all attorneys, they
make up almost half of the most junior level of the South African attor-
neys' profession. 1
3 6
With regard to candidate attorneys in elite commercial law firms,
there, too, one might argue that persons of color are not grossly under-
represented in light of the country's recent history. Most top-tier
commercial firms have, over the past decade, easily tripled or quadru-
pled the number of black candidate attorneys they employ. They have
moved from a situation where fewer than ten percent of their candidate
attorneys were black to a situation where as many as twenty-five to forty
percent are persons of color.'37 Thus, while representation of persons of
color commensurate with the general population would be eighty-five to
ninety percent, representation in proportion to the number of young
blacks completing law degrees would be about fifty percent. In fact, a
few of the most elite firms are not far from that fifty percent mark in
their candidate attorney hiring.
Beyond the candidate attorney ranks, the number of attorneys of
color who are professional assistants in elite commercial firms drops off
rather sharply, to half or less than half the number of candidate attorneys
of color in those same firms. Thus, while a given large firm might have
eight to ten candidate attorneys of color, only about half of them choose
to stay once they are admitted attorneys. Further, many of the small
number of persons of color who stay on as professional assistants remain
for only a short time following their admission to practice.'38 The severe
134. Interview with Sibusiso Gamede, supra note 74.
135. E-mails from Interviewee No. 67 to Lisa R. Pruitt (May 16, 2001, 12:47:07 EST),
(June 22, 2001, 13:33:34 PST) (black female former professional assistant at top-tier firm
noting that firm had named its first black equity partner in 2000) (on file with author).
136. See supra text accompanying note 111.
137. See Interview No. 26, supra note 133 (of approximately 20 candidate attorneys en-
tering his top-tier firm when he did, 3 were black and 2 of those made partner; the other left to
go into a parastatal, a state-owned entity); Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (indicating that of 5
candidate attorneys, 2 were African, I was Indian, and 2 were white); E-mail from Interviewee
No. 67, supra note 135 (describing her class of 17 candidate attorneys who began their candi-
date attorney stints at top-tier firm in 1998, as including 3 Africans and 2 "colored/Indian" for
a total of 5 blacks); see also Employment Equity Report filed by Werksmans Attorneys, infra
note 237; Employment Equity Report filed by Edward Nathan & Friedland, infra note 237.
138. For some of the same reasons firms have difficulty retaining blacks, they also have
difficulty retaining white attorneys. Still, firms generally are better able to retain white attor-
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attrition at this early juncture is probably attributable to several factors,
including the natural decision point represented by the completion of
one's candidacy, and the concurrent admission to practice as an attorney.
Once admitted as an attorney, a South African can explore many profes-
sional options outside of law firms, just as a lawyer in the United States
can after passing a bar examination and being admitted to a state bar.
The higher one looks in the hierarchy of South Africa's elite com-
mercial firms, however, the fewer attorneys of color one sees and the less
disputable the conclusion they are underrepresented at that level. Few
would disagree, for example, that persons of color are seriously under-
represented in partnership ranks of these law firms. Even looking solely
at the ranks of junior partners, of those who have ascended to the ranks
of partnership in the post-apartheid period only one or two partners of
color have been appointed and retained at each of the largest firms.
These figures are appallingly low not only in relation to the country's
broader racial profile, but also in proportion to the number of persons of
color who have been graduating from South Africa's more prestigious
law faculties in the period since apartheid ended and who, during that
period, could have ascended to partnership had they chosen to persevere
with large firm practice and had their firms, in turn, offered them part-
nership.
The composite portrayal of South African commercial law firms,
then, is of a still largely segregated labor market. While South Africa's
elite firms are hiring and training more and more candidate attorneys of
color each year, they are retaining only a small number of these in the
intermediate ranks of attorneys and even fewer as partners.'39
In order to understand why South Africa's elite law firms are not
achieving integration in the post-apartheid period, it is necessary to
consider their organizational structure, as well as the historical and social
context within which they have evolved into their present form. In short,
these firms are characterized by close partner to non-partner ratios,
apprentice-type training, very low candidate attorney salaries, marginally
better professional assistant salaries, and relatively low overall
neys than they are attorneys of color. See infra note 226 and accompanying text (comparing
some public sector and private sector salary information and discussing the challenges law
firms face in retaining young attorneys).
139. One media account characterized the phenomenon this way:
Corporate law firms seem to suffer ... when it comes to losing trained black staff.
No sooner have they served their clerkship and passed their attorney's admission
examination, than they are courted, either by commerce or industry or government.
In the end, the pressure put on them and the stunning offers made, no less than the
glittering career prospects that appear to be on tap, are frequently impossible to ig-
nore.
A Change of Game, supra note 74.
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profitability.4 0 While the compensation schemes of these firms formerly
were often lock step, they are increasingly linking to individual
productivity the salaries they pay attorneys-from professional assistants
up through partners.'4 ' These organizational characteristics, which are
discussed in greater detail below, are highly relevant to why these firms
are not achieving integration in post-apartheid South Africa. The
emergence of predominantly black commercial law firms is similarly
relevant to the persistence of segregation in the South African legal
market.
140. By relatively low profitability, the implicit comparison is to these firms' U.S. coun-
terparts, which are highly profitable. While no information on partner salaries in South Africa
is publicly available, a few indications of partner salaries were given in the interviews. One
white female professional assistant on the verge of partnership with a boutique firm believed
that the senior partners in her firm were earning.ZAR 2 million ($327,000) annually, while
junior partners were earning about ZAR 600,000 ($98,000). Interview No. 75, in Plettenburg
Bay, S. Afr. (Mar. 30, 2000) (white female professional assistant at white boutique) (transcript
on file with author). Others implied that partners in top-tier firms earn between ZAR I million
and ZAR 3 million annually. Interview No. 13, supra note 109 (alluding to the fact that part-
ners in a firm such as his earn ZAR I million ($164,400) a year); Interview No. 43, in
Sandton, S. Aft. (July 9, 1999) (28-year-old African professional assistant implying that part-
ners in his firm earn ZAR 3 million ($490,000) annually) (transcript on file with author). One
white partner in a prestigious boutique firm estimated that very few partners in South African
law firms earn more than ZAR 800,000 ($130,718) a year. Interview No. 55, supra note 3. The
average exchange rate for 1999 was ZAR 6.12 to $1. See Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
Foreign Exchange Rate: South Africa, at http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/exchange/exsfus (on
file with author).
A study by the Human Sciences Research Council indicates that in 1994, the median sal-
ary of a law firm partner or other self-employed attorney in South Africa was ZAR 156,000
($44,000), while one quarter of such attorneys earned more than ZAR 230,000 ($65,000) and
one quarter earned below ZAR 100,000 ($28,000). Human Sciences Research Council, Re-
muneration of Graduates as of I July 1994 (1996). The average exchange rate for 1994 was
ZAR 3.55 to $1.
In many regards, including this one, large South African firms at the turn of the 21 st cen-
tury look comparable to large U.S. law firms in the 1950s and 1960s. GALANTER & PALAY,
supra note 72, at 20-36. During this period, U.S. law firms were characterized by stable rela-
tions with clients and steady but manageable firm growth. Id. Their labor structures had not
yet fully taken on the pyramid shape now associated with them. Id.
141. See, e.g., Interview No. 13, supra note 109; Interview No. 39, in Johannesburg, S.
Afr. (June 29, 1999) (36-year-old African male professional assistant) (transcript on file with
author); Interview No. 67, in Sacramento, Cal. (July 26, 2000) (African female former profes-
sional assistant) (transcript on file with author). One professional assistant referred to her top-
tier firm's new "business model," which meant that no longer were all salaried partners being
made equity partners. E-mail from Interviewee No. 67 (June 22, 2001, 13:33:34 PST), supra
note 135. She said "making equity partner is not as guaranteed as it used to be. I guess you
could say it is another indication of the move toward the business model in that if you are not
contributing materially to the firm and are viewed more as a liability and especially if you
have no serious political backing or allies, they will constructively dismiss you." Id.
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D. The Emergence of Black Commercial Firms
We will try to redeem the name of black lawyers by running
a very professional firm. We will spare nothing for professional-
ism.
-African partner in a newly established
black commercial law firm'
A number of predominantly or all-black commercial firms have been
established and taken root in the Gauteng legal community during the
post-apartheid period. Both public and private-sector procurement pro-
grams seeking to foster the transfer of skills from predominantly white
firms to predominantly black firms have provided much of the economic
incentive for the establishment of these firms.'4 3 The increasing number
of black-controlled businesses, who have sometimes become clients of
these firms, have also sustained them. At the same time, a growing sup-
ply of young black attorneys with a few years of elite commercial law
firm training have satisfied the labor demands of these upstart firms.
Black commercial firms have provided employment opportunities for
black lawyers looking for alternatives to predominantly white firms,
where many have felt alienated and undervalued. Few of these black
firms have more than twenty professional staff, and many have fewer
than a dozen attorneys."
One young partner with a newly formed black firm enthusiastically
described the small enterprise's history, goals, and plan for growth.
142. Interview No. 34, supra note 49.
143. See A Change of Game, supra note 74 (government policy is to favor giving busi-
ness to joint ventures between black "newcomer" law firms and the large, established white-
owned corporate law firms).
144. Id. (noting that emerging black corporate law firms tend to be smaller than white
corporate firms, with black firms having between five and fifteen partners each); Interview No.
34, supra note 49 (black male partner noting that his newly formed firm has five attorneys);
see also World Legal Forum, Guide to Black Law Firms in South Africa (Oct. 1, 1999) (indi-
cating that the largest black firm listed in the directory, Maponya, Inc., had 20 fee earners,
including 6 partners, in October 1999), at http://www.worldlegalforum.co.uk/southafrica/
surveys/l9991001886.html (on file with author).
The BLA provided rough estimates of the type of legal work in which black lawyers were
involved as of 1999. According to the BLA, of an estimated 1,400 black attorneys, some 500
were solo practitioners and another 800 were engaged in two-person practices. The remaining
100 black attorneys worked for the government or were practicing in medium and large com-
mercial firms, whether black or white. The BLA estimated that only a handful of
predominantly black firms in the country, perhaps five, were doing commercial work, and then
only on a small scale. Interview with Sibusiso Gamede, supra note 74. Another source indi-
cates that no black firm had more than 10 partners or directors, and very few black firms had
"permanent clients because of the limited services they are able to render." Matlala, supra note
67, at 44.
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"Many black firms are coming up. In [four to five] years, we will have a
big firm, primarily African. We have no interest in staying the way we
are. Our business will come from our networks."1 45 He noted that the sen-
ior partner, who had previously been a candidate attorney at a prestigious
white firm, enjoyed considerable goodwill and the ability to generate a
lot of business. The partner went on to describe how the firm's compen-
• 146
sation scheme provided incentives to partners to bring in new business.
Opinions about the skills, capacity, and credibility of such black
firms vary widely in the legal and business marketplace. Many white
firms are openly skeptical that these black firms possess the
sophisticated skill set required for high-level commercial work, such as
public finance or stock market offerings. Several attorneys in top-tier
white firms expressed particular skepticism about the effectiveness of the
skills transfer that some clients' procurement programs seek to
achieve. 47 Pursuant to these programs, some clients require or prefer the
engagement of law firms in which the majority of partners are black. The
shortage of skilled black attorneys, however, often means the client hires
both a black firm and a white firm to work jointly on a matter, with the
expectation that the white attorneys will transfer sophisticated
commercial skills to the black attorneys. One white senior partner
characterized the compelled pairings as "window dressing" that are a
"disservice to everyone."'48 While in principle favoring the transfer of
skills from white firms to black firms, she opined that these programs do
not achieve the goal. She characterized the role of the black firm as that
145. Interview No. 34, supra note 49. At the time, his firm had five attorneys, including
three partners. He indicated that the firm planned to grow by expanding the range of services
provided to existing clients. Id.
146. Id. (stating that, in addition to his partner's draw on the firm's profit, each partner
would be rewarded with a 15% share of the income generated from business he brought to the
firm). Like many black firms, this firm had existed previously in a different iteration but had
broken up due to financial difficulties and disputes among the partners. Id.; see also Matlala,
supra note 67, at 45-46 (discussing the financial problems that black firms have, including
difficulties getting loans).
147. According to the interview data, many public sector clients and a few private sector
clients have such procurement policies. Little information on the schemes is publicly avail-
able, however. See supra note 28.
148. Interview No. 15, supra note 3. One account of the phenomenon stated:
The white firms provide the expertise and capability, and ensure a skills transfer,
their black partners secure the workload. Typically the [joint ventures] are struc-
tured to provide what many probably see as an unfair distribution of the workload.
But that's not the point right now. The effect is to bolster the economic effectiveness
of black legal firms.... More than a few black attorneys ... claim the 'empower-
ing' process simply isn't working. The vaunted skills transfer is more a matter of
imagination.
A Change of Game, supra note 74.
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of a post office for transaction documents, which are generated by the
white firm.' 9
A relatively junior black partner at a predominantly white firm also
endorsed the principle of traditional white firms and traditional black
firms working together, but with the caveat that "all must pull their
weight. There must be real opportunities for blacks."'' 0 A mid-level col-
ored attorney at another elite white firm called the pairing schemes a
joke. Noting that his firm was engaged in very sophisticated commercial
work, including public finance, he told of asking black firms with whom
his firm had been paired in joint ventures about the black firms' com-
mercial experience. "They look you in the eye and say they've drafted
some leases," he ridiculed, playing up the distinction between the com-
mercial work to which black firms typically have access and that which
the more elite white firms do. "No one sees these firms as a threat" he
concluded.'5' A young black lawyer who recently completed his period
149. Interview No. 15, supra note 3.
150. Interview No. 26, supra note 133.
151. Interview No. 25, supra note 133. He went on to describe the allocation of work in
the context of these joint ventures:
The firms generally agree themselves on the allocation of work. In some cases the
black firms we were working with just fell out of the picture. There is no real bene-
fit to either [black or white firm]-just window dressing the government is getting
.... Things can get nasty. They say, "you don't copy us... you're racist." It makes
us both look like assholes to the client. It is an unhappy situation for both firms, of-
ten acrimonious. They bill their time; we bill ours. That's a whole 'nother talk show
how these arrangements don't work.
Id. Another attorney with a top-tier firm focused on another downside to these pairings, noting
that they have the "unfortunate negative consequence" of increasing client costs:
Black firms cannot put out a first draft-they don't have the know-how. [We] put
out the first draft, but blacks have no clue. Some ask no questions of us-
pretending to know what they are doing. Others ask too many questions; they ques-
tion everything, ask irrelevant questions. This is duplicated time for the clients.
Interview No. 40, supra note 64.
One mid-level attorney at an all-black commercial firm defended his firm's capacity to
perform the type of legal work involved without the assistance of a white firm, but he ac-
knowledged that many clients still wish to utilize these pairings. He, too, acknowledged that
these pairings accomplish little skills transfer. Because the white firm often has "long-standing
relationships, personal and professional with clients ... it's very easy [for the black firm] to
get sort of left out." He went on to say, "once you get in, you've got to form and develop a
separate relationship with the clients and, in fact, you're competing with the other firm and
you have to regard it that way or else it doesn't ... really work otherwise." Interview No. 56,
supra note 123.
A partner in a black firm described the pairing this way:
In many ways, there has been good transfer of skills. On the other hand, attitudes
are difficult to change. Many of us carry a whole lot of baggage. Our chaps in pub-
lic works were upset by lack of visible transfer of skills. We could have achieved a
lot more. It is a new experience for them, new for us. A lot of things were done as
they should have been. Realities catch up with you. You become more determined.
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as a candidate attorney at a prestigious white firm offered a similar opin-
ion, stating that even black commercial enterprises often preferred to
engage white firms because they valued the prestige associated with
these firms, but also because the black ones still lacked credibility.'
Thus, black firms are struggling to gain both elite skills and the profes-
sional reputation associated with them.
One way for black firms to achieve both is to merge with white
firms. Some white partners in managerial roles within their elite firms
acknowledged the possibility of merging with black firms in order to
achieve their business goals-specifically the coveted "black names on
the letterhead." One senior partner indicated her firm's lack of openness
to such arrangements noting her firm's desire to maintain "all the same
character" through "organic growth." She said that her firm had been
approached by a black firm "about amalgamation," quickly adding "our
partners weren't at all interested. We don't want another firm using our
name."'53 Other firms appeared to desire such mergers, but nevertheless
acknowledged the obstacles to accomplishing such arrangements. As one
white partner in a top-tier firm explained, white firms have little to offer
black firms, economically or otherwise, in the current market. He said,
If we say, "chaps, come across to us, come into this big organi-
zation; we have a prime base, we'll give you a BMW as your
company car and you will earn a million rand a year." And he
says, "well, that's what I'm doing now. Why would I come
across to you and have a boss? Right now, I'm my own boss, and
I'm in the right place at the right time." And that's the prob-
lem. 1
54
A small black firm would be swallowed up by a white firm. The cultures are com-
pletely different.
Interview No. 20, supra note 91.
152. The attorney explained that "from a P[ublic] R[elations] point of view, black em-
powerment groups want to go [to] the best firm" and that black firms lack credibility so that
they are rarely used by these black empowerment groups. Interview No. 33, supra note 133;
see also E-mail from Daniel Steenkamp, supra note 3 (noting that black clients have histori-
cally used white attorneys for prestige value).
153. Interview No. 15, supra note 3.
154. Interview No. 13, supra note 109 (white male partner). The senior partner of one
modestly sized black firm, discussing why he had not accepted any of the many offers to
merge with white firms, stated "'it seems to me that all this will achieve is a circumstance in
which I become a glorified public relations functionary, a marketing man at best.' "A Change
of Game, supra note 74. He went on to explain, "'My job would be to go off and bring in
business, whether from government or private-sector industry would be irrelevant. After that, I
could expect handsome monthly rewards. But this isn't why I became a lawyer so I've turned
down offers of this nature.'" Id.
There has been at least one post-apartheid merger of a white firm with a black firm. The
firm of Routledge-Modise is the product of a 1998 merger of the white firm formerly known
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Similarly, many young black attorneys attributed their decisions to
do articles at a white firm rather than a black one to the superior training
opportunities at the former.'55 Some noted their openness to joining a
black firm, however, if the black firm had the kind of work they wanted
to do.'56 However, as several observed, in order for these black firms to
gain credibility, they need to hire lawyers with elite skills and not only
newly admitted attorneys who have merely been candidate attorneys at
white firms.'57
In short, a number of black commercial firms are likely to survive
over the coming decades, and some will probably experience moderate
growth driven in part by procurement schemes favoring black-owned
enterprises. It is not clear, however, that they will, in the foreseeable fu-
ture, compete on a level playing field with their elite white counterparts.
Because few black attorneys will acquire the highly sophisticated legal
skills that are needed to attract the sort of legal work associated with
elite firms, they will not take such highly marketable and lucrative skills
to the firms they found and join. Black attorneys who do acquire com-
mercial legal expertise from white firms are more likely to be
as Routledges, Inc., and the black firm formerly known as Mlambo & Modise. Mlambo &
Modise was apparently a very small firm, as its merger with Routledges did not result in a
significant black presence in the new firm. Dunstan Mlambo, co-founder of Mlambo &
Modise, has since become a judge on the Labor Court and is no longer with the firm. The
black firm's other co-founder, Lavery Modise, is the only black partner shown on the
Routledge-Modise website as of January 2002. The firm lists 17 directors, 3 associate part-
ners, and 12 professional assistants. See Routledge-Modise, About Us, at
http://routledges.co.za/about.html (last visited May 9, 2002).
155. One black female professional assistant who had completed her articles at a black
firm noted that her "older friends in the profession were against" her joining a white firm, but
that one of her young black attorney friends thinks that white firms are "the only place where
you can get any form of training, which is proper training." Interview No. 57, in Pretoria, S.
Afr. (June 10, 1999) (African female professional assistant) (transcript on file with author). All
of the black law students who participated in the 1998 University of Cape Town survey indi-
cated that they preferred to work for large law firms. Barclay, supra note 7, at 6. Interestingly,
30% of white females and 40% of white males preferred smaller firms. Id. The black students
indicated that their preference was based on the superior training, in a variety of areas, that
one gets in larger firms. Id. at 7.
156. Interview No. 54, supra note 12. One black female attorney at an intellectual prop-
erty boutique explained her opinion, "If we say we want integration, we must join these
[white] firms, be a part of them. Trademark work has been monopolized by all-white firms,
but if I could do trademark work in a black firm, I would consider it." Interview No. 47, supra
note 71.
157. See A Change of Game, supra note 74 (managing partner of Deneys Reitz lament-
ing the difficulty in securing experienced black partners). One African female candidate
attorney at a relatively progressive mid-sized white firm offered this opinion: "Black law firms
need people to come in who already have skills. This is one reason I didn't want to do my
articles at a black firm. There are not many established black firms." Interview No. 68, supra
note 133; see also Matlala, supra note 67, at 44 (noting that first and foremost, black firms
need properly trained professional and non-professional staff).
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assimilated into those firms and, therefore, to remain with them. Either
way, the most sophisticated and lucrative skills are unlikely to migrate
from white firms to black ones.
IV. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
ELITE LAW FIRMS AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM
The legal profession has long been a subject of scholarly inquiry,
and U.S. literature on both the sociology and the economics of the legal
profession is very rich indeed.5 8 Several subsets of this literature are
relevant to this project-especially those on elite law firms, their internal
labor markets, and the economics of discrimination.
A. The Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms:
Pyramids, Tournaments, and High Wages
So-called elite law firms have been the subject of much discussion in
the U.S. literature on the legal profession in the past several decades.
Also referred to simply as "large law firms,"' 9 these firms display several
distinct characteristics, including a high degree of specialization within
firms and working in teams to serve clients. Elite firms tend to maintain
enduring relationships with their clients, who are primarily institutional
rather than individual.' 6° Furthermore, these firms are socially homoge-
nous, each presenting a somewhat distinct culture from the others. '6' The
. 158. Scholarship on the profession is both analytical and descriptive. Among other func-
tions, it documents the way in which different segments of the American legal profession
operate and evolve. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); NAN ARON,
LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1989);
LAWYERS' IDEALs/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PRO-
FESSION (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992); LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (Richard Abel & Philip
S.C. Lewis eds., 1989); CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK
LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS (1996); Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational
Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 669 (1997); Camie Menkel-
Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversi-
fication and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621 (1994). In addition, the
American Bar Association and its various branches and commissions conduct surveys and
track and publish empirical information about the demographics, economics, and other aspects
of the U.S. legal profession. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992)[hereinafter TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION].
159. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 72, at 1-2.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 54-55. While lateral movement from one large firm to another was once un-
usual, it became more common in the 1990s. See Arthur S. Hayes, Hot Economy Provides
More Opportunities but Corporations Lure Lateral Talent, 224 N.Y. L.J. 9 (2000) (National
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structure of elite firms is hierarchical, with many associates making up
the larger base of a pyramid-like structure and a few partners comprising
the narrow top.' 62 Promotion of some associates to partnership is neces-
sary for these firms to survive, which leads to exponential firm growth.'
63
Widespread agreement exists among scholars who have written
about large firms that an elite firm's most important asset is the accumu-
lated human capital of its lawyers.' 64 Because their survival depends
upon their delivery of "high-quality legal services at acceptable
prices,"' 65 these firms have strong incentives to hire and retain lawyers
who will meet the firm's labor needs in a way that both preserves and
enhances the firm's reputation. 6 6 In short, these firms have a great inter-
est in hiring and retaining the "best" lawyers.1
67
According to the widely accepted model of the internal labor mar-
kets of U.S. elite law firms, these firms identify and promote the "best"
Association of Legal Professionals (NALP) reporting that lateral hiring increased by about 7%
nationwide between 1997 and 1998, with firms hiring about 1.4 laterals for every entry-level
hire).
162. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 72, at 2.
163. Id. at 3; see also John P. Heinz, Book Review, 2 L. & POL. BOOK REV. 6-10 (Jan.
1992), at http://www.unt.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/galanter.htm (reviewing GALANTER &
PALAY, supra note 72) (on file with author).
164. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 72, at 3. (citing Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry Into the Corporate
Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985)); see also Peter D.
Sherer, Leveraging Human Assets in Law Firms: Human Capital Structures and Organiza-
tional Capabilities, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 671 (1995)). David Wilkins has also
observed that the most valued component of a firm's human capital is relationships with cli-
ents. David B. Wilkins, Legal Ethics: Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black
Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. STUD. OF LEGAL ETHICS 15, 24 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Wilkins, Partners Without Power].
165. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 523.
166. Id. at 523, 549-54. As they express it, the primary hiring goal is to "stock the pipe-
line" with talented lawyers who can meet the firm's labor needs, while also signaling the
firm's quality to clients, competitors, and potential recruits. Id.
167. There is widespread consensus among scholars of the profession that "best lawyer"
means one with good professional judgment, a concept that includes more than technical ex-
pertise and specialized knowledge. This good professional judgment means that the "best
lawyer" is also a person who is a
good judge of character, a quick and accurate calculator of costs and benefits, an
empathetic listener, and a thorough, balanced, and calm deliberator who neverthe-
less does not lose sight of the important role that passion plays in human affairs. In
the world of elite law practice, she must also be a team player, a salesperson, and a
manager of complex personalities, events, and institutions.
Id. at 524-25. Firms naturally face a challenge in identifying the "best lawyers" so that they
know whom to recruit, train, and retain to best bolster the pool of human capital. Id. Part of
the challenge is that it is costly to determine who the best prospects are and, therefore, who
should be hired. Id. It can be equally as costly to determine who, among current employees,
should be trained and mentored, retained, and promoted. Id.
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lawyers to partnership in the context of a "'tournament'" of lawyers.168
That is, within the firm's pyramid structure, a relatively small number of
experienced senior associates and partners are responsible for monitor-
ing the performance of a much larger number of junior associates. As
lawyers work their way up the stages of a typically lock-step ladder to
partnership, the number at each level diminishes as lawyers depart for
other jobs in the public or private sectors, either by choice or because
they are nudged out by firm management. The junior associates are mo-
tivated to work hard by high wages, as well as eligibility for the reward
of partnership.69 This structure allows firms to reduce the costs associ-
ated with monitoring employee performance and productivity, while at
the same time inducing efforts on the part of associates by promising
that a few of them will win the tournament by receiving the lucrative
promotion to partnership. 70
The payment of high wages complements the tournament model and
the pyramid structure of large U.S. law firms: paying more for services
than the employees could earn elsewhere in the marketplace reduces
search costs and places the burden on applicants to differentiate them-
selves in order to get and keep the jobs. In addition, high wages give
employees an incentive to perform at a higher level than they otherwise
might. This incentive not to "shirk," as it is called, arises from the diffi-
culty an associate would have in explaining a termination for
underperforming to a competing employer who pays a comparable
wage."' In short, by employing a tournament-to-partnership model, firms
reduce monitoring costs by using high wages and the enticement of the
brass ring of partnership to provide associates an adequate incentive to
perform.
In theory the winners of this tournament will be the "best"-the
most talented from among the highly qualified law graduates the firm
hired a number of years earlier. In practice, however, this will not neces-
sarily be the case because bias based on a number of factors, including
race, may influence the outcome of the tournament. The following Sec-
tion discusses some theories associated with race discrimination in the
workplace.
168. Id. at 519-20; see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 72.
169. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 72, at 519 (citing James M. Malcolmson, Work In-
centives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 486 (1984)); see also
David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A The-
ory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV.
57 (1998) [hereinafter Charny & Gulati, Efficiency Wages].
170. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 72, at 99-101.
171. Id. at 100.
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B. Economic Theories of Discrimination
Many economists have long been skeptical about the existence of
race discrimination because, they posit, the phenomenon is inconsistent
with the behavior of a rational economic decisionmaker. Nevertheless,
some have theorized how, why, and to what extent discrimination may
occur in spite of its apparent irrationality. Two theories that explain such
discrimination are "taste discrimination" and "workplace culture theory."
Taste discrimination assumes employers are rational economic actors
who, in spite of whatever biases they may have based on race or other
illegitimate bases, will be deterred from acting on these biases or tastes
because doing so will have adverse economic consequences for them.'72
Workplace culture theory, on the other hand, posits that costs associated
with integrating a workforce may be great enough to render rational an
employer's preference for a homogeneous workforce, even when that
preference leads to discrimination in hiring in order to maintain the
homogeneity.
1. Taste Discrimination
Taste discrimination hypothesizes that if and when employment dis-
crimination occurs, it can be explained by employers' (and employees')
"taste for discrimination," and the fact they make employment decisions
consistent with those tastes. Articulated by Professor Gary Becker in the
1950s, this theory held that when decisions not to hire, retain, or pro-
mote are made on the irrational basis of taste, they are inefficient to the
extent they are inconsistent with the profit-maximizing motives of the
employer.13 Becker further posited that those engaging in such ineffi-
cient behavior would ultimately be driven out of business because others,
who shun such irrational tastes and instead act solely to maximize their
profits, would take advantage of the equal or superior human capital that
the discriminating firm had passed over. Non-discriminating employers
would hire members of the disfavored and bypassed group, sometimes at
lower wages, become more profitable than their discriminatory competi-
tors, and ultimately put the discriminating firm out of business.1
74
Competitive market forces, the theory went, would ultimately eliminate
such taste discrimination. 71
As Becker's critics have pointed out, if the costs of discrimination
were as high as Becker posited, there would be no employment
172. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16 (2d ed. 1971).
173. Id. at 39.
174. Id. at 40, 43-45.
175. Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action
Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1280 (1995) (citing BECKER, supra note 172).
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discrimination. '76 These critics explain that, given a surplus labor supply,
the discriminating employer's search costs for employees will be low,
and discriminating employers will suffer few costs as a consequence of
their discrimination. Secondly, due to legal restrictions such as minimum
wage laws or prohibitions on paying blacks less than whites, non-
discriminating employers will be unable to hire at lower wages those
employees who have been passed over by discriminating employers.
Finally, pervasive bias against a group may mean that no employer acts
rationally in the face of widespread prejudices against the rejected
employees; thus, no employer claims the prospective advantage. These
critics conclude market forces do not prevent discrimination because the
non-discriminating employer enjoys no real competitive advantage over
the discriminating one."'
Judgments about an applicant's potential are an integral part of a de-
cision to employ, and absent perfect information about each worker,
employers' judgments may be influenced as much by unconscious biases
related to particular groups as by tastes of which they are aware.' 78 When
the basis of the decision is unconscious,'79 the opportunity for market
forces to correct it is further diminished.
176. Id. at 1280.
177. See id. at 1280-81 n.94 (citing Steven Shulman, A Critique of the Declining Dis-
crimination Hypothesis, in THE QUEsTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE
U.S. LABOR MARKET 143 (Steven Shulman & William Darity Jr. eds., 1989) ("When there is
an excess supply of labor, the additional hiring costs imposed by discrimination are reduced
and conceivably eliminated. The hiring of qualified workers need not be foregone, search time
need not be appreciably expanded, nor wages raised if the competition for wages is severe
enough.").
178. For example, statistical discrimination, an alternative explanation for employment
discrimination, suggests that discrimination is driven by a desire for efficiency and is,
therefore, rational. Because employers must make decisions based on imperfect information
about individual employees, the theory goes, they rationally revert to reliance on statistics
about the group of which the employee is a member. Thus, discrimination based on statistics
occurs when, given the uncertainty surrounding a particular individual's productivity, an
employer relies on information about a group as a proxy for predictions about individual
ability. Selmi, supra note 175, at 1289--90 (citing Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of
Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972) and others). For example, an employer
might rely on a stereotype that blacks are less productive than whites in order to justify his
preference for hiring whites over equally qualified blacks. If there is empirical evidence to
support the proposition that whites are more productive than blacks, it is arguably rational for
the employer to base his decision on these stereotypes rather than making an investment in
acquiring additional information about the productivity of an individual black applicant. While
the additional information acquired might show the individual applicant is inconsistent with
the stereotype, the cost of acquiring the information might exceed the productivity achieved
by hiring the black applicant who has proved her superior productivity. Thus, statistical
discrimination may be characterized as rational.
179. For example, employers may act on the basis of stereotypes about members of a
particular group. An extensive body of literature documents the effects of stereotyping on
cognitive processes. See Selmi, supra note 175, at 1284 n.105 (citing Susan T. Fiske & Steven
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Unconscious biases based on race may be manifested only indi-
rectly 8° because of employers' inability to internalize social norms to
which they claim to ascribe.' That much discrimination is unconscious
may help explain how discriminatory practices, while inefficient, can
persist. They persist, in short, because employers are unconscious of the
motives that drive their decisions and, therefore, do not act to counter
them. They also persist because such discriminatory practices are so
widespread that non-discriminating employers are not present to take
advantage of the irrational discrimination of their competitors. Because
opportunities to evaluate candidates subjectively always exist, uncon-
scious bias will almost certainly influence who gets hired, as well as
who gets promoted.'82 Because of the subjectivity of the evaluation proc-
esses, it is difficult and costly to document the existence of unconscious
bias. "'83
L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from Category-Based to Individuating
Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention & Interpretation, in 23
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1990); Charles R. Law-
rence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 339-44 (1987); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist
Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1773-76 (1991)).
180. Selmi, supra note 175, at 1284.
181. Associated with such unconscious discrimination is the concept of "aversion ra-
cism:' which means that individuals try to conceal their racism because it is inconsistent with
socially accepted behavior. Id. at 1285 n. 108. "The aversive racist believes in white superior-
ity, but her conscience seeks to repudiate this belief or, at least, to prevent her from acting on
it." Id. (quoting Lawrence, supra note 179, at 335).
182. These stereotype-based expectations may also become self-fulfilling prophecies: an
individual who is given fewer opportunities on the job may respond to the lack of opportunity
by underperforming. See John M. Darley & Russell H. Fazio, Expectancy Confirmation Proc-
esses Arising in the Social Interaction Sequence, 35. AM. PSYCHOL. 867, 879 (1986)
(discussing the concept of self-fulfilling prophecy). In job interviews, it has been shown that
African-Americans who were met by a job interviewer with less immediacy and greater
physical distance reciprocated by performing less well in the interview than they performed
under more friendly circumstances. See Carl 0. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-
Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 119
(1974); see also Roberts, supra note 30 (noting the South African equivalent of this phenome-
non).
183. Selmi, supra note 175, at 1287 (citing William T. Bielby, Modern Prejudice and
Institutional Barriers to Equal Employment Opportunity for Minorities, 43 J. Soc. ISSUES 79,
81 (1987) ("Modem prejudice is difficult to eradicate because it persists despite social and
structural change and because its perpetuators are not aware of it.")); see also Thomas F.
Pettigrew & Joanne Martin, Shaping the Organizational Context for Black American
Inclusion, 43 J. Soc. ISSUES 41, 50 (1987) (bringing discrimination to the attention of
managers is frequently futile because victims are often the only ones cognizant of it).
Others have posited that discrimination can persist because workers who are less visible
in the market, those individuals whose talents are masked by widespread bias against the
group to which they belong, are more easily discriminated against because their talents can be
concealed from competitors. See Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, Job Discrimination, Market
Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis, 102 Q.J. EcON. 453 (1987). Milgrom and Oster argue
individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to be invisible in the
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An employer cannot recognize and act on the opportunity presented
by a competitor's policy of excluding a class of individuals when the
non-discriminating employer is unable to discern whether discrimination
is the reason the employee is available. When an excluded worker pre-
sents herself to a non-discriminating employer, that employer will not be
able to assess accurately the opportunity presented because that em-
ployer will not know if the worker is available because the worker has
suffered discrimination, or if the worker is available because she is, in
fact, inferior.
Taste discrimination, then, operates not only where an employer is
willing to forgo profits in order to indulge his taste for discrimination,
but also where an employer unconsciously does so. A conscious counter
effort may therefore be required to check the impact of unconscious taste
discrimination. Otherwise, it will go undetected and unstemmed.
84
2. Workplace Cultures, Worker Preferences,
and the Costs of Integration
A second theory of persistent discrimination, workplace culture the-
ory, identifies reasons why "atypical" workers, such as members of a
disfavored or minority group, might be less productive than "typical"
workers, thereby making them more costly to employ.'85 Discrimination
might arise from the different attributes of different groups. Such attrib-
utes might include language skills or common culture, which make
workers in the majority or "typical" group reluctant to train or otherwise
cooperate with the "atypical" minority workers, who do not share the
dominant culture. The cost of diminished productivity might deter inte-
gration, explaining why a segregated work force persists.'86 For example,
a predominantly Asian workforce might be less cooperative with Cauca-
sian workers introduced into the workplace, thus diminishing overall
productivity. Integration of a work force may be costly and inefficient,
then, not because of the employer's racial animus or bias, but because of
the employee's bias, along with perhaps some culture-based impedi-
ments to communication, including multiple languages.
marketplace. Id. at 456. The invisibility thesis is strengthened by considering how the
unconscious nature of some discrimination may render these workers less visible. Market
visibility is a function of the amount of information an employer has about an employee's
skills; unconscious discrimination diminishes the quality and amount of available information.
Thus, even non-discriminating employers will tend to underestimate the value of the available
talent because pervasive bias renders the workers less visible. Consequently, discrimination
based on unconscious biases will be harder to detect and more likely to persist. Id.
184. Selmi, supra note 175, at 1289.
185. Charny & Gulati, Efficiency Wages, supra note 169, at 66-67.
186. Id.
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Some options exist for leveling the playing field when atypical
workers are present. Firms could pay atypical workers lower wages to
offset the higher costs of employing. them, if doing so were not illegal.'87
Alternatively, atypical workers may make their employment less costly
by making themselves look more like typical workers.'88 They may, for
example, learn the language or culture of the dominant group. Once a
minority group member has assimilated to the point of appearing typical,
she may be able to avoid discrimination. Minority employees, then, may
enjoy a great return on investments in the type of skills that enable them
to assimilate into the dominant culture. This will occur, however, only if
the atypical worker has adequate resources to invest in the education and
skills that facilitate assimilation and the willingness to do so. Without
these resources, culture-based discrimination is likely to persist because
a rational economic actor will choose not to bear the higher cost of em-
ploying an atypical worker.'89
The way the market permits the dominant or majority group to dic-
tate workplace culture may thus induce atypical workers to alter their
behavior as a result of diminished opportunities. ' That is, lacking the
resources to assimilate or being unwilling to do so, atypical workers may
abandon pursuit of the chosen profession or job.'9 '
C. Wilkins and Gulati's "Richer" Theory of
Discrimination in Elite U.S. Law Firms
Critics of tournament theory have argued that reduction of the inter-
nal labor market paradigm and the phenomenon of discrimination to
explanations based purely on economic forces is overly simplistic. These
commentators, most notably David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati, who
have written extensively on race and the legal profession in the United
States, share the assumption that law firms and clients are "rational eco-
nomic actors who seek to maximize their own interests"' 9 ' They assert,
however, a firm's rationality is limited by available information and a
firm's interests are not solely financial.' 93 In addition, even when firms
"wish to maximize their economic interests, professional ideology and
187. Id.
188. Id.; see also Edward McCaffrey, Slouching Toward Equality: Gender Discrimina-
tion, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 626 (1993) (noting that some
women adopt men's labor patterns, for example not bearing children, to narrow the gender gap
in the workplace).
189. Charny & Gulati, Efficiency Wages, supra note 169, at 66.
190. See McCaffrey, supra note 188, at 627.
191. Id.
192. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 515.
193. Id. (law firms "compete for relative status or prestige in ways that may or may not
be reducible to monetary gain").
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culture may restrict a firm's ability to perceive and or implement institu-
tional policies likely to achieve these goals efficiently."'94 This means that
while a firm's interest in hiring and retaining the "best" lawyers is great,
they will not necessarily achieve this goal. One impediment to doing so
according to Wilkins and Gulati is the opportunity for prejudice. That is,
an employer's taste for discrimination may influence law-firm hiring and
promotion decisions, while nevertheless going undetected by the market.
Commenting on tournament theory in particular, Wilkins and Gulati
argue that, along with the payment of high wages, the hierarchy of the
tournament and its complementary pyramid structure allow firms to
insulate themselves from the economic consequences of discrimination,
which might otherwise deter the discriminating behavior. Their work
theorizes how the structures and institutional practices of these firms in
the context of recruiting, training, and promoting shield them from any
competitive disadvantage that might result from race-based discrimina-
tion in which they engage."'
Wilkins and Gulati base their analysis of institutional discrimination
within elite law firms on the assumption of a bell-shaped distribution of
worker talent. They assume a small number of "superstars" at one end
and a small number of "unacceptable" workers at the other, with the ma-
jority of candidates clustered in the "average" range.' 96 Employers
naturally want to hire as many superstars as possible and to avoid hiring
the unacceptable ones. Assuming too few superstars to go around, em-
ployers will satisfy their labor needs by hiring from the average pool.
From among this cluster of apparently equivalent "average" candidates,
firms should be relatively indifferent about who gets hired.' Further-
more, because the quality of candidates is subjective and, therefore,
difficult to evaluate, the signals that applicants use to demonstrate their
merit-signals such as educational credentials, recommendations, and
work experience-will be less reliable the farther one gets from the su-
perstar range and the closer one gets to the truly average associate. 9 ' A
thorough investigation of a potential employee who appears "average"-
by checking references or by reading a writing sample-might show the
candidate to be qualitatively better, or worse, than some others in the
average cluster. The firm has little incentive to investigate, however, be-
cause such an investigation is costly and the firm assumes that its use of
high wages and the tournament promotion model will ultimately reveal
194. Id.
195. Id. at 496.
196. Id. at 520.
197. Id. (citing Chamy & Gulati, Efficiency Wages, supra note 169, at 85-86).
198. Id. at 520-21.
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the true worth of a given candidate.' 99 As a result, average candidates,
who are plentiful because the firm pays high wages, appear largely fun-
gible.2°°
If those making hiring decisions act on their taste for discrimination
and prefer average whites over average blacks from among this fungible
group, the firm should suffer no loss in productivity. Thus, firms have
little incentive to investigate whether whites are being systematically
preferred to blacks.2°' In short, the internal labor market creates no incen-
tive to detect or eliminate any race discrimination that may be occurring.
Wilkins and Gulati assert the external labor market will similarly fail
to deter the discrimination. Employers who discriminate on the basis of
race, they argue, will not experience a competitive disadvantage because
a non-discriminating employer who hires passed-over black employees
is unlikely to be able to do so at reduced wages. 02 Furthermore, employ-
ers may not hire these black employees at all given their inability to
discern why these employees have been passed over. Even employers
making a conscious effort not to discriminate will not know whether the
available black employees represent a good opportunity or whether they
are, in fact, poor workers who have been passed over for rational rea-
sons, such as lack of productivity or ability. The problem is not
necessarily eliminated with respect to lateral workers because signals
about their productivity will similarly not be perfectly reliable and clear.
In the context of a law firm, it is often difficult to know whether a lawyer
who leaves prior to the partnership decision does so of his own accord or
because he has been nudged out by lack of work or by other signals that
he is unlikely to be made a partner.2 3
Another reason that firms will not necessarily identify and hire the
best lawyers is that good lawyers are largely "made," not born.2 4 The
best lawyers are made not by legal education, but rather through the
training they receive in elite law firms. The best lawyers become so by
practicing law.205 Accordingly, aside from a few superstars who may be
truly better equipped to become the best lawyers, the best lawyers cannot
be identified at the hiring stage because, at that point, they simply do not
exist. The best lawyers will become so through good training available at
the firm.
199. Id. at 521.
200. Id. at 520-21.
201. Id. at 520.
202. Id. at 521 (citing Charny & Gulati, Efficiency Wages, supra note 169, at 67).
203. Id. at 564-67.
204. Id. at 524.
205. Id. at 525 (citing TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, supra note
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The growth of large law firms has led to the routinization of many
legal tasks. 2° Legal work may now fairly be divided into two categories:
tasks that require discretionary judgment and those that do not. This di-
vision has led to the evolution of parallel career tracks: the training track
and the flat-lining track. 27 Lawyers who secure the type of work that
requires professional judgment also have opportunities to work with and
observe more senior lawyers' exercise of their own highly developed
judgment. They are effectively on the training track, being groomed to
become the "best" lawyers. 28 Those who are relegated to performing
routine legal tasks that do not require such judgment are "flat-lining."
Not getting opportunities to learn and develop discretionary judgment,
their utility to the firm is soon optimized, and their careers hit a dead end
within the firm's internal labor market. The division between those on
the training track and those on the flat-lining track is thus self-
perpetuating. Once an associate is on the training track, the firm's more
senior lawyers have a greater incentive to give that associate more and
increasingly sophisticated training and, ultimately, to make her partner.
The development of dual career tracks within elite law firms means
their internal labor markets are not consistent with standard tournament
theory because not all competitors have the same opportunity to win the
tournament. Rather, partnership decisions within these firms are largely
dependent on the early days of associates' careers, in particular which
associates got onto the training track. By the time the tournament
winners are selected, firms have had eight to ten years to assess whether
those who received the coveted training have, in fact, developed into the
"best" lawyers, worthy of partnership. 9 Those who did not get onto the
training track were never truly competing for partnership; they were
never actually in the game.20 Thus, partnership decisions are more
straightforward than tournament theory suggests; partners are,
essentially, preordained.
Who gets good training, like who gets hired to begin with, can be
determined by any number of factors, including decisionmakers' per-
206. Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers, supra note 11, at
1609; Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 536-37.
207. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 539-
40.
208. Id. at 541 (analogizing to a bee colony and noting that training is the "Royal Jelly"
of elite law firms).
209. As expressed by Wilkins and Gulati, the firm has had the opportunity to determine
if those on the training track, who have had the benefit of the Royal Jelly of firm training,have
developed into "queen bees:' capable of supporting their own cadre of worker bees. Id. at 542.
210. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 536;
Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers, supra note 11, at 1606.
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sonal tastes and preferences.2"' Because the best lawyers are made
through practice and training, the making of these great lawyers requires
firms to invest in training, which can be very costly. 2 This is why U.S.
law firms have increasingly turned to the tournament and pyramid mod-
els to manage their internal labor markets. It means, in turn, that training
periods represent another opportunity for discrimination with respect to
retention and promotion decisions.
Just as hiring decisions are frequently subjective, so are the assess-
ments of the quality of work an associate performs. Indeed, given the
importance of discretionary judgment in assessing the quality of a law-
yer's work and the range of probabilities of success associated with a
given legal task, results alone rarely measure accurately a lawyer's skill
or effort. The fact that a motion was lost or a deal completed, for exam-
ple, is generally not a reflection on the skill of the lawyer who performed
the task.2'3 Easily quantifiable inputs such as the time required to accom-
plish a task can be similarly misleading because they reveal little about
the quality of the product. The resulting subjectivity of work assessment
provides yet another opportunity for firms, or the individual decision-
makers within them, to discriminate without the market holding them
accountable for doing so.2 '4 A firm engaging in such discrimination will
rarely suffer competitive disadvantage as a casualty because an act of
race discrimination manifested by a negative assessment of someone's
work product will likely appear to a competing employer to be merely
the latter. Under such circumstances, non-discriminating employers will
not know if and when an assessment was colored by the racist attitudes of
the employer, and, thus, it will not have complete information on which to
base a hiring decision. Thus, just as the external labor market fails to dis-
cipline racial bias in hiring, it similarly fails to do so in the context of
training and promotion.
Based on how firms hire, train, and promote attorneys, including a
lack of transparency that permits discrimination to go undetected at each
stage, Wilkins and Gulati have argued that race discrimination in elite U.S.
law firms implicates a complex web of individual attitudes and institu-
tional structures and incentives. The following Section describes the ways
in which structures of South African firms are similar to and different from
those of U.S. firms. This comparison is offered as a prelude for theorizing
211. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 546-
49.
212. See RICHARD N. FEFERMAN, BUILDING YOUR FIRM WITH ASSOCIATES: A GUIDE FOR
HIRING AND MANAGING NEW ATTORNEYS 55-56 (1988) (acknowledging that time spent train-
ing associates is generally not billable to clients).
213. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 527.
214. See Charny & Gulati, Efficiency Wages, supra note 169, at 77.
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how institutional structures may conceal discrimination in a market place
which purportedly disfavors it.
V. ELITE LAW FIiRMs IN SOUTH AFRICA
In this decade following the dismantling of apartheid-which had
mandated the virtually complete separation of the races for purposes of
residence, education, and employment, among others-it would come as a
great surprise if racial biases were not widely held in South Africa. Racial
prejudice is surely pervasive at the turn of the 21 st century. Assuming that
widespread bias exists in South African society, this Article assesses if and
how such racial biases play a role in elite commercial law firms' practices
surrounding the hiring, training, and retaining of attorneys of color. In or-
der to do that, it is helpful to examine these firms as institutions, including
their internal labor markets and compensation systems; to consider the
forces that are driving them to integrate; and to assess their responses to
these forces.
A. The Internal Labor Markets of Elite Firms:
Monoliths, Apprenticeships, and Financial Endurance Contests
South African firms' partners are unable to leverage associates the
way American law firms do-so they are very top heavy. The
South African firms' partners are unable to train multiple associ-
ates at one time because they are too busy doing the work
themselves. To pay the... professional assistants more than these
firms do would cut into partners' salaries too much-which is
why firms won't change their salary scales.
-Ron Goodman, Managing Partner,
White & Case, Johannesburg25
Just as pyramiding, tournaments, and high wages are relevant to the
richer theory of discrimination advanced by Wilkins and Gulati with re-
spect to U.S. law firms, the organizational characteristics of South
Africa's elite firms help explain why racial integration is not being
achieved in the commercial law sector. Three characteristics of the South
African law firm model distinguish it from the U.S. model: (1) a labor
market represented by a monolith rather than a pyramid, (2) the greater
opportunity for relatively close monitoring of junior attorneys' work with
apprentice-like training, and (3) low salaries for non-partner attorneys.
These features all make the path to partnership more direct and arguably
more certain for those who endure the financial sacrifice it requires. A
215. Interview with Ron Goodman, supra note 128.
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fourth feature of most South African firms is also relevant: the preva-
lence of a partnership model that compensates partners according to
seniority rather than fees earned, leaving the most senior partners earn-
ing the highest salaries, but with no accompanying incentive to cultivate
new clients or to worry about the firm's medium to long-term future.l
In contrast to the U.S. model, the South African model of law firm
organization is less a pyramid and more a monolith. South Africa's elite
firms typically have as many non-partner attorneys, called professional
assistants, as they do partners. In several of the large Gauteng firms, the
ratio of professional assistants to partners is essentially one to one. 217 If
candidate attorneys are taken into account, the ratio comes closer to two
non-partner fee earners for every partner. Thus, the professional staff of a
large elite firm might include fifteen to twenty candidate attorneys on the
bottom, forty to fifty professional assistants in two or three degrees of
seniority in the middle, and perhaps fifty partners in a few degrees of
seniority at the top.
Furthermore, the track to partnership in South Africa is not a tour-
nament in which an attorney at a given level must outshine competitors
at that level in order to advance; rather, it is more an endurance contest, a
period of paying one's dues. Traditionally, the vast majority of South
African attorneys who persevere through the requisite partnership track
period-usually four to five years following the period of articles-
become partners, first salaried and then equity. Historically, young South
African lawyers have not been nudged out of their firms in significant
216. This remuneration scheme, which means junior and mid-level partners are often the
profit centers of firms, even though their compensation is well below that of senior colleagues,
has been blamed for the significant attrition of mid-level partners into their own smaller bou-
tiques. See A Tough Nut to Crack, supra note 76 ("People in their 40s find they are generating
more fees for a firm than they are drawing out ... [t]hey have established a strong client-base
and think they can make more profit by setting up on their own.").
217. For example Adams & Adams had 51 partners and 51 professional assistants in
1999. Interview with Esme du Plessis, partner with Adams & Adams, supra note 70. In 2001,
Werksmans had 42 partners out of a total "professional staff complement" of 90. See Werks-
mans Attorneys, Home, at http://www.werksmans.co.za.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2001) (on
file with author). One law student in March 1999 said that she planned to do her candidate
attorney period at Edward Nathan & Friedland, which at the time she said had 50 partners and
50 professional assistants. At that point in the hiring season, she was one of 6 candidate attor-
neys who had been hired. Interview No. 45, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 17, 1999) (white
female law student) (transcript on file with author). One black attorney in a black commercial
firm confirmed that "we don't have that typical pyramid shape with lots of people at the bot-
tom." Interview No. 56, supra note 123.
Other firms reported these figures in October 1999: Webber Wentzel Bowens, 150 fee
earners, including 63 partners; Deneys Reitz, 149 fee earners, including 58 partners; Bowman
Gilfillan, Inc., 105 fee earners, including 62 partners; Edward Nathan & Friedland, Inc., 97 fee
earners, including 33 partners; Bell, Dewar & Hall, 41 fee earners, including 20 partners. See
World Legal Forum, supra note 78, at http://www.worldlegalforum.co.uk/southafrica/
surveys/19991001 887.html.
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numbers due to lack of productivity or skills acquisition; instead, most
have been indulged more time to acquire the necessary skills and, even-
tually, nudged up to partnership."' As a consequence, unlike in their U.S.
counterparts, attorneys in large South African firms less often ascend to
partnership in lock step with others at the same level of seniority or who
were admitted to practice at the same time. The attorneys at any given
point in their path to partnership, then, are less in competition with one
another than are those who aspire to partnership in the context of U.S.
firms' tournament model. Because the number of attorneys who can be
made partner is not necessarily limited by a South African firm's profit-
ability in any given year, all who make the grade, in theory, can and will
be made partners.
While not nudging aspiring partners out of the firm in the way that
U.S. firms do, South African firms nevertheless have been able to rely on
another factor to cause attrition among those otherwise seeking partner-
ship: salary. In sharp contrast to their U.S. counterparts, South African
firms pay low salaries right up to the partnership threshold 2 9 In the
late 1990s, for example, elite firms paid starting candidate attorneys
between ZAR 24,000 and ZAR 54,000,20 or some $4,000 to $9,000
218. See, e.g., Interview No. 42, supra note 133; Interview No. 75, supra note 140.
219. Even though firms pay low salaries to candidate attorneys, the widespread percep-
tion is that candidate attorneys cost more to employ than they earn for the firm in fees. A 1987
survey revealed that the average salary of candidate attorneys was ZAR 1,000 ($490) per
month, while senior partners estimated Ihat the total monthly cost of training a candidate at-
torney with a law degree was ZAR 7,000 to ZAR 11,000 ($3,400 to $5,400) per month.
Candidate attorneys with a B.Proc were paid less than candidate attorneys with an LLB de-
gree. When senior attorney participants were asked whether employment of candidate
attorneys was profitable, 18% agreed that it was; 40% were neutral; and 41% disagreed, im-
plying that many candidate attorneys are a financial burden to their principals. Steenkamp,
supra note 7, at 200-04. The average exchange rate for 1987 was ZAR 2.038 to $1. Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, Foreign Exchange Rate: South Africa, at http://www.stls.frb.org/
fred/data/exchange/exsfus (last visited July 1, 2002) (on file with author); see also Naidoo,
supra note 67 (discussing how setting a minimum salary for candidate attorneys may effec-
tively prohibit some firms and solo practitioners from serving as principals). But see Interview
No. 67, supra note 141 (indicating that at her top-tier firm, the fees earned by candidate attor-
neys easily covered their meager salaries).
220. Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (stating that she earned ZAR 4,000 per month as a
candidate attorney); Interview No. 67, supra note 141 (stating that she was paid ZAR 4,000
per month during her first year as a candidate attorney at a top-tier firm in 1998 and ZAR
5,500 per month during her second year); Interview No, 75, supra note 140 (stating that she
earned ZAR 3,000 per month during her first year as a candidate attorney in 1995 and ZAR
4,500 per month in her second year as a candidate attorney). One black attorney who had
completed her articles at a mid-sized white firm had earned ZAR 2,200 per month during the
first year of her candidacy. Interview No. 29, supra note 71. Furthermore, these are the gross
salaries; taxes and even health insurance must be deducted from these amounts. Interview No.
75, supra note 140. In South Africa, health insurance can be as high as ZAR 1,000 per month.
Accordingly, a professional assistant earning ZAR 20,000 per month in 2000 took home only
ZAR 13,000 after taxes, pension, and medical aid were deducted. Id. See also Barclay, supra
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annually,22' a pittance even in the context of the South African economy.
This is commensurate with or slightly less than what a law firm would
pay a tea lady who has been with the firm for a few years.222 Indeed, a
1987 survey indicated that candidate attorneys were consistently below• 2 2 1
secretaries and typists in law firms' salary hierarchies.
By the time an attorney is admitted and becomes a professional
assistant at an elite firm, her salary is more in the range of ZAR 72,000
to ZAR 144,000, or $12,000 to $24,000 annually.24 At the threshold of
partnership, a professional assistant is typically paid around ZAR
240,000, less than $40,000 a year.25 Thus, while the path to partnership
in either the United States or South Africa might be characterized as an
endurance contest, in South Africa what is being endured is less the
punishing physical endurance and billable hours contest of the Wall
Street or other large law firm; rather, it is one marked by financial
sacrifice, even deprivation. Contributing to this attrition are the often
higher salaries paid to attorneys by public sector and other private sector
employers in South Africa.226 Indeed, law firm salaries rarely exceed
note 7, at 7 (salary was the second most important motivation driving candidate attorneys to
seek articles at a larger firm, because the pay at smaller firms was much poorer).
221. The average exchange rate for 1999 was ZAR 6.12 to $1. See Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, supra note 219, at http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/exchange/exsfus.
222. Interview No. 75, supra note 140.
223. Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 200.
224. Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (noting her salary would be ZAR 7,000 or ZAR
8,000 per month if she stayed on as a professional assistant); Interview No. 67, supra note 141
(noting that salary for a professional assistant in first year after admission was ZAR 11,000 in
her top-tier firm in 2000, doubling the ZAR 5,500 she earned in her second year as a candidate
attorney); see also Interview No. 14, supra note 3 (black attorney at a mid-sized white firm
said that second-year professional assistants there are paid ZAR 10,000 per month, while at a
top-tier white firm a second-year professional assistant would earn ZAR 13,000); Interview
No. 56, supra note 123 (professional assistant at a black commercial firm stated that his firm
paid ZAR 16,900 ($2,761) per month to first year professional assistants, whereas he believed
elite white commercial firms paid only about ZAR 11,000 ($1,797) to attorneys at that level);
Interview No. 57, supra note 155 (black professional assistant reported being paid ZAR 7,000
when she joined a white firm shortly after completing her candidacy). The average exchange
rate for 1999 was ZAR 6.12 to $1. See Federal Reserve Board of Governors, supra note 219,
at http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/exchange/exsfus.
In the United States, of course, large firms pay very high salaries, even to lawyers just out
of law school. As of April 2001, for example, the median salary for first-year associates in all
firms was $95,000. In the largest firms, those with at least 500 employees, it was $115,000,
with salaries as high as $125,000 in New York, Los Angeles, and Silicon Valley. For first-year
associates in offices with 2 to 25 attorneys, the median salary was $60,000. National Median
Entry Salary $95,000, N.J. LAW., Sept. 10, 2001, at 4.
225. Interview No. 75, supra note 140.
226. Information on the pay scales for attorneys in the South African civil service is not
available, but information is available on the pay scales for public prosecutors and magistrates.
In 1999, the pay scale for public prosecutors ranged from ZAR 55,257 ($9,051) to ZAR
275,851 ($45,184) annually. Government Notice (GN)1421 of 23 November 1999. One attor-
ney who had completed part of her candidate attorney stint at the public defender's office in
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those paid to attorneys in non-law firm employment until an attorney is
made a partner in the firm. At the juncture when an attorney becomes an
equity partner, her remuneration typically exceeds what an attorney with
the same number of years of experience could earn in any other legal
job, public or private.22 ' The disparity then increases as the attorney
becomes more senior within the firm with partners quickly far outpacing
what those of equivalent seniority earn in other legal employment
sectors. It is, of course, this long-term financial pay off, as well as the
prestige associated with and skills acquired at such firms, that permits
these firms to retain any attorneys at all. Another allure of partnership is
that senior partners in South African firms often do not experience the
same income pressure that most U.S. law firm partners often do. This is
1999 said that her net monthly salary was ZAR 1,700 ($277). Interview No. 32, in Sasolburg,
S. Afr. (July 9, 1999) (27-year-old African female working in the legal department of a South
African corporation) (transcript on file with author).
Since modified in 1996, the annual salaries of magistrates range from ZAR 65,520
($15,351) to ZAR 221,141 ($51,813) annually. Prior to the 1996 change, they ranged from
ZAR 40,868 ($9,575) to ZAR 131,476 ($30,805), with 32 different gradings. Media Release,
Dep't of Justice, Regarding the Salaries of Magistrates (July I, 1996), at http://
www.polity.org.za/govdocs/pr/1996/prO7O.html. The average exchange rate for 1996 was
ZAR 4.302 to $1 and for 1999 was ZAR 6.12 to $1. See Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
supra note 219, at http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/exchange/exsfus; see also Interview No.
13, supra note 109 (white male partner discussing the difficulty law firms have in competing
with the salaries paid by other employers); Interview No. 50, supra note 77 (white female
partner noting that an African male professional assistant with excellent political connections
had recently left the law firm for a relatively high-level government job paying three to four
times as much as he was making at the firm). Discussing the many opportunities young law-
yers have in the new South Africa, one writer characterized law firms as having become "the
meat in the sandwich between government and parastatals [state-owned entities] on the one
side and the temptations of industry and commerce on the other." A Change of Game, supra
note 74.
A 1998 study of the Human Sciences Research Council showed that the average attorney's
annual remuneration package was ZAR 200,000 ($43,377) in 1997, ZAR 20,000 ($4,337) higher
than the average for the 70 different professions surveyed. Barbara Whittle, The Income of
Attorneys, Feast or Famine?, DE REBUS, Mar. 2000, at http://www.derebus.org.za/archives/
2000Mar.htm (on file with author). A quarter of self-employed attorneys earned less than ZAR
100,000 annually, and one in four earned more than ZAR 250,000 ($54,221). Id. The average
exchange rate for 1997 was ZAR 4.61 to $1. See Federal Reserve Board of Governors, supra
note 219, at http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/exchange/exsfus..
Some opined that black partners, as well as more junior black attorneys, leave white law
firms because they have better-paying opportunities in the market. See, e.g., Interview No. 22,
supra note 133.
227. This may not be true in all cases, as several attorneys interviewed speculated that
black attorneys who had left partnerships with white firms had probably been enticed by
higher salaries than they were earning in their firms. See Interview No. 40, supra note 64;
Interview No. 44, supra note 88 (commenting that law firms cannot match industry salaries);
Interview No. 73, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (June 15, 1999) (37-year-old African male) (tran-
script on file with author). These interviews, however, appear to have been referring to salaried
partners in white firms, whose salaries would have been easier for industry to match or exceed
than those of equity partners.
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because a partner's remuneration in South Africa is linked as much or
more to her seniority as it is to her client base and the income she
generates. 28 The opposite is, of course, true in the United States, where
partners in large law firms are generally compensated more on an eat-
what-you-kill basis, taking greater consideration of fees earned and
clients cultivated, than of seniority.
2 9
Law firm training is as critical to an attorney's professional devel-
opment in South Africa as it is in the United States. Indeed South
African legal education tends to be more highly theoretical, offering very
few opportunities for clinical training.230 Although some young attorneys
acquire practical skills by attending the LSSA's Practical Legal Training
School after their university law studies,' most rely on their candidate
attorney stints to equip them with the rudimentary practical skills associ-
ated with an attorney's work. Indeed, there appears to be a fairly
widespread, if naive, expectation that by the time a candidate completes
her articles and is admitted to practice, she should be equipped to func-
tion as a "beginning lawyer in a fair-sized city with a general practice.""'
Even beyond the period of articles, young South African attorneys are
naturally dependent upon their senior colleagues to equip them with an
increasingly sophisticated set of legal practice skills right up through
partnership.
While the apprenticeship training model is less efficient because it
takes senior lawyers away from fee-generating activities, it is
nevertheless the training model still utilized by most South African law
firms, including the large commercial ones. Unlike the tournament
228. See Telephone Interview with Interviewee No. 37 (Jan. 22, 2002).
229. See Wilkins, Partners Without Power, supra note 164, at 24.
230. As one commentator has written, "Universities are the drawing boards, actual prac-
tice must be learned in the field" Matlala, supra note 67, at 43; see also Philip F Iya, Legal
Education for Democracy and Human Rights in the New South Africa with Lessons From the
American Legal Aid Movement, 12 J. OF PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 216 (discussing general lack
of clinical training in South African legal education); Interview No. 44, supra note 88 ("There
is no structured way to train commercial lawyers. You learn from doing."). But see Steenkamp,
supra note 7, at 63-65 (suggesting that although South African legal education has historically
been highly theoretical, the trend is to incorporate some practical training). The view has been
that the Law Society of South Africa (formerly the Association of Law Societies) is responsi-
ble for skills training for attorneys. In addition, the trend toward specialization early in an
attorney's career is seen as contributing to the importance of training. See Barclay, supra note
7, at 9.
231. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the LSSA's Practical Legal
Training Schools).
232. See Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 64, 66-67. Indeed, the admission exam that candi-
date attorneys must pass tests the ability to function as a "beginning lawyer in a fair sized city
with a general practice." § 15(1)(b) of Attorneys Amendment Act 53 of 1979, discussed in
Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 110. One young attorney expressed frustration at the end of her
articles because she knew she would not be so equipped. Interview No. 49, supra note 77; see
also Interview No. 29, supra note 71.
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model used by U.S. law firms, in which the lower ratio of partners to
associates means that some associates get much better training than
others, in theory, all junior attorneys in South Africa should have better
prospects for obtaining good training, supervision, and mentoring.1
3
A South African firm is not pressed to determine who, from among a
pool of average young attorneys, will get the coveted and highly valuable
firm training. Because South African firms pay huge training and moni-
toring costs to learn about each attorney in the pipeline, they should have
enough information on which to base well-informed partnership deci-
sions.
As currently structured, then, South African firms should be able to
give most young attorneys excellent training, which in turn should foster
retention. Yet, this is not happening. The majority of black attorneys,
along with many of their white counterparts, leave these firms soon after
being admitted to practice. Poor training is one reason for the attrition.
The question remains, then, why these firms have failed to respond to the
market's incentives to leverage their structural opportunities to train and
retain black attorneys.
B. The Commercial Incentive to Integrate:
Needing Black Names on the Letterhead
I am always cynical about empowerment. Even a [law] firm with
ten to fifteen black partners is doing it for the wrong reason. It
isn't altruistic. It is about surviving. It is about business.
-African professional assistant commenting on
white firms' hiring of black attorneys..
Before considering the dynamic that is preventing black attorneys
from flourishing professionally and remaining in elite South African
firms, it is helpful to understand the apparent motivation firms have to
hire and retain blacks. That is to say, only an understanding of the array
of reasons firms have to integrate their professional workforces can lead
to full appreciation of the magnitude of the obstacles that are apparently
233. In the United States, the ratio of associate leverage for all firms surveyed in 2000
was .71, a decrease from .69 in 1999. See Press Release, Altman Weil, Inc. (July 23, 2001), at
http://www.altmanweil.comlnews/release/cfm (on file with author). In 1998 the ratio of asso-
ciate leverage had been .66. See Press Release, Altman Weil, Inc. (Aug. 14, 2000), at
http://www.altmanweil.comlnews/release.cfm (on file with author). Large U.S. law firms typi-
cally leverage a higher number of associates against each partner. For example, the 25 U.S.
firms with the highest per partner earnings in 1999 averaged a ratio of associate leverage of
.269, or almost four associates to every one partner. The Am. Law. 100, AM. LAW., July 2000,
at 100, 127-28.
234. Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
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hindering this integration, else it might already have been achieved, or at
least be progressing more quickly than it is.
Ask most white partners in major South African law firms whether
the firms have any incentive to integrate their professional staff, and the
answer will be an emphatic "yes." Ask about the nature of the incentive
and the partner will likely first note the considerable moral imperative to
hire and train blacks, to "empower" them. One partner, for example, ex-
pressed pride in his firm "from a moral point of view," based upon the
firm's history of hiring black attorneys, even during apartheid.235
Other motivations to integrate are cited beyond the moral imperative,
among them legal and commercial imperatives. The legal imperative
typically refers to relatively recent legislation, most importantly the Em-
ployment Equity Act of 1998, which compels employers to develop and
implement diversity hiring, training, and promotion plans . Because the
legislation is quite new, however-having taken effect in mid-2000-it is
only slowly becoming a driving force toward hiring blacks. 37
235. Interview No. 13, supra note 109 (also noting that "we've always tried to do this...
probably [since] the inception of our firm, which is over a hundred years old'") Indeed, his
firm had one of the more commendable records of hiring and training black candidate attor-
neys during apartheid. See Interview No. 23, supra note 77 (former candidate attorney at firm
noting its hiring record).
236. See Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. The Employment Equity Act does not im-
pose quotas but rather aims to ensure that "'designated employers' "-those in the private
sector that employ more than 50 people or have a turnover above a certain threshold-should
attain "'demographic proportionality.'" See Grimond, supra note 25, at 10.
237. Under the Act, all designated employers must complete a profile showing the break-
down by race, sex, and disability of their workforce. They must determine the "degree of
underrepresentation" of blacks, women, and the disabled, and identify any barriers, including
anything that contributes to the "lack of affirmation of diversity in the workplace." Then, "all
practices must be assessed in terms of cross-cultural and gender fairness," taking into account
"more subtle and indirect forms of ... stereotyping." Plans must be implemented to achieve
"reasonable progress" toward employment equity. §§ 7.3(b), 7.3.1(b)(c), 8.1 of Employment
Equity Act 55 of 1998.
At least two major Johannesburg attorneys firms, Werksmans, Inc. and Edward Nathan &
Friedland (Pty) Ltd., filed Employment Equity Reports with the Department of Labor in June
2000. Werksmans indicated that of 65 employees in the "Professionals" category, it had 5
Africans, 2 Indians, and 58 whites. Employment Equity Report, EEA2, filed by Werksmans
Attorneys (June 1, 2000) (on file with author). Among "technicians and associate profession-
als' which presumably includes candidate attorneys, the firm listed 5 Africans, 2 Indians, I
colored, and 17 whites. In the section designating the goals the firm had set for itself, Werks-
mans indicated that it wished to employ, among a total of 62 professionals, 6 Africans, 4
Indians, and 52 whites; among a total of 29 "technicians and associate professionals," the firm
aimed to hire 6 Africans, 2 coloreds, 5 Indians, and 16 whites. In the section where the firm
indicated "categories of employment policy or practices," where barriers to equity were identi-
fied, the firm listed only "appointments," elaborating that the "recruitment pool [is] too small."
Id. The firm also indicated that affirmative action measures had been implemented in many of
the listed categories, including "selection criteria" where the firm elaborated "lower criteria";
"appointments" where the firm indicated it was "aiming for numerical goals"; "diversity pro-
gramme and sensitization" where the firm elaborated "with managers"; and "community
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Beyond whatever legal imperative has been created by recent legisla-
tion, significant commercial or economic incentives also appear to
provide some incentive for South Africa's elite and historically all-white
law firms to hire and retain black attorneys. No one disputes some com-
mercial incentive to integrate exists for South Africa's elite commercial
legal community in a way that it rarely has, and then only quite recently,
in the United States.238 As several attorneys of all races expressed it, a
investment and bridging programme" where the firm added "do have a vacation programme."
Id. With respect to "retention measures," the firm commented that its implemented measure
was to "promote open discussions." Id.
Edward Nathan & Friedland (Pty.) Ltd., following its purchase by Nedcor, listed the fol-
lowing in its Employment Equity Report: among 12 professionals, 11 whites and I Indian;
among 37 "technicians and associate professionals," 8 Africans, 1 colored, and 27 whites.
Employment Equity Report, EEA2, filed by Edward Nathan & Friedland (Pty) Ltd. (June 1,
2000) (on file with author). The Report identified several categories of "employment policy or
practices barriers" that it considered to be barriers to employment equity. These included "ab-
sence of a comprehensive recruitment policy' "insufficient appointment of black professionals
at levels higher than trainee," "perceived gender and race discrimination in remuneration,"
"perceived gender and race discrimination in the allocation of challenging and high profile
work assignments to professionals," "evaluations for professionals held irregularly" and "in-
sufficient opportunities for inclusive social interaction, lack of a comprehensive human
resources management system" The firm did not set any numerical hiring goals. Id.
238. See, e.g., James W. Pearce et al., African Americans in Large Law Firms: The Pos-
sible Cost of Exclusion, 42 How. L.J. 59 (1988) (eight-year study relating to law firm
performance, organizational structure, and African-American lawyer representation in large
law firms posits that racially inclusive law firms that are able to leverage diversity will become
more competitive in a more ethnically pluralistic society); Suzanne Baer, The Value of Ethnic
Diversity, TRIAL, Jan. 1994, at 28 (including minority members enriches the firm and can
boost business given the recent growth trends in minority-owned businesses); Don J. DeBene-
dictis, Changing Faces: Coming to Terms with Growing Minority Populations, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1991, at 54 (corporations have begun to persuade their law firms to become ethnically di-
verse); Thelma Elizalde & Jennifer Joyce, Diversity as a Management Issue: A Call to Action,
57 TFx. B.J. 986, 987 (1994) ("[D]iversity is a business strategy designed to make a law firm
more competitive"); Donald S. Gray, One American Initiative-A Call to Action to the Legal
Profession, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Sept. 1999, at 5 (commending the diversity statement of
principle, which reads in part: "We expect law firms which represent our companies to work
actively to promote diversity within their workplace. In making our respective decisions con-
cerning selection of outside counsel, we will give significant weight to a firm's commitment
and progress in this area." Gray identifies some of the 125 companies nationwide, which have
signed the diversity statement, including Sony Electronics, Inc., Sears, Roebuck and Co., The
New York Times Co., and AT&T to name a few); Tamara Loomis, Corporate Counsel Push
Law Firms to Diversity, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 25, 2000, at 8 (explaining how various corporations,
like General Motors Corp., DuPont, and Exxon Mobil Corp., collect data from their outside
law firms on the number of minority and women lawyers working on company matter; refer-
ring to the Statement of Principle on [D]iversity, which has now been signed by more than 300
companies); see also Ghannam, supra note I I (discussing the latest practices and trends re-
garding the recruitment and retention of blacks in large U.S. law firms); Jenkins, supra note
I I (discussing Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton's failed efforts in the 1990s to retain attor-
neys of color).
Although the impact of some clients' preferences for diversity is not clear, Elizabeth
Chambliss's 1997 study of the organization determinants of law firm integration concluded
[Vol. 23:545
No Black Names on the Letterhead?
law firm needs to have black names on its letterhead in post-apartheid
South Africa.239 This need has not been created singularly by the racial
transformation of the South African government. Attendant to the post-
apartheid transformation, both public and private entities have changed
their procurement policies. Apparently reflecting the marketplace's bur-
geoning appreciation for diversity, many clients now aim to hire black
attorneys firms or, alternatively, firms with racially diverse professional
staffs. '40
A black attorney on the verge of partnership with an all-white firm
discussed the market's newfound appreciation for diversity in terms of
how his firm's own failings in this regard were preventing the firm from
getting more business:
Major clients of the firm want to see transformation. They are
ahead of us with their own transformations ... [South African]
Brewery is not giving us much work, and this is likely why.
They are ahead of their time [with respect to transformation].
Eskom, Telkom ... we haven't done any work for these giants.
If you look at Business Day and Financial Mail, where major
transactions are reported ... our name is not featuring promi-
nently in big deals. That tells you something.2'
that the racial composition of a law firm's client base was the most important determinant of
the firm's racial integration. Chambliss, supra note 158, at 739.
Some U.S. clients have asked their South African law firms to provide information about
the racial composition of their professional staff. Interview No. 75, supra note 140. Other
attorneys commented that racial diversity of law firms or otherwise "empower[ing] blacks" is
important to international clients. Interview No. 40, supra note 64; Interview No. 54, supra
note 12.
239. See, e.g., Interview No. 61, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (June 17, 1999) (34-year-old
African male, former professional assistant) (transcript on file with author). South Africans
appear to use this expression figuratively-to convey the need to be seen to have black attor-
neys, and black partners in particular. However, because African surnames and Indian
surnames are often identifiable as such, having a black named partner would in fact likely
immediately convey to the market the presence of a black partner. Under the Attorneys Act
and the rules and rulings of the provincial law societies, any past or present partner of a firm
may have his or her name used in the name of the firm. See, e.g., Ruling 5(4) of the Natal Law
Society.
240. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 3, at 1970-71 (describing some of the dramatic, virtually
"non-Whites only" hiring policies adopted by some state-owned institutions, including those
of South African Airways, the national park service, and the State rail company, Transnet,
which announced that no white could be hired without formal approval from the chairmen);
Roberts, supra note 30, at 18 (noting the ease with which black professionals can find jobs in
the current market; labeling the demand for these skills "aggressive"). In late 1993, the state-
owned national telephone company, Telkom, discovered that it had only one black manager
among its 58,000 employees. Drogin, supra note 24, at A 1. It promptly adopted "an aggressive
affirmative action plan to recruit, train and promote many more." By August 1995, this plan
had produced an additional 82 black managers. Id.
241. Interview No. 39, supra note 141.
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The managing partner of White & Case in Johannesburg told in 2000
of a then-recent pitch to a prospective, private sector client. The partner
had traveled with two of his fellow white partners to a provincial city to
tender for the work. The prospective client had inquired about the firm's
"empowerment plan," asking specifically, "Where are your black law-
yers?" The partner had responded, "They're back in Johannesburg
getting good training; it's not a good use of time and money to bring
them along for the show." The client reportedly accepted this, even
chuckling a bit, and the firm secured the business. The partner explained
that he is often asked about the firm's "empowerment program" when
his firm bids for work. "The query," he said, "is always, 'How many
PDIs do you have?' PDI, the acronym for 'previously disadvantaged in-
dividual,'" is used as a synonym for blacks, he explained, adding that
clients inquire about the category as a whole without seeking a break-
down into Indians, coloreds, and Africans.2 A mid-level attorney at the
same firm had this to say about his firm's success in garnering both pub-
lic and private legal work: "We do a lot of government work ... I have
absolutely no idea [how we get it]. We pitch along with [other elite
firms] and walk away with it. It may be because we get our demograph-
ics right."24' 3 Although all three partners in the Johannesburg office at that
time were white, all nine associates were persons of color.
44
A significant number of black attorneys interviewed saw their own
hiring as having been driven by commercial considerations on the part of
their employers-considerations associated with those attorneys being
persons of color. For example, an African professional assistant at a
white boutique said, "They have me here because they have to have me.
That is a given." When asked if this meant that the firm needs a black
attorney she replied, "Yes, that is a fact. Because they have to. 24 5 This
was not only the perception of junior attorneys, it was also a factor noted
by both black and white partners in their comments about their firms'
recruitment strategies. One newly minted African partner explained his
firm's efforts to recruit persons of color: "The top five firms are scram-
bling to get the best non-white candidates they can get .... We bend over
backwards with black candidates. It increases our profile and makes
business sense for us to have them. 246
242. Interview with Ron Goodman, supra note 128; see also Interview No. 26, supra
note 133 (describing clients' inquiries into the firm's "empowerment program").
243. Interview No. 25, supra note 133.
244. Id.; see also Interview with Ron Goodman, supra note 128 (describing the same
firm's racial composition in a similar fashion).
245. Interview No. 57, supra note 155.
246. Interview No. 26, supra note 133; see also Interview No. 7, in Rosebank, S. Afr.
(June 15, 1999) (34-year-old white male professional assistant) (transcript on file with author)
(noting the perception that it is hard to find well-qualified black attorneys).
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The apparent commercial incentives to which firms are responding
are sometimes linked to a particular client that is predominantly black or
associated with a historically disadvantaged community, such as an
ethnic group or labor union.247 In other instances, they are linked to the
composition of the post-apartheid government. For example, one African
candidate attorney, who had spent much of the 1980s and early 1990s in
exile, believed his excellent political connections had led his elite white
firm to hire him. He fully expected the firm to use him for pitches for
government work, in particular.2 8 As a white lawyer explained the
phenomenon, "a black person can speak to the government ... with a
voice that will be heard better than a white person. ' 249 He added that the
black-controlled government represented much of the impetus law firms
have to hire and retain black attorneys, as does the anticipated presence
of increasing numbers of black judges. Another partner in a top-tier firm
explained that "parastatals [state-owned enterprises] and government
The managing partner in a mid-sized predominately white firm explained her firm's diver-
sity strategy:
Our partnership is not nearly representative enough. We have no quotas, but we do
have a plan. We are looking for black and colored laterals; we want to be represen-
tative in the next three years.
Interview No. 50, supra note 77. She explained many black professionals follow a black-
consciousness ideology rather than the ANC's non-racialist philosophy, which causes them to
be averse to integration into white firms and to prefer all-black firms. Id.
The perception that black attorneys are commercially valuable based on their skin color
seems only to have emerged recently, however, as interviewees describing the situation in the
early 1990s noted clients did not care if black lawyers were being integrated into these firms
and actually doing their legal work. Interview No. 23, supra note 77. Indeed, there are some
indications that this is still the case with some clients.
247. One lawyer whose predominantly white firm had long represented labor union in-
terests commended her firm for its hiring and training of young black lawyers, but added that
the firm was not doing enough and that sometimes black clients were not insistent enough
regarding the firm's efforts. Interview No. 59, supra note 39 (African female associate part-
ner). Referring to her firm's labor union client base, she said: "Sixty to seventy percent of the
firm's work comes from black people. Big clients should demand to have blacks participating
in their work." Id. Bell, Dewar & Hall was another firm with better-than-average history of
black hiring during apartheid. This was likely related, at least in part, to their representation of
the Bafokeng tribe both during and following apartheid. See supra note 77.
248. Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (African female candidate attorney referring to the
circumstances of her fellow black candidate attorney, who had been a student activist and later
was in exile during the latter years of apartheid). A number of the lawyers interviewed, aware
of the marketability of their color, believed that they had been or would be used as window
dressing or tokens in pitches for work. See id. (African female candidate attorney whose
mother was a senior master in the Northwest Province, home to one of the firm's important
clients); Interview No. 61, supra note 239 (African male who had been recruited by a top-tier
firm in order that he could "attract government work"). Some added that after being used in
such pitches, they had later not been included in the actual performance of the work. See, e.g.,
Interview No. 23, supra note 77.
249. Interview No. 9, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (June 10, 1999) (29-year-old white male profes-
sional assistant) (transcript on file with author).
Spring 20021
Michigan Journal of International Law
agencies insist-we state in our tenders [for business] which black
professionals will be involved and how they will be involved in the
deal." 0
Yet another African attorney, the sole black professional in her
former firm, believed the mid-sized white boutique had hired her
because of the presence and preferences of international clients. She
noted in particular S-Curl, the U.S. black hair care products company,
whose in-house counsel was an African-American. The firm had needed
to give the appearance of empowering black South African attorneys in
order to cultivate and retain such "black" U.S. business. 25' Another
attorney was keenly aware his ethnicity played a role in causing a
breakaway commercial firm to recruit him. The colored professional
assistant had been told by the firm's managing partner, whose job offer
he ultimately declined: "You're a good lawyer. You're also a black
lawyer. Come work for us. We don't have enough black lawyers. 212
Other attorneys, while acknowledging clients in the new South
Africa are increasingly attuned to issues of diversity, were more skeptical
about the power of this interest to drive genuine integration in top-tier
firms. These attorneys believed tokenism or window-dressing would sat-
isfy these clients, whose commitment to diversity hardly exceeded lip
service. They opined that most private sector clients, in particular, were
concerned literally only with seeing a few black faces in the firms they
engaged, and these clients did not expect, let alone demand, a significant
degree of integration.253
250. Interview No. 40, supra note 64.
251. Interview No. 47, supra note 71.
252. Interview No. 54, supra note 12.
253. See Interview No. 7, supra note 246 (white male professional assistant stating that
most clients will be satisfied by the presence of token blacks); Interview No. 51, in Johannes-
burg, S. Afr. (Mar. 15, 2000) (white male partner) (stating that the commercial incentive
created by most clients is not so great that it cannot be satisfied by the current practices of
firms in simply bringing in black lawyers, while not doing what's necessary to retain them)
(transcript on file with author); E-mail from Daniel Steenkamp, supra note 3 ("having blacks
on the letterhead is very PC-required only if dealing with clients who have a high public
visibility" such as large practices within institutional clients).
Indeed, there are also indications that some clients do not wish to have blacks involved in
doing their legal work. For example, one African female was told that she could not have her
own clients because they would not trust a black attorney and that it would cause the firm to
be sued for malpractice. Interview No. 22, supra note 133. One Indian partner in a top-tier
firm told of having an Indian client ask the firm's managing partner whether the Indian partner
could be trusted, implying that the question arose because of his race. Interview No. 40, supra
note 64; see also Interview No. 44, supra note 88 (speaking of clients being distrustful of
young lawyers generally, but young black lawyers particularly); Interview No. 63, in Pretoria,
S. Afr. (June 28, 1999) (28-year-old sole African male partner in mid-sized, predominantly
white firm) (speaking of the incredulity of a firm's client that his legal matter was to be han-
dled by a black attorney); E-mail from Daniel Steenkamp, supra note 3 (speculating that some
attorneys firms are reluctant to hire blacks and to expose them to clients out of fear the client
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In addition to the perceptions articulated in the interviews, very little
official information about clients' procurement policies and the role di-
versity plays in these policies is publicly available. While information is
more plentiful with respect to public sector entities than for those in the
private sector, the information generally applies to the procurement of
goods rather than services. It therefore provides little specific informa-
tion about how these entities would assess providers of legal services for
black involvement in the delivery of those services."4 In particular, it is
difficult to know whether clients seek firms with black partners or direc-
tors or whether they are satisfied with the presence of black professional
staff at any level.
What is clear is that many clients who value diversity are utilizing
schemes that pair black firms with white firms to complete a given legal
task. While admirable in their goal of achieving skills transfer, as I dis-
cuss further in Part VI, these pairing schemes arguably deter integration
because they discourage black and white attorneys from joining forces in
truly multiracial firms.
C. Responding to the Incentive
Given that South Africa's elite law firms have commercial incentives
to integrate, it is appropriate to consider how the firms are responding to
these incentives. The following Sections discuss how elite firms recruit
and train attorneys, as well as consider how race has influenced these
practices in post-apartheid South Africa.
will object to the "black protdgd"); Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 15-16, 18 (noting
that black attorneys in white firms are not permitted to perform commercial work for banks
and similar institutions because those clients "prefer dealing with people of the same colour").
In addition, many black attorneys felt that companies did not expose them to a variety of fields
of law, including company law and conveyancing, while they were doing their articles. Id. at
16.
254. Information on private sector procurement practices is not publicly available. With
respect to the public sector, more information is available. Black businesses have urged re-
views of the government's procurement policies, in particular that greater preferences be given
to black suppliers. Some have called procurement policies aimed at black economic empow-
erment a joke, noting the fronting exercises that have dominated government procurement
deals, "referring to white businesses' use of black middlemen to secure government contracts."
See Gavan Tredoux, 'Give Us Our Pie' Says Black Business, REUTERS, Oct. 16, 2000, at
http://www.mugu.com/pipermail/upstream-list/2000-October/000580.html (on file with au-
thor); see also supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text (discussing the efficacy of skill
transfer schemes).
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1. Flexibility Regarding Traditional Hiring Priorities
Has Led to Gains by Blacks in Hiring
We don't want kaffirs because they have no conceptual under-
standing of issues. We don't want women because they bleed on
the furniture, and we don't want [homosexuals] because they
make passes at us.
-Comment reportedly made to a University of Witwatersrand
law student during a job interview
with a top-tier Johannesburg firm
255
The recruitment procedures followed by South African law firms at
the turn of the 21st century are somewhat similar to those in the United
States during the late 1950s and early 1960s.256 As in that U.S. era, the
hiring process in South Africa is relatively informal and brief. While the
process is becoming increasingly structured in South Africa, with the
largest firms conducting interviews on the campuses of the most prestig-
ious law faculties as a precursor to and sometimes in lieu of invitations
to interview at the firms' offices,257 many hiring decisions are still made
based on a single event. That event is either a candidate's on-campus
interview or the candidate's visit to the law firm's office during a univer-
sity holiday period.2 5' Formerly, these interviews were most often
255. See, e.g., Interview No. 8, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 17, 1999) (white female
law student) (transcript on file with author). Although hearsay, and perhaps only a "campus
legend," the comment reflects the attitudes many students believe these elite firms have with
respect to their hiring preferences. See also Barclay, supra note 7, at 32-33 (reciting various
questions that law graduates were asked and comments made to them by interviewers, which
students considered offensive and unprofessional; these included: (i) a suggestion to a female
student that she would not be able to cope in the high-pressure environment, and (ii) chal-
lenges to students, in the context of their turning down jobs, to explain their reasons for doing
so).
256. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 545.
257. For example, the University of Cape Town organizes a Law Graduate Placement
Program during which attorneys firms and other prospective employers come to campus to
conduct interviews with final-year students. Barclay, supra note 7, at 11; see also Interview
No. 40, supra note 64 (partner in top-tier firm indicating that most candidate attorneys are
hired in on-campus interviews, but that others "get hired when sending in resumes because
they are so outstanding"); Interview with Andrew Skeen, Dean of the University of
Witwatersrand Law Faculty, supra note 41 (indicating that some attorneys firms come to the
Wits campus to conduct screening interviews).
258. In the 1998 University of Cape Town study, two-thirds of the interviews were
conducted in the UCT Careers Office, whereas one-third were held in the firm's offices.
Barclay, supra note 7, at II. Whether the interview takes place at the law firm's office or on
campus often depends on the relative locations of the university and the law firm's office. Id.
For example, 32% of the 305 interviews were conducted with Johannesburg firms, 8% with
Pretoria firms, and 60% with Cape Town firms. Id. Forty-six percent of the interviews
conducted with Cape Town firms took place in the firm's office, whereas only 18% of the
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secured by the candidate applying in writing to the firm. The larger and
more prestigious law faculties now also facilitate the process with more
centralized application schemes.259 Alternatively, offers for candidate at-
torney positions are sometimes made based on performance during a so-
called "vac" or vacation placement, a nominally paid or unpaid intern-
ship that lasts only a few weeks during a university vacation period.
26°
interviews held with Johannesburg firms were conducted in the firm's Johannesburg offices.
Id. As the study concluded, this is likely attributable to the fact that most University of Cape
Town students are based in Cape Town and it is easier and less costly for them to interview
with Johannesburg firms when those firms visit campus than by traveling to Johannesburg to
do so. Id.
259. Indeed, many of the interviews that occur on campus are also arranged by the can-
didate applying to the firm directly by submitting a curriculum vitae, rather than being
facilitated by a careers placement program at the university. Under these circumstances, firms
pre-select those whom they will interview. When the interviews are facilitated by the careers
office, firms have no opportunity to select which students they will see. Instead, each student
is permitted to sign up for four interviews of his or her choice, with students on the Dean's
Merit List being permitted to attend more interviews if law firms approach them separately. Id.
260. South African firms do not have vacation internship programs on the scale of U.S.
law firms' summer associate programs. The largest South African firms have perhaps half a
dozen "vac" students in the firm at any given time. See Interview No. 21, supra note 60 (Afri-
can male was candidate attorney at same firm where he had participated in a "vac" program);
Interview No. 27, supra note 96 (African male who had served in a couple of "vac" place-
ments with elite firms in the early 1990s); Interview No. 43, supra note 140 (African male
described his "vac" placement at top-tier firm, where he later served articles, as giving broader
exposure, if less responsibility, than his candidate attorney stint). A number of students who
participated in the University of Cape Town study indicated that they had secured articles with
the same firms where they had previously had "vac" placements. Barclay, supra note 7, at 30.
Some said that they were comfortable going back to those firms because they knew the envi-
ronment and feared going to a firm that they did not know. Id. Some firms view their "vac"
programs as "bridging" programs aimed at reaching students from disadvantaged back-
grounds. See Employment Equity Report filed by Werksmans Attorneys, supra note 237.
Since the late 1980s, an increasing number of these "vac" jobs for black law students have
been arranged through the Integrated Bar Project (IBP), a program of the University of Preto-
ria's Centre for Human Rights. See What is the IBP?, at http://www.up.ac.zalchrlibp/ibp.html
(last visited July 1, 2002) (on file with author). The program places black law students in
"vac" jobs with law firms, courts, advocates, and commercial banks. A number of the best
performing students are then placed in longer-term paid positions, including as candidate
attorneys with elite commercial firms. Ultimately, a few black law graduates each year are
placed in international postings, with law firms in the United States and in The Netherlands.
Between the project's inception in the late 1980s and December 1998, approximately 450
students were placed in three-week internships, or "vac" jobs, during July university holidays.
Id. The project has been subject to some controversy because it places only black students. In
June 1999, white University of Pretoria students were challenging the project's exclusivity.
Interview with Prof. Christof Heyns, IBP Project Director, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (June 23, 1999);
see also Deborah Fine, Bar Project's Exclusivity 'Necessary', Bus. DAY, Mar. 26, 1997, at
http://www.bday.co.za/97/0326/news/n29.htm (discussing complaints that IBP serves only
black students) (on file with author). A 2000 study evaluating the effectiveness of the IBP
concluded that it was meeting its objectives by "exposing students to commercial law and to
the practical side of the legal profession." Cmty. Agency for Soc. Inquiry (CASE), Evaluation
of the Integrated Bar Project, at 19 (Dec. 2000) (unpublished report available from CASE), at
http://www.case.org.za/htmpubli.htm (on file with author). Noting that some "stakeholders
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Although there is a great deal of discussion in the media about South
Africa's post-apartheid legal "brain drain,, 261 the market for recent law
graduates seeking to complete their articles of clerkship appears clearly
to be an employers' market in which competition for jobs is stiff.262 One
managing partner of a mid-sized white firm indicated that her firm re-
ceived 700 applications in the previous year for only three to four
candidate attorney positions.163 A second managing partner, of a small
white boutique, indicated he just interviewed more than a dozen appli-
cants for professional assistant positions, but that only one or two offers
would be made.26 Such competition is consistent with the conventional
wisdom of the marketplace that firms do candidate attorneys a favor by
employing them because doing so is often a loss-making proposition for
the firm. It also means a plentiful supply of raw labor exists for firms,
and the onus is on prospective employees to differentiate themselves
from one another in order to get hired.
While recruitment processes themselves are somewhat transparent,
the hiring patterns, priorities, and criteria of South African firms are
more difficult to discern given the lack of collected data on who the
country's elite firms are hiring. As in the United States, South African
law firms primarily hire to secure the services of young lawyers who will
best meet the firm's labor needs. Firms also hire to signal their quality to
clients, competitors, and prospective recruits. While the goals of U.S.
and South African firms in the two legal labor markets are the same, the
attributes seen as making a young lawyer the best-or more accurately,
the attributes that endow her with the potential to become the best, differ
somewhat.
As in the United States, the minimum credentials most South
African firms accept probably include both law school reputation and
grade components.2 65 The minimum acceptable level of academic
... expect the IBP to have made a visible impact on the commercial legal field within a short
period of time," the authors of the study called for more realistic expectations. Id. Among the
conclusions of particular relevance to this project were the call for host firms to provide more
structured training that involves students in the work of the firm rather than leaving them to
observe. Id. at 16.
261. See, e.g., A Change of Game, supra note 74.
262. The number of law graduates from all South African Universities was 2,325 in
2000, up from 1,380 in 1991. O'Regan, Producing Competent Law Graduates, supra note 68.
263. Interview No. 50, supra note 77. Another said that his black commercial firm might
receive as many as 200 applications each year, while hiring perhaps only one candidate attor-
ney from among them. Interview No. 56, supra note 123. The attorney also pointed out that
the firm doesn't take in candidate attorneys as a matter of charity but rather that it expects
them to pull their weight. Id.
264. Interview No. 55, supra note 3.
265. Barclay, supra note 7, at 19 (concluding that the strength of a candidate's academic
record and ranking on the Dean's Merit List substantially increased the candidate's chances of
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achievement in South Africa's top-tier firms is likely well below what
elite U.S. firms would consider a superstar level, however, and is perhaps
even below the minimum acceptable level for an average attorney in a
large U.S. firm. South African firms have typically considered and
weighed heavily factors other than grades in deciding whom they will
employ. In particular, landing an elite legal job-if only an agreement to
complete one's articles at one of these prestigious firms-can still
depend on family connections.266
As in the United States, it is common for partners in elite South
African law firms to say they seek young lawyers whose "personality"
will "fit" nicely into the existing institution. "Fit" sometimes refers to
cultural fit, including the right family connections. A 1998 study of the
University of Cape Town Unit on Law, Race, and Gender supports the
assertion that "fit" is an important hiring criterion. Sixty-one percent of
the ninety-four applicants surveyed reported being asked in their
interviews to describe some aspect of their personality, for example, to
identify their strengths or weaknesses.2 67 The study also concluded that
being offered a job interview, but that being offered a position as a candidate attorney de-
pended ultimately on the candidate's suitability for the firm's criteria and "culture"); see also
Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 17 (noting the difficulties associated with students from
HDUs).
266. The University of Cape Town study indicated that family contacts are extremely
important when it comes to securing articles. Barclay, supra note 7, at 17. "The majority of
white interviewees indicated that they were offered places in law firms only because they had
prior contacts such as family and friends who had recommended them. Black candidate attor-
neys, on the other hand, were of the opinion that they were lucky to have been selected in the
first place." Id. Others credited contacts through their high schools. The study also noted the
widespread practice of asking law students during interviews about their family connections.
In addition, a number of students were "asked in their interviews about whether they knew this
person or that person from a particular school, reinforcing the 'old boys network,'. . . making
it clear that where you go to school and who you know is more important than what you
know." Id. at 16; see also Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 13 (majority of whites inter-
viewed said they were offered law firm jobs "only because they had prior contacts with family
and friends who had recommended them"); E-mail from Interviewee No. 67 to Lisa R. Pruitt
(June 19, 2001, 11:25 PST) (emphasizing that because blacks have no economic power, "they
are regarded as not being able to truly and meaningfully contribute to the law firms since they
cannot bring big commercial clients to the firm") (on file with author).
Thirty-two percent of those interviewed in the study reported they were asked about their
parents and families. Barclay, supra note 7, at 17. Two white females elaborated that the in-
quiring firms had specifically asked about the students' "fathers' occupations to assess their
social standing and the type of clientele they could attract based on family connections." Id.
One told of the interviewer asking whether her father played golf after he was unclear, in light
of her earlier answers, who her father was. The other said that the "interviewers were obvi-
ously 'networking' to see if they can get business from my family connections." Id.
267. Id. at 19-20. Interestingly, the study concluded that women were more likely to be
asked this type of question because in comparison to the 61% average, 78% of white females
and 82% of black females were asked this type of question. Id. Some female study partici-
pants speculated that women are more likely to be asked these questions, consistent with the
greater difficulty they have, as compared to their male colleagues, to convince employers that
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while good grades may help a candidate secure a job interview, securing
articles "ultimately depended on a candidate's suitability for the firm's
criteria and culture. 268
Elite firm attorneys who make hiring decisions often articulate "fit"
in terms of assertiveness-those who will not sit in their offices waiting
for work to come to them.269 One young black partner explained that his
firm uses the interview process to try to identify those with
"[p]artnership potential." He went on to say, "We try [to] engage the per-
son in conversation, to see if the person is confident enough. 270
Law students also observed that personality and fit are assessed dur-
ing the interviewing process.27' Several noted substantive questions are
rarely asked and when they are, they are intended more to determine if
the candidate can "bullshit," not to determine if he or she knows the an-
272
swer to the question.
In their quest to identify students who will "fit" into their institution,
law firms often ask race and gender-related questions of those they inter-
view. Certainly, many of the questions asked would be considered
inappropriate by U.S. standards, and a number of South African students
found them offensive, too. For example, many female students had been
asked about their marriage and family plans during their job inter-
they "have what it takes" to be good attorneys. Id. Topics such as schooling, academic
achievement, long-term plans, and personality were more frequently discussed with male
students than with female students, suggesting that men are treated more seriously and with
more interest in the individual than women. Id.
Other subjects commonly broached in interviews, which were considered non-
controversial, included school activities (58%), academic achievement (64%), hobbies (54%),
legal experience (58%), long term plans for future (70%), leaving South Africa (24%), spe-
cialization (84%), and salary (34%). Id. at 15-27.
268. Barclay, supra note 7, at 19.
269. Interview No. 55, supra note 3; Interview No. 9, supra note 249.
270. Interview No. 26, supra note 133. The importance of "fitness" in the recruiting
process is demonstrated by partners' emphasis on "organic" firm growth over mergers between
firms. Interview No. 15, supra note 3. As they explain it, growing the firm from within has the
benefit of permitting young lawyers to be brought up in the ways of the particular firm, ensur-
ing that they fit into the firm's distinctive culture by training them to do so. "The person must
be fully integrated into the firm, our principles, our ethics ... Our policy is that [candidate
attorneys] get exactly the same training." Id.
271. For example, one African law student opined that interview panels mostly want "to
get to know the candidate's personality, asking why [he or she] is interested in law." Interview
No. 46, in Johannesburg, S. Aft. (Mar. 17, 1999) (African female) (transcript on file with au-
thor); see also Interview No. I in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 17, 1999) (colored female law
student felt interviewers "primarily wanted to get a sense of [her] ability to relate") (transcript
on file with author). But see Barclay, supra note 7, at 32-33 (one student characterized her
interview as "a bit of an interrogation" and opined that questions were "designed to 'catch me
out' instead of asking what I had to offer").
272. See, e.g., Interview No. 1, supra note 271; Interview No. 71, in Johannesburg, S.
Afr. (Mar. 17, 1999) (Indian female law student) (transcript on file with author).
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views.273 Several black attorneys and law students also told of having
been asked how they would be able to relate to the firms' clientele.274 The
implication, based on their class and/or their color, was that these stu-
dents would not easily rub elbows with the firms' highbrow commercial
clients.275
Both black and white students complained that black students
seemed to be interviewed later in the hiring season than their white
counterparts.276 They noted this impeded the blacks' ability to get the best
jobs because receiving an initial offer from a smaller or less prestigious
firm often enabled a student to leverage that opportunity into an offer
from a more prestigious firm. 7
273. Interview No. 8, supra note 255 (white female law student said that she refuses to
answer interviewers' questions about her family plans); Interview No. 29, supra note 71 (Afri-
can female who had completed her candidacy at a mid-sized commercial firm told of being
questioned about her boyfriend and marriage plans); Interview No. 45, supra note 217 (white
female law student of Portuguese descent said she was told: "If you decide you want to go off
to Portugal to have babies, just let us know so that we don't waste our time"); Interview No.
47, supra note 71 (noting that when she interviewed with her former firm, they had asked if
she was married and if she had any prospects of marrying soon).
Similarly, the University of Cape Town study revealed that women are more likely than
men to be asked about their marital status and their plans for having children. Barclay, supra
note 7, at 22. In that study, 7% of those interviewed were asked about their marital status, and
another 6% were asked about their "boyfriend/girlfriend/partner" Id. Six percent were asked
about their plans for children. Id. One woman said that "two of three firms asked very gender-
related questions, i.e., did I intend to marry and have a family." Id.
274. See, e.g., Interview No. 53, supra note 133 (firm inquired of Indian female when
she was a law student: "what does your father do for a living?" When she responded that he
was a truck driver, the interviewer inquired: "You understand the type of clientele we have.
How will you be able to relate?"); Interview No. 54, supra note 12 (colored male reported
being asked how he would relate to the firm's white corporate clientele and responding that he
would relate "like any other young attorney").
275. One student told of being asked by a top-tier firm if students perceived this firm to
be racist. She had responded, "All Johannesburg area firms have this reputation" explaining
that the inquiring firm was not considered more racist than its elite counterparts. Interview No.
71, supra note 272.
276. Interview No. 4, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 17, 1999) (Indian male) (transcript
on file with author). The University of Cape Town study indicated that 63% of interviewers
asked candidates whether they had other job offers. Barclay, supra note 7, at 26. One student
commented: "It seems as if firms have specific 'quotas' to fill with regard to the number of
women or non-white students they employ. They seem to fill these as an afterthought, in other
words after they have selected their white male students." In addition, the study showed that
colored males had twice as many interviews, on average, as other groups. Id. at 10. It is not
clear whether this means that colored males have more difficulty in securing articles and
therefore must participate in more interviews, or whether it is indicative of their desirability. In
addition, there was a widespread perception among University of Witwatersrand final-year law
students in 1999 that fewer blacks were receiving articles in commercial firms. See, e.g., id. at
15. The Law Student Council, a student government organization, was planning to write letters
to firms commenting on this. Interview No. 45, supra note 217.
277. See Interview No. 4, supra note 276. The importance of leveraging a first job offer
in order to attract other offers was confirmed by the University of Cape Town study. As one
colored male student said, "Firms act like sheep when it comes to selecting their candidates.
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A review of South African hiring procedures indicates that, as in the
United States, there are opportunities within the recruiting process to
disguise or camouflage racially discriminatory hiring decisions. While
"fit" or "personality" as a decision-making criterion is not expressed in
relation to race, assessment on that basis may be a proxy for race dis-
crimination in South Africa, just as Wilkins and Gulati assert it is in the
United States. Furthermore, because South African firms do not publicly
state objective criteria for hiring, like minimum grade levels, the entirety
of the South African decision-making part of the process is invisible and,
therefore, insulated from the checking or correcting power of the market
or other institutions with the power to scrutinize.
Whatever the credentials that elite law firm employers in South
Africa find attractive, whites have long been more likely than blacks to
possess them. Even when blacks have attended historically white
universities, they rarely have been academic superstars. Many blacks
still enter university without the educational foundation needed to excel.
In addition, blacks may find these settings intimidating, and their lower
expectations of themselves may become self-fulfilling prophecies.279
Moreover, the greater likelihood that blacks hold part-time jobs to
support themselves, and in some instances their families, undermines
academic performance.8
Once they think you're a wanted commodity, the offers come rolling in." Barclay, supra note
7, at 26.
278. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text (discussing the historical disparity in
educational opportunity); Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 144 (discussing differential educational
standards of black and white teachers). Some participants in a recent survey on the profession
suggested that blacks graduating from HDUs needed additional mentoring and a longer period
of articles in order to compete with their white counterparts. Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note
7, at 10.
279. One Indian female candidate attorney, reflected on her experience at a predomi-
nantly white university: "Blacks, Indians sat in the front row of class but didn't speak"
Interview No. 53, supra note 133. Another said that at university, "black students sat in the
front of the classroom, the Indians behind them, then the whites .... the white students didn't
respect the blacks." Interview No. 21, supra note 60. As one young colored attorney noted,
many blacks first witnessed white fallibility only once they were at university. "It was the first
time many blacks had heard a white make a mistake," he said. Interview No. 25, supra note
133; see also Interview No. 40, supra note 64 (noting that "[alpartheid was so successful be-
cause it used race and class to undermine how blacks saw themselves" and that "the oppressed
were led to believe" that they possessed an "inherent defect"); Jomills Henry Braddock 11 &
James M. McPartland, Social-Psychological Processes that Perpetuate Racial Segregation:
The Relationship Between School and Employment Desegregation, 19 J. BLACK STUD. 267,
269-71 (1989) (suggesting that in the United States desegregated experiences early in life
create a different attitudinal basis among blacks that, in part, produces or sustains desegrega-
tion in adult life).
280. One study on access to the attorneys' profession concluded "financing their studies
was not a major problem for the majority of white graduates who had their studies paid for by
their parents or received bursaries from the Department of Justice at the time. The same can-
not be said for black graduates, some of whom indicated that they had worked whilst doing
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In addition, few aspiring black attorneys have historically had the
sort of family connections that make them more attractive to law firms.
As one Indian candidate attorney expressed, "[w]hites have contacts.
Arrangements for where they will do articles are made when they're in
kindergarten."28 ' Nevertheless, some black law graduates have found
themselves with valuable human capital in the form of their color,
political connections, or top-notch educational accomplishments. Some
black attorneys who were active in the struggle believe that their political
connections have made them more marketable candidates for
employment.282
Another group of politically connected black attorneys has proved
perhaps even more marketable in post-apartheid South Africa. Many in
this latter group were educated outside South Africa while their
parents-ANC and other anti-apartheid activists-were in exile during
the struggle to end apartheid. The political stature of these attorneys,
paired with educational opportunities that have often surpassed even
those of many white South Africans, have made them extremely
attractive to elite law firms. They are what some in the marketplace refer
to as "soft blacks,"283 a reference not only to the superior educational
opportunities they have enjoyed, but also to the social and professional
experiences that allow them to assimilate into these elite establishments
with greater ease. According to several partners interviewed, all firms are
scrambling to hire these black attorneys from privileged backgrounds,
who bring with them the current benefits of their color, but little or none
of the historic disadvantage associated with it.
28
their articles part-time while others sourced funds through relatives, and in the last instance,
by way of bank loans." Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 10; see also Barclay, supra note
7, at 3 (noting that blacks more often must work to finance their studies); O'Regan, Producing
Competent Law Graduates, supra note 68, at 4 (speculating that half of enrolled law students
are from "disadvantaged backgrounds whose families scrimp and save to cover the costs of
their admission to law school").
281. Interview No. 53, supra note 133.
282. Interview No. 52, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (July 1, 1999) (35-year-old African male
who had been detained several times during his university years) (transcript on file with au-
thor); Interview No. 31, supra note 3 (African male who went into exile to avoid arrest for his
political activities) (transcript on file with author).
283. Interview No. 13, supra note 109.
284. One white managing partner said that he aggressively goes after black South Afri-
cans who have spent time abroad, either because they were raised and educated there while
their parents were in exile or because, for example, they had received Fulbright Scholarships
to study abroad. Interview No. 55, supra note 3. Another white partner commented that it is
the easy way out for firms to hire blacks from more privileged backgrounds, such as from the
"traditionally more privilege[d] Indian community" or "soft blacks who grew up and went to
the universities ... in London." Interview No. 13, supra note 109. Another said all the firms
are scrambling to hire the best black candidates, implying that everyone wants the black su-
perstar. Interview No. 26, supra note 133. Another white attorney said that his firm was
"proactive about hiring the best blacks," and that his firm had "just hired a black candidate
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Even blacks without political connections or prestigious foreign
educations have something working in their favor in the 21st century
South African labor market-their "blackness."285 Because in the new
South Africa, a young attorney's color may prove commercially valuable
to a law firm, it is similarly valuable to the candidate herself. The follow-
ing Section discusses firms' use of affirmative action programs, which
reflect the market's newfound appreciation for diversity. Firms are hiring
more black candidates than ever before-even when these blacks do not
satisfy traditional hiring criteria. The changing marketplace for legal ser-
vices, in other words, has altered the profile of the ideal new hire,
creating an alternative highly desirable profile.
2. Affirmative Action Programs Suggest that Blacks Are Unqualified
You['re] okay. You have [a] basic kind of competence. You're
unlikely to embarrass us. But we're nudging you because you
are black.
-African attorney explaining the meaning of
affirmative action at his elite firm
86
The term "affirmative action" carries a range of meanings in South
Africa, just as it does in the United States. At one end of the spectrum,
some associate "affirmative action" with the provision of employment
opportunities and training to those who have previously been denied
them. As one young black attorney expressed it: "We are historically dis-
advantaged and must be given opportunities. People must be willing to
train us. They must give us exposure, training.... So, affirmative action
should be some sort of bridging program to help blacks cope. 2 87 A white
attorney who is well connected, knows the Johannesburg mayor, ministers in the government.
Firms are looking at what candidates can bring to the firm, the job. He probably had good
marks. [The firm] wouldn't necessarily lower standards." Interview No. 7, supra note 246.
This is consistent with the shortage of highly-trained blacks in other professions and
fields in South Africa, a shortage that has reportedly produced "'feverish' bidding wars among
private employers for a relative handful of highly skilled non-White employees, but that it
bodes ill for hopes of significant immediate progress in integrating the middle and upper ranks
of private industry." Ford, supra note 3, at 1975 (citing Drogin, supra note 24).
285. See Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 12 (noting the perception that the attor-
neys' profession currently favors blacks, that black candidate attorneys are highly mobile);
Interview No. 13, supra note 109; Interview No. 14, supra note 3 (referring to the great mobil-
ity of black professionals).
286. Interview No. 42, supra note 133.
287. Interview No. 22, supra note 133. The African female professional assistant went
on to say, "Yeah, it was obvious I was appointed on an affirmative action basis, but not neces-
sarily because I was not able... " Id. Another professional assistant, explaining what the term
means in the context of public sector hiring, indicated that it makes previous disadvantage
only one factor considered in hiring and that this diminishes the importance of factors such as
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partner in an elite firm used the term similarly, focusing on the tempo-
rary character she believed appropriate for such employment and
training policies. "Meritocracy cannot be reconciled with affirmative
action. Once balance is restored, merit must be restored. Black people
had enormous expectations. But you cannot write a new constitution and
immediately have everything come right."'288
At the other end of the spectrum, "affirmative action" is sometimes
used to refer to the practice of employing those without the minimum
skills to perform a given job. When used to refer to such policies, it is
often called "reverse discrimination." '289 One African junior partner at a
law firm used the term in that way when he said: "The firm has no af-
firmative action policy as such. Law is too complicated ... and it would
be a disservice to create jobs for people who are not capable of handling
them."2'9
Whatever precise definition is given to the term, "affirmative action"
in South Africa has a broader function than it has had in the United
States. While in the United States it has meant creating opportunities
for members of a minority group, one journalist expressed its role in
South Africa as "transforming an economy that once barred 75% of the
population from any meaningful role."'29' Another commentator has
length of service and seniority. Interview No. 14, supra note 3. In deciding whom to hire or
promote, "suitability" for the position is assessed. Id. She explained that this term considers
"previous disadvantage" along with "notions of length of service, merit, etc." Id.
288. Interview No. 15, supra note 3.
289. See Legislation Closing the Equity Gap in SA's Companies, Bus. DAY, June 6, 2001
(citing a survey by Deloitte & Touche Human Capital Corporation, incorporating FSA
surveys, which found that 35% of 27 companies "noticed a deterioration in the standard of
work and productivity as a result of affirmative action. This was attributed mainly to a lack or
experience and training"), at http://www.bday.co.za/content/direct/l,3523,864015-0678-
0,00.html (on file with author); Affirmative Action: Experienced by Whites as Reverse
Discrimination, FIN. MAIL, Oct. 8, 1996 (citing a 1996 FSA-Contact study that shows that
60% of organizations spend 2% or less of their annual salary/wage bill on training and
development programs; indicating that many organizations pay above-average salaries,
especially to black recruits who help their affirmative action programs look successful), at
http://www.fm.co.za/96/181096/LA.4.html (on file with author); see also Roberts, supra note
30, at 22.
290. Interview No. 26, supra note 133. Note that this is the same partner who character-
ized his firm as seeking to get the best non-white candidates they could. See supra note 244
and accompanying text. The implication, then, is not that race doesn't influence hiring deci-
sions at all, but that the firm is looking for black superstars. Another partner in a white
boutique explained that affirmative action means creating a position for a qualified black,
regardless of current need, whereas no position would be created, absent need, for an equally
qualified white. But see Barclay, supra note 7, at 14 (noting student opinion that Johannesburg
firms have more aggressive affirmative action programs than firms in other cities).
291. Menaker, supra note 28, at 5A; see also Michelle Singletary, S. African Blacks Now
Fight for Jobs, Wealth, WASH. POST, May 21, 1994, at A16 (quoting Nelson Mandela: "The
whole social program of the new democratic government which we envision for South Africa
will be one of affirmative action."). Several South African authors have written about
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characterized the ANC's "expansive" philosophy of affirmative action as
including not only "measures to redress past discrimination, but also re-
quires public and private actors to build an equal society through
redistribution and corrective policies."292 Consistent with these functions,
affirmative action hiring programs have been implemented in the post-
apartheid period with some degree of aggressiveness in both the public
and private sectors.293 Reflecting this trend, most major South African
firms have increased their efforts to recruit previously disadvantaged
persons following apartheid's demise. 4 The majority of these appear to
affirmative action. See, e.g., AD9LE THOMAS, BEYOND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, MANAGING
DIVERSITY FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1996); T. H. Mandala,
Affirmative Action-A South African Perspective, 52 SMU L. REV. 1539 (1999).
292. Kim Robinson, False Hope or a Reasonable Right? The Implementation of the
Right to Shelter under the African National Congress' Proposed Bill of Rights for South Af-
rica, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 513 (1993).
293. See A Change of Game, supra note 74 (discussing the issue of "fast-tracking" black
professionals, which would be a type of affirmative action); Ford, supra note 3, at 1970-76;
Roberts, supra note 30, at 18.
One recent study indicates that those appointed on the basis of affirmative action are not
being given appropriate training and thus affirmative action is not serving the desired end. For
example, 60-80% of management representatives indicated they did no assessment of the
training needs of affirmative action appointees, while 80-90% said they doubted whether the
needs of affirmative action appointees were any different from the needs of other employees.
Affirmation Is Just Not Enough, Bus. DAY, July I1, 2000, at http://www.bday.co.za/bday/
content/direct/1,3523,655336-6078-0,00.html (on file with author). Twenty to fifty percent of
affirmative action appointees said they had received no training; for those who had received
training, it was of a very general nature. Id. Ninety percent believed affirmative action was not
working. Id.
294. See, e.g., Interview No. 25, supra note 133; Interview No. 42, supra note 133; In-
terview No. 58, in Sandton, S. Afr. (June 29, 1999) (African male professional assistant)
(transcript on file with author) (all acknowledging that their top-tier firms engaged in affirma-
tive action hiring). One partner in a mid-sized white firm with an activist history said her firm
was seeking black laterals in order to achieve greater diversity. Because of attrition issues, she
said her firm was specifically seeking those it would have a better chance of retaining. She
said her firm was seeking "people who love the law, are committed to the law; non-[black
consciousness]; [they] must be committed to ethos of firm, the socio-political morality of it.
Our goal is to retain one of the three over the long run." Interview No. 50, supra note 77. An-
other said that when his firm used the expression "affirmative action" it meant that they would
create a slot for a black candidate with the standard credentials, whereas they would not create
a place for a white candidate with the same credentials. The clear indication was that no dif-
ferentiation existed between the credentials required of a black candidate and those required of
a white candidate. Comment by white partner in boutique firm in Pretoria, S. Afr. (June 12,
1999). See A Change of Game, supra note 74; Roberts, supra note 30, at 22.
The University of Cape Town study of its law graduates' placement experiences in 1998
also indicated that firms are engaging in affirmative action. Barclay, supra note 7, at 28. In
particular, students believed firms were using hiring quotas. One colored male had found it
highly disconcerting to be asked his race when he phoned a Johannesburg firm to arrange an
interview. He believed this meant he might be seen as a token, which offended him greatly. Id.
The students also believed that affirmative action is implemented at the candidate attorney
level, but "fades at higher levels" in the firm. Id. In a 2000 study, all attorneys' firms respond-
ing to a survey indicated that they were "in the process of developing employment equity and
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have altered their hiring criteria in order to achieve that goal. Interest-
ingly, white women are often considered to be "previously
disadvantaged persons" under these schemes, 95 and some attorneys of
color are quick to speculate that white women are likely to be the great-
est beneficiaries of affirmative action programs which, consistent with
the goals of the Employment Equity Act, seek to redress employment
inequities based on gender as well as race.2 96
In addition to altering their hiring priorities in order to achieve a
more integrated professional workforce, these firms are also communi-
cating to their various constituencies the value they place on a diverse
professional workforce.2 97 For example, most of these firms hint at or
directly laud their dedication to diversity on their websites.2 8 A few of
the largest firms' websites feature a "Recruitment" or "Employment"
page where they note their efforts to recruit law graduates from "previ-
ously disadvantaged" communities.2" Additionally, several of the largest
affirmative action plans." Of the firms surveyed, approximately 3 1 % said they had "policies
with regard to race." Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 15.
295. See supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text (discussing the Employment Eq-
uity Act, which compels each employer to assess the diversity of its workforce in terms of
race, sex, and disability and then to identify any barriers contributing to the "lack of affirma-
tion of diversity in the workplace"). Because the Act does not impose quotas based on race,
gender, or disability, and because each employer is left to set its own goals, these employers
could presumably look more diverse merely by hiring more white women, even while failing
to hire more persons of color and disabled persons. See also supra note 34 (noting the paucity
of women in management positions in South Africa).
296. Interview No. 22, supra note 133 (speaking of white women being preferred over
their male counterparts); Interview No. 3 1, supra note 3 (speculating that Indians will be fa-
vored over Africans and coloreds).
297. For example, one colored law student was very impressed when a Cape Town firm
interviewing him asked his opinion on how the firm could accommodate racial integration. He
characterized as "'inspiring'" the firm's "'genuine concern for addressing this problem.'"
Barclay, supra note 7, at 28.
298. The firm of Bowman Gilfillan, Inc., for example, describes itself on its homepage
as a "diverse group of people with a broad spectrum of skills," who "follow a policy of em-
ployment equity and are committed to creating an even more diverse team in terms of
ethnicity, gender and religion." Bowman Gilfillan, Inc., Home, at http://www.bowman.co.za
(last visited Sept. 3, 2001) (on file with author). Werksmans states on its homepage that "[t]he
firm is fully committed to supporting the [Reconstruction and Development] program, believ-
ing that it can make a major contribution to South Africa's future success by educating
previously disadvantaged black attorneys with commercial legal skills. It does this by engag-
ing and educating black attorneys within its own ranks, but is also involved in educating black
lawyers outside of the firm in many aspects of corporate law, through relationships with black
law firms." Werksmans Attorneys, Home, supra note 217, at http://www.mbendi.co.za/
werksmans/co.za.html.
299. Deneys Reitz hosts a recruitment link that emphasizes diversity, stating,
Deneys Reitz recruits top graduates from law faculties around the country. We are
an equal opportunity employer and in making our selection are mindful of the im-
balances in the make up of the legal profession in South Africa. We pride ourselves
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firms convey an image of diversity through subtle, diversity-oriented pic-
tures on their websites. For example, one firm displays under the caption
"Our People" a photo of a large group of professionally-attired black and
white men and women, many of them apparently in their twenties and
thirties.3°° The implication is that the photo portrays the firm's junior and
mid-level attorneys. That firm also displays an image of black and white
partners working side by side.'O Another firm shows an image of a black
hand locked in a handshake with a white one.
While the vast majority of black attorneys interviewed support
affirmative action in principle, most do not wish to be thought of as af-
firmative action hires within their firms, and they do not wish to be
"tokens." Because that label often implies the employment or promotion
of unqualified or lesser qualified candidates on the basis of their color,
on the diversity of candidates we select and employ and on the top class training
provided.
Deneys Reitz, Recruitment, at http://www.deneysreitz.co.za (last visited Dec. 26, 2000) (on
file with author). The firm of Hofmeyr, Herbstein states, "Hofmeyr employs law students and
attorneys who have demonstrated exceptional abilities, regardless of their race, gender, age,
religion, national origin, sexual orientation or disability.... As a matter of policy and practice,
Hofmeyr actively seeks out historically disadvantaged candidates and encourages them to
interview with the firm." Hofmeyr, Herbstein, Employment at Hofmeyr, at http://
www.hofmeyr.co.za/employment-at-hofmeyr.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2002) (on file with
author). Some firms have social awareness links, where they emphasize the firm's involvement
with the development of the "new South Africa." For example, Webber Wentzel Bowens'
"Corporate Strategy" and "Social Responsibility" links describe the firm's corporate social
responsibility programs. Webber Wentzel Bowens, Social Responsibility, at http://
wwb.co.za/socialresponsibility.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2000) (on file with author); Webber
Wentzel Bowens, Corporate Strategy, at http://wwb.co.za/general.htm (last visited Dec. 26,
2000) (on file with author). A few of the programs discussed include the "Cop of the Year"
program, WWB's practice of donating PCs to previously disadvantaged schools, and support-
ing organizations for abused children. Webber Wentzel Bowens, Social Responsibility, supra,
at http://wwb.co.za/socialresponsibility.htm. The "Corporate Strategy" page comments, "We
recognize that the environment in which businesses operate is constantly changing. Therefore
our aims and objectives, directed to providing excellence of service to our clients, are posi-
tively developing with flexibility to adapt to the constantly shifting business scene created by
the dynamics of the clients for whom we work." Webber Wentzel Bowens, Corporate Strategy,
supra, at http://wwb.co.za/general.htm. The firm of Hofmeyr, Herbstein states, "The energy
and experience in legal matters which attracts clients to Hofmeyr is reinforced by ... the
firm's recognized commitment to the new South Africa and the vital part it played in cultivat-
ing the peaceful environment in which the April 1994 elections took place." Hofmeyr,
Herbstein, About Hofmeyr, at http://www.hofmeyr.co.za/about-hofmeyr.htm (last visited Jan.
24, 2002) (on file with author).
300. See Bowman, Gilfillan, Inc., Home, at http://www.bowman.co.za.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2001) (on file with author). In February 2001, the site displayed a black and white
photo of a number of its staff, which gave the impression of a professional staff with a large
number of blacks. As of September 14, 2001, the website had changed and no longer showed
this image.
301. See Bowman, Gilfillan, Inc., Home, supra note 300, at http://www.bowman.co.za.htm.
302. See Werksmans Attorneys, Home, supra note 217, at http://www.
werksmans.co.za.html.
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blacks fear it will cause them to be judged as unqualified for the jobs
they hold. °3 Although some, like the young attorney quoted above, ac-
knowledge the need that blacks may have for bolstering their skills
because of their previous disadvantage, these attorneys do not equate this
with being unqualified for professional jobs in the post-apartheid period.
One black attorney, discussing the possibility that his firm would make
him a partner ahead of schedule when the firm's prior sole black partner
left, was staunchly opposed to the prospect. "We are under pressure, es-
pecially since [the black partner] left. There were rumors I would be
appointed prematurely [so that] the firm would have a black director. I
would have rejected it if offered because appointment of convenience,
not merit, would be the perception."3 4
Black attorneys who did not suffer educational disadvantage during
apartheid and whose credentials are objectively at the superstar level, are
particularly resentful of the assumptions that the market sometimes
makes about them because of their race. One colored attorney whose
parents, both teachers, had sent him to private schools, said, "I'm middle
class, educated. I've been to better schools than most of my white peers.
I don't need to be affirmed." '5 Others professed not to be bothered by
303. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 30; Ford, supra note 3, at 1959 (citing Affirmative Ac-
tion: Needed Change or Clumsy Bid to Correct Past?, AP WORLDSTREAM, Oct. 8, 1995,
available at LEXIS, News Library, APINL File; The Darkening of White South Africa, THE
ECONOMIST, May 20, 1995, at S18); Barclay, supra note 7, at 28 (colored male student com-
mented that firm's inquiring about his race when he called to arrange an interview "hints at
tokenism"; he went on to say that he would prefer to win the position on merit, rather than
because of his race).
In a 2001 survey, 41% of Africans saw racism as possibly occurring in the context of em-
ployment equity policy or affirmative action. S. Afr. Inst. of Race Relations, supra note 3, at
http://www.sairr.org.zalpublications/pub/ff/200112/rainbow.htm. However, only 16% of Afri-
cans in the higher lifestyle categories and only 25% of African professionals, managers, and
other high level occupations voiced these concerns. Id. In other words, those who stood to
receive the greatest benefit from race-based preferences were least likely to object to them. Id.
304. Interview No. 39, supra note 141 (African male professional assistant); see also A
Change of Game, supra note 74 (quoting several partners of large elite law firms who con-
clude that selective "fast-tracking" of black professionals is undesirable).
The phenomenon of discrediting blacks in the face of affirmative action hiring schemes
has also been identified as a hindrance to black advancement in the United States. See Wilkins,
Partners Without Power, supra note 164, at 29 (discussing the case of a black lawyer with a
prominent Chicago firm, whose story was chronicled in PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD
BLACK: A STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999)).
305. Interview No. 25, supra note 133 (colored male professional assistant); see also
Roberts, supra note 30, at 22. Another attorney, this one an Indian partner in a top-tier firm,
observed that "[p]eople don't want to make it just because they are black; they don't want to
be tokens, with the associations that accompany that." He went on to say that when people
inquire how blacks got into these firms, they contemplate "three possible answers:
(1) [B]ecause he's black, full stop, (2) because of a combination of factors-'he's not so bad
for a black,' or (3) [h]e's the best of the lot [of blacks] we have-let's go for it." Interview No.
40, supra note 64.
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assumptions of their inferiority. An Indian woman, also likely a superstar
based on her academic credentials, said she had not been treated as an
affirmative action hire by the top-tier white firm where she had done her
articles. "My being black was a bonus to them. I had an excellent aca-
demic record., 36 Another said: "People do [sometimes] assume I am an
affirmative hire; conservative people do assume that. I just do the best
work I can."3°7
Thus, while affirmative action means more blacks are being given
opportunities in the post-apartheid period, these comments illustrate one
of its most significant downsides: widespread assumptions that such hir-
ing preferences are causing blacks to be placed in jobs for which they are
unqualified or for which there are better-qualified white candidates. Be-
cause white colleagues may assume that blacks are affirmative hires who
are not capable of certain tasks, black attorneys may not be given the
opportunity to perform these tasks, or even to acquire the skills to equip
them, ultimately, to do so. 308 The following Section highlights another
complication associated with affirmative action hiring programs, specifi-
cally their failure to respond to the sometimes unique training needs of
some who are affirmative-action hires, those who may require additional
training due to their previously disadvantaged circumstances.
3. Training Efforts Fail to Respond to the
Needs of Many Black Attorneys
I'm rotting. I'm literally rotting in that office. I almost hate to
come to the office. I'm getting tired and I'm getting depressed.
-African female professional assistant on the lack
of opportunity at her white boutique firm3°9
[T]he partners should not just see if you can cope.... The part-
ner should ask if the candidate attorney is just incapable-or
whether he just needs development.
-African professional assistant at a top-tier firm3
306. Interview No. 70, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Mar. 15, 1999) (Indian female associate
partner) (transcript on file with author).
307. Interview No. 26, supra note 133.
308. Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (African female candidate attorney lamenting not
being given the work of her fellow candidate attorneys when they were away from the office
for a period); see also Interview No. 67, supra note 141 (discussing how some black candidate
attorneys get no work); Interview No. 68, supra note 133 ("Lots of firms don't accommodate
blacks . .. they hire them but don't train them. They get to park the partner's car, do photo-
copying").
309. Interview No. 57, supra note 155.
310. Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
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Very little information is publicly available on how South African
law firms train and promote those they hire.3 ' Nevertheless, the training
opportunity represented by the candidate attorney period is somewhat
more formalized and transparent than the remainder of the path to part-
nership, in part because it is overseen by the provincial law societies
who ultimately grant admission to practice. During an aspiring attorney's
candidacy, she is formally assigned to a particular admitted attorney.
That attorney serves as the candidate's principal and is registered as such
with the relevant provincial law society.3 2 Because the principal is often
responsible for the candidate's workload and training in practice as well
as by official designation, the principal assigned often makes a critical
difference to a young attorney's experience in a firm. One young attor-
ney described his very positive relationship with his principal this way,
focusing on the ethic of respect:
[H]e was a very good trainer, so he would take you by the hand
... he encouraged you to make a contribution even if you may
feel it's not appropriate. When we were with clients, I mean, he
wouldn't treat me like a second rate [attorney], chew me out or
whatever, you know? ... He would treat me ... as a colleague
who would ... portray a picture to the client. We [were] both
rendering professional services to him as professionals. He is the
senior professional, but I am the junior professional. But we are
both ... part of the team and he would ... allow me to make
certain decisions in ... you know, in front of clients, ask me for
my input and that... that builds your confidence, you know, and
you realize that and the clients realizes you're not simply there
to ... to take notes.33
In addition to the mentoring that occurs through the formal assign-
ment of principals to candidate attorneys, informal mentoring
311. Similarly information is not readily available on firms' practices with respect to hir-
ing laterals, an alternative to retaining blacks that would also allow these law firms to achieve
more meaningful integration among the ranks of their senior attorneys.
Attorneys from a few firms did mention they had hired blacks as laterals in the post-
apartheid period. Interview No. 55, supra note 3; Interview No. 56, supra note 123. Many of
the blacks hired as laterals were relatively junior, meaning they had just completed their can-
didate attorney stints or had been admitted attorneys for only one or two years. See, e.g.,
Interview No. 22, supra note 133; Interview No. 25, supra note 133 (demonstrating instances
where attorneys moved from the firm where they completed articles to different firms once
they were admitted as attorneys); Interview No. 47, supra note 71. One firm, noting the diffi-
culty it was having retaining blacks, indicated that it was actively seeking to hire as laterals
attorneys of color. Interview No. 50, supra note 77.
312. §§ 5-6 of Attorneys Act 53 of 1979.
313. Interview No. 39, supra note 141.
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relationships sometimes also evolve.3 4 One colored attorney described
the outstanding mentoring provided by a white female partner at the top-
tier firm where he completed his articles. He respected the attorney not
only for her substantive expertise, but also for her commitment to black
professionals.
I worked for a great partner ... in my humble opinion one of the
best commercial lawyers in the country. She is acutely sensitive
to issues of race, but she doesn't have time to address them at a
firm level. No molly-coddling. She challenges you, treats you
respectfully, expects a lot. She is aware of race, but won't com-
promise the work standard. When race issues arose, she would
call people in to discuss the situation-one by one. This was in
the midst of her 14-hour days. She did this without patroniz-
ing-just listening and trying to change things a little. In the last
three years, she had almost exclusively black clerks. She will
expose you to her practice 100%. [The senior partner in the
firm] would not. The first matter he sent me-to meet with a cli-
31.
ent, an Indian man.
While these attorneys of color were among several who lauded the
ways in which they had been mentored, more lamented the lack of men-
toring."' One candidate attorney even described the acrimonious
relationship that had developed between him and his principal, noting
that at one point the principal had threatened not to sign the requisite
documents supporting the candidate's application for admission."' Yet
another attorney observed a "schizophrenia" in firms like hers: "Some-
times we are mentored, but generally blacks are overlooked. 38
A range of reasons might be offered for the less productive mentor-
ing relationships discussed in the interviews, as well as for the complete
lack of mentoring about which some complained. For example, personal-
ity conflicts no doubt sometimes arise, undermining these relationships.
In addition, some senior attorneys surely make less time for training than
314. None of the attorneys interviewed spoke of programs by which their firms formally
assign mentors following the termination of the candidate attorney-principal relationship. The
firms apparently assume that to the extent mentoring relationships are valuable, they will sim-
ply emerge.
315. Interview No. 25, supra note 133.
316. See, e.g., Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (stating "[n]o one has taken me on to be
my mentor").
317. Interview No. 31, supra note 3. One black attorney in the same firm felt he had
been well mentored but observed that his colleague, Interviewee 3 1, had not been so fortunate.
He explained that the colleague had fallen "into the hands of an inconsiderate principal." In-
terview No. 39, supra note 141.
318. Interview No. 54, supra note 12.
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do others. Thus, even in a labor market in which the proportion of senior
attorneys to junior attorneys is close and opportunities for training are
good, training experiences will rarely be very standard or equal. Some
attorneys will always get less or poorer quality training than others. In
post-apartheid South Africa, however, blacks appear to represent a dis-
proportionate number of those who receive poor training, inadequate
mentoring, and fewer opportunities for professional development. Given
the historical and social context, it is difficult to imagine that distrust or
animus based on race is not a significant reason for the professional ne-
glect suffered by some of these black attorneys.
In addition to one-on-one training, most larger firms also offer for-
mal training opportunities to all of their junior attorneys, in particular to
their candidate attorneys."9 Some large firms rotate attorneys through
various departments as part of their training programs so that the candi-
date attorneys get experience in different practice areas."' Larger firms
may also offer paid time off for candidate attorneys to prepare for and
take the admissions exam, as well as specialized exams.32' In addition,
some firms invest in more formal training, as by conducting in-house
seminars on a particular subject for all candidate attorneys.322 The effec-
tiveness of such formal training is unclear, however, at least with regard
to meeting the needs of attorneys from previously disadvantaged back-
grounds. One attorney characterized his former firm's efforts this way:
"To [the firm's] credit, they did organize lunchtime seminars, an addi-
tional learning environment for all professionals. The theory is good, but
in practice it is not that effective."323
A recent study of affirmative action programs in other sectors of
South African business similarly questions the efficacy of training
programs that do not take account of the needs that those from
previously disadvantaged backgrounds may have for supplemental or
remedial training. The study indicates that the training needs of
319. As one white partner expressed it, "Our policy is that [black candidate attorneys]
get exactly the same training. But then they must get the work and do it. We do. If a person is
trained, he must carry his weight. This is not just idealistic. It is good for the firm." Interview
No. 15, supra note 3.
320. But see Interview No. 14, supra note 3; Interview No. 49, supra note 77; Interview
No. 26, supra note 133.
321. See, e.g., Interview No. 75, supra note 140. This preparation generally includes a
short course through the Practical Legal Training School of the Law Society of South Africa.
See Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 99.
322. For example, Edward Nathan & Friedland on its website boasts a "Practical Legal
Training Programme which includes a series of formal lectures by experts in various fields of
the law and practical work under the guidance of experienced practitioners." Edward Nathan
& Friedland, Training, at http://www.enf.co.za/working-at-enf/serving-clerkship/intro.asp
(last visited Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
323. Interview No. 25, supra note 133.
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affirmative action hires are not being met by such general training,324 and
the interview data indicate that this holds true in the context of law firms,
too."' Specifically, ninety percent of managers surveyed indicated that
they doubted that the training needs of affirmative action appointees
were any different from the needs of other employees. Eighty percent of
affirmative action appointees said their training needs had not been
assessed and those who had received training said it had been of a
general nature. Thirty to forty percent reported that if they had been
given performance assessments at all, these had been irregular.326
While relatively little information is available on how firms train and
mentor young attorneys, even less is available regarding promotion poli-
cies and practices, which completely lack transparency. In the past, some
large firms appear to have engaged in lock-step promotion of classes of
attorneys, but practices in this regard seem to vary more in the post-
apartheid period. More firms, for example, are setting compensation for
second-year candidate attorneys and for professional assistants according
to how they have performed in terms of their fee targets during previous
years.327 In addition, a number of those interviewed indicated that firms
324. Affirmation Is Just Not Enough, supra note 293 (reporting on a study by Edith
Makakane of the Milpark Business School MBA program). "The view that the training needs
of all employees can be satisfied by standardized courses or by 'sink or swim' on-the-job
training has long been questioned. This is even more questionable in the case of affirmative
action appointees given the education many received under the old government." Id.
325. See, e.g., Interview No. 22, supra note 133 (African professional assistant arguing
that firms must give all attorneys, including affirmative action hires, "enough exposure, suffi-
cient training:' and that the firms must "continually assess your progress, see which areas you
need to develop or which areas that you are good at, so that you know where you stand");
Interview No. 43, supra note 140 (African candidate attorney noting that candidate attorneys'
individual needs should be assessed and met rather than senior attorneys assuming that if a
young attorney fails once, he is simply incompetent).
One partner in a top-tier firm defended the practice of not tailoring training to the needs
of the individual attorney. He said:
You don't want to create the impression you are treating [blacks] differently. You
don't want to reinforce the differences. The easiest thing is to be normal-to treat
white and black the same way. The minute you suggest to a black student the need
for augmentation of skills, they will assume you are racist for underscoring the
difference. The white student might say, on the other hand, "I'm from an
impoverished background. Why nothing for me?"
Interview No. 40, supra note 64.
326. Affirmation Is Just Not Enough, supra note 293.
327. One black female attorney who had completed her articles and worked briefly as a
professional assistant at a top-tier firm said that differential in salaries "were a serious bone of
contention and actually were the one thing that showed true favouritism" of whites. "What
they did was to offer the blue-eyed girls and boys higher rates than the rest of us, pumped
them with a lot of work and then gave them high salaries after we had all complained that the
increase from the previous year was minimal and did not take into account [the] rise in infla-
tion and living expenses and interest rates, etc." She said that some of the white professional
assistants were earning as much as ZAR 2,000 to ZAR 3,000 per month more than their black
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do not necessarily have established requirements regarding the path to
partnership, particularly in terms of the number of years required prior to
consideration.3 28 Thus, there appears to be greater flexibility within the
internal labor market to indulge black attorneys more time to demon-
strate that they are partnership material-or more of an opportunity to
delay partnership decisions about them without clearly signaling to the
candidates themselves, or to competing employers, that the attorney's
partnership quest lacks merit, In short, there is an easier opportunity to
take time to nurture these candidates' partnership potential, or to take
advantage of them by continuing to dangle the carrot of partnership, de-
pending on the decisionmakers' inclination.
Some of the interviews with black attorneys provide insights into
their perceptions of how promotion decisions are made, including the
decision to retain a candidate attorney as a professional assistant once
she is admitted to practice. This decision may fairly be characterized as a
promotion decision rather than simply one about retention because the
end of the candidate attorney stint leaves the firm with no legal obliga-
tion to retain the newly admitted attorney. It thus functions as a natural
decision point for the firm, deciding whether to retain the candidate
attorney once she is admitted, and for the newly admitted attorney decid-
ing whether to stay if asked. Many top-tier firms retain and promote to
professional assistant, as a matter of course, the vast majority of candi-
date attorneys they train. These firms offer employment to all except
those whose work is unquestionably unacceptable or who clearly do not
fit into the firm, perhaps ten percent of all candidate attorneys.329 At the
other extreme, a few prestigious firms typically retain only ten to twenty
counterparts but added, "Of course it was all confidential so we were never really in a position
to confront them about it." She anticipated that management's response would have been that
the higher paid professional assistants were billing more fees and thus that the higher rate of
compensation was justified. E-mail from Interviewee No. 67 to Lisa R. Pruitt (May 17, 2001,
14:16:58 EST) (African female who had completed articles at a top-tier firm) (on file with
author). An African male candidate attorney complained that when he became a professional
assistant he would receive less compensation than his colleagues because in the past they had
billed more fees than he had. Interview No. 73, supra note 227.
328. See, e.g., Interview No. 67, supra note 141; Interview No. 42, supra note 133; Tele-
phone Interview with Interviewee No. 37 (Jan. 22, 2002).
329. One former candidate attorney in a top-tier firm said that her firm made offers to re-
tain as professional assistants 15 of the 17 candidate attorneys in her class. One of those not
offered a position as a professional assistant was a white woman. See E-mail from Interviewee
No. 67, supra note 135. Another attorney said that her firm never fires anyone and that all
candidate attorneys are given the opportunity to stay at the firm as professional assistants. She
noted that this may eventually have to change for economic reasons. Telephone Interview with
Interviewee No. 37, supra note 328. Another professional assistant at a very progressive firm
said that all candidate attorneys have the opportunity to become professional assistants at her
firm. Interview No. 14, supra note 3.
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percent of their candidate attorneys as professional assistants, keeping
only the very best.33°
Whichever philosophy a firm employs, apparently little stigma typi-
cally attaches to a firm's decision not to retain a young attorney once
articles are completed. 3 ' There is surely, however, a greater stigma at-
tached to a firm's decision not to retain a newly admitted black attorney,
particularly in the eyes of other elite firms from whom the attorney
might seek employment. This greater stigma would arise from the as-
sumption that the black is not of a high caliber because if she were, the
firm would retain her with a view toward achieving the coveted black
names on the letterhead. In short, because the market arguably values the
black superstar even more than the white superstar, the signal to the
market is that blacks who are not kept on as professional assistants are
not superstars. Because competing law firms are only highly interested
in employing black superstars, the newly admitted black attorney who is
passed over by the firm where she completed articles is unlikely to have
opportunities with other similarly prestigious firms. For the same rea-
sons, a black attorney passed over for partnership is unlikely to have
opportunities for partnership at competing firms. In short, these attorneys
will not likely be perceived as black superstars and will not be highly
marketable except to non-elite firm employers.
A few attorneys discussed their experiences regarding promotion to
partnership. While only anecdotal, these do illustrate some of the
experiences that black attorneys have in their quests for partnership. Fee
collection and client management were recurring themes among those
who discussed promotion to partnership issues. One African attorney on
the verge of a partnership decision had been told at his last appraisal,
"You're there. We're happy for you. The door is open .... The way to
get in is to meet your targets, collect your accounts"332 Another African
attorney, who in 1999 had been elated at her then-recent promotion to
associate partner at her firm,333 was denied equity partnership in the firm
in 2001 and departed to take a job with a major South African
corporation. She wrote, "Out of the blue, they told me they could not
invite me to partnership because my supervisor says since I returned
from [my leave] he had not had time to assess me. Nonsense, and I told
330. Interview No. 69, in Plettenburg Bay, S. Afr. (Mar. 30, 2000) (white male who had
completed articles at a prestigious white firm) (transcript on file with author).
331. E-mail from Interviewee No. 67, supra note 135. As she explained it, there is a
ready market for newly admitted attorneys who have completed their articles at her top-tier
firm because of the perception they have been very well trained. See also Interview No. 13,
supra note 109 (noting the desirability of all young lawyers trained by his firm).
332. Interview No. 39, supra note 141.
333. Interview No. 59, supra note 39.
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them as much.'334 She added that the firm had gone on to make some
"questionable appointments" that, in combination with the denial of
partnership to her, had resulted in other blacks leaving the firm over the
following few months.335 Another black had been similarly frustrated on
his path to partnership, which had been delayed several times, at a top-
tier firm.336 He felt that the firm had, on several occasions and over the
course of several years, moved the proverbial goal posts regarding what
he had to do to make partner. His perseverance had paid off, however, as
he was made a salaried partner in 1998 and an equity partner in 2000.
7
These anecdotes represent at least part of the black perspective re-
garding why attorneys of color are underrepresented in South Africa's
elite commercial law firms, particularly among the ranks of partners.
D. Establishment Explanations for Black Underrepresentation
Given the situation described, it is relatively easy to conclude that
the problem of underrepresentation in elite law firms is more one of re-
tention than of recruitment. A reasonable number of attorneys of color
are being employed by. elite firms in the post-apartheid period, but they
are either being nudged out prior to partnership, choosing not to stay, or
some combination of these two. A number of reasons are typically of-
fered for the relative scarcity of persons of color in mid-level and senior
positions in these firms. These are considered below.
1. Blacks Are Intellectually Inferior to Whites
There are people with warped minds who believe all black peo-
ple are stupid. This can be difficult to deal with at times.
-African professional assistant at a top-tier firm338
334. The attorney had returned one year earlier from a leave of absence during which she
served as a law clerk to a Justice on the Constitutional Court of South Africa. E-mail from Inter-
viewee No. 59 to Lisa R. Pruitt (Dec. 17, 2000, 15:49:00 PST) (on file with author). Some
partners in her firm had encouraged the leave of absence; others had not. Interview No. 14, supra
note 3.
335. E-mail from Interviewee No. 59, supra note 334.
336. Interview No. 42, supra note 133.
337. Id.; E-mail from Interviewee No. 67, supra note 135.
338. Interview No. 39, supra note 141. Another explained, "white people ... don't have
much confidence in black people, you know." Interview No. 29, supra note 71. Yet another
opined that white firms make a "judgment on your intelligence immediately.' Interview No. 57,
supra note 155 (African female). An African woman candidate attorney was accused by the
senior professional assistant with whom she worked of being "intellectually lazy." She said that
when speaking about black people, "he'd go on about competence." Interview No. 67, supra note
141; see also Interview No. 22, supra note 133 (noting perception that white candidate attorneys
at her former firm saw both black candidate attorneys as being "not capable" because they
were black). In a 1987 survey, 39% of senior attorneys surveyed agreed with the statement
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Given the recency of apartheid, it is surely an understatement to say
that South Africans have different expectations of persons on the basis of
their race. Indeed, race-based stereotypes appear to run to every segment
of South African society, including culture, personality, interests, intellec-
tual ability, values, and ethics. Among these, a myth of black intellectual
inferiority still holds sway among many South Africans. It no doubt affects
the way the white establishment perceives and treats black attorneys. Thus,
an openly racist white explanation for why there are so few blacks in
South Africa's elite commercial law firms would be an assertion of blacks'
inferior intellects. On this basis, many white South Africans would opine
that racial animus plays no role in the lack of integration; rather, blacks are
simply doomed to failure in these meritocratic institutions.
While black South Africans often believe they are viewed as
intellectually inferior simply because they are black, whites in the new
South Africa are unlikely to admit harboring such views, at least in mixed
company. Nevertheless, any South African employer who holds such a
view, even subconsciously, will have a ready justification for discriminating
against a black candidate. This is true even if the discriminatory act is
preferring to hire a white with average credentials rather than a black with
similarly average credentials or, as is more likely the case, preferring to
mentor and train a white attorney rather than a black attorney. Thus, while
the notion has no currency in most of the world, to the extent a presumption
of black intellectual inferiority persists among white South Africans, it
undermines the career prospects of black attorneys.
2. Blacks Have Less Human Capital Than Whites
[Blacks] must want the skills, must work for it. They must un-
derstand the need continuously to be improving their profile.
-African male partner at a top-tier firm339
The problem of institutional culture of large law firms is hard for
[blacks]; if they have had Model C educations, they usually can
cope. If they are covering some basic educational inadequacy,
they may wind up more alienated than ever.
-White female judge "°
"Black candidate attorneys are less competent than their white counterparts." Steenkamp,
supra note 7, at 161.
339. Interview No. 26, supra note 133.
340. Interview No. 30, supra note 34. One African professional assistant from a very
disadvantaged background described his first perceptions of the top-tier firm where he did
articles:
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A related reason offered for blacks' underrepresentation in South
Africa's elite law firms is that, due to a combination of historical, cul-
tural, and political reasons, black attorneys tend to have less human
capital then their white counterparts. A major cause of most blacks' hu-
man capital deficit is the inferior educational opportunities that the
majority of black South Africans have had both during apartheid and, to
a lesser extent, following its dismantling in the early 1990s.14 1 Inferior
formal educational opportunity has meant that many blacks have been
handicapped by, as one example, never having learned how to speak or
write English in a grammatically correct way. In addition, the fact Eng-
lish is rarely the first language of black South Africans means attorneys
of color face the added challenge of working in their second or third lan-
guage.31 2 Needless to say, in the highbrow world of commercial law
[W]hen I came into the firm, it was intimidating because then I wasn't very much
aware of the outside world, as it were. I was not aware of like work ... the various
habits that a person has, the various attitudes that people have about you. I was very
much blank about those.
Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
341. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. As one scholar has written, "If
South Africa is to remedy the apartheid era's deliberate neglect of 'human capital' accumula-
tion among non-Whites, it will have to overcome formidable resource constraints." Ford,
supra note 3, at 1975; see also Interview No. 29, supra note 71 (African female noting that
blacks are less likely to have participated in certain extracurricular activities if they attended
HDUs because these activities are not available at HDUs and explaining that the lack of these
opportunities might make them less desirable candidates for employment); Interview No. 50,
supra note 77 (stating that while her firm was highly committed to achieving diversity, the
firm was pleased that some blacks had chosen to leave because they "didn't make the grade in
terms of hours, quality, etc.").
342. As one young African female lawyer stated with respect to Zulu being her first lan-
guage: "I have to work more than a white girl has to work. I have to put in twice as much
effort-because Zulu is my first language, because my education, background is not as good.
It's the history that we find ourselves in. We cannot change it; it's very irritating." Interview
No. 47, supra note 71; see also Interview No. 22, supra note 133 (commenting on the difficul-
ties of working in a language other than one's native tongue). Another attorney commented
that blacks who speak English well are more marketable to elite firms. Interview No. 27, su-
pra note 96. One black law student told of being asked repeatedly in her interview with one of
the most elite commercial firms in Johannesburg whether she could speak Afrikaans. She
responded, "When I have to speak Afrikaans, I can." Interview No. 46, supra note 271.
In addition, the University of Cape Town study found that 24% of the student respondents
had been asked in job interviews about their language skills. Barclay, supra note 7, at 25. One
black male student had been told by a large Pretoria-based firm that they were looking for
somebody who could fit into their culture, i.e., someone who could speak Afrikaans well. Id.
He said, "I wonder why they had come into an English-speaking university to recruit [candi-
date attorneys] if this criterion counted." Id. Another black male said, "The questions
regarding language seemed to suggest that blacks generally don't understand English." Id.; see
also Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 13, 18 (noting the language barriers that sometimes
exist for black attorneys, both in firms and before the courts); Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 143
(discussing handicap represented by blacks' poor language skills).
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practice, such visible inadequacies may prove serious impediments to a
young lawyer's success.
While few would disagree that both inferior education and the ne-
cessity of functioning in one's second or third language represent
formidable obstacles, most would also agree they are not insurmountable
ones. With training and effort, the writing and speaking skills of a non-
native English speaker, like those of a native English speaker who has
never learned proper grammar, can be refined, improved, and raised to a
widely acceptable, even perfect level. Nevertheless, the cost of sur-
mounting the obstacle may be considerable, both in terms of the time
needed to achieve such fluency and proficiency, and the resources re-
quired to finance the effort.
In addition to educational and language handicaps, blacks in South
Africa often have less access to the type of social networks that can ulti-
mately be very valuable in the practice of law, particularly for the purposes
of business development. The lack of such social capital may be due in
part to blacks' historical lack of opportunities to leverage friendships and
social contacts into professional or business networks. As a consequence,
blacks may not instinctively do so when they have the chance.343
Accordingly, while black attorneys represent assets to their firms to
the extent that clients are more attuned to diversity issues, black
attorneys still rarely have human capital in the form of social
connections to be rainmakers by more traditional or direct means. The
disparities created and perpetuated by apartheid mean that black lawyers
have fewer of the traditional markers of academic success than their
white counterparts. Such deficits in human capital may be the basis for a
white firm's lesser investment in the training of young black attorneys.
343. See Interview No. 26, supra note 133 (stating that black attorneys must continually
work to improve their profile, but implying that many do not do so); Interview No. 33, supra
note 133 (African male discussing black economic empowerment groups' preference for white
attorneys). But see Interview No. 34, supra note 49 (indicating that his black firm would de-
velop business from existing networks); Interview No. 39, supra note 141 (black attorney near
partnership stating that he attracts commercial work by virtue of his black "networks:' includ-
ing "friends... in powerful positions in government").
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3. Blacks Lack Exposure to and Are Uninterested
in Commercial Legal Work
I knew how to spell "stock exchange," but I didn't know what it
was. Whites, on the other hand... many had inherited trust portfo-
lios, were managing these by the time they were in their teens.
This stuff was discussed at the dinner table, was second nature to
whites.
-Indian attorney in a top-tier firm'
Another factor often blamed for black attorneys' lack of suitability
for commercial law practice is that very few had contact with commer-
cial matters while growing up. A number of the attorneys interviewed,
both black and white, opined that blacks are at a considerable disadvan-
tage if and when they join commercial law firms because they have
rarely, if ever, been exposed to the language and concepts of commercial
law.'4 A colored male who had worked at two different elite firms ex-
pressed it this way, "A corporate environment-well, no blacks have that
background ... for familiar historical reasons. 3 46 One white male part-
ner in a top-tier firm commented on the significance of many blacks
having grown up in a house where, for example, a car purchase had
never been financed. He said that while some people focus on the cul-
tural differences between blacks and whites when discussing law firm
integration, perhaps the more significant difference lies in the two
groups' experiences or opportunities. 47
Whether this factor has any real significance with respect to one's
ability to become an excellent commercial lawyer, or even a solid one,
may fairly be questioned. First, like the ability to speak or write English
using proper grammar, rudimentary commercial law principles can be
learned. Indeed, one can presumably learn the terminology and concepts
associated with commercial law more easily than one can become a flu-
ent speaker and writer of impeccable English grammar, particularly if
one's handicap with respect to the latter is at all severe. In addition, the
344. Interview No. 40, supra note 64. Indeed, this lack of exposure is, in part, what law
firms are likely referring to when they ask black candidates, in the course of job interviews,
how they will relate to the firm's clients. See supra notes 274 and accompanying text.
345. Some expressed the phenomenon in relation to educational opportunity. One Afri-
can female who had completed her articles at a mid-sized firm said, "People who are from
[HDUs] do not have a keen grasp of commercial issues, as opposed to people who are from
advantaged institutions." Interview No. 29, supra note 70. Another said that those "from his-
torically disadvantaged institutions don't have as good a grasp of commercial issues as those
who've studied at Wits." Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
346. Interview No. 25, supra note 133.
347. Interview No. 13, supra note 109.
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relevant handicap with respect to past exposure to commercial law is
surely not the need to learn all commercial law. Rather, the relevant dis-
parity is the degree to which the young black attorney lags behind the
white one at the outset. Thus, if junior white attorneys generally have
had only casual exposure to commercial matters, they actually know
very little commercial law. Thus, in order to function at the level of the
average white, a black attorney would have to do relatively little catching
up. Much of this is presumably achieved in an introductory commercial
law class early in one's legal education. What differential in knowledge
remains, if any, should be eliminated in the early months of training and
work in a commercial firm. It is in the practice of commercial law that
the real, meaningful learning about it begins-for both those with previ-
ous casual exposure and those without, regardless of color.
A related argument often offered by the white establishment for the
scarcity of blacks in elite law firms in South Africa is blacks' lack of in-
terest in commercial law.48 South Africans often cite as evidence of this
proposition the involvement of many young blacks, usually during their
university years, in the struggle to end apartheid.349 Because of black in-
volvement in the struggle and because black attorneys have historically
made livelihoods out of motor vehicle claim and criminal work, the rea-
soning goes, they must not be interested in commercial law. An African
senior professional assistant at a top-tier firm told of his efforts to con-
vince the firm's recruiting partner of his interest in commercial law
when, as a final-year law student, he had first sought articles with the
firm in 1991. He described a lively exchange with the partner, who re-
peatedly expressed disbelief at the young attorney's interest in
commercial law. "He thought that [blacks] were interested in what he
calls political law; he had no idea," the attorney said."'
Some-including a few black attorneys interviewed-presume that
blacks are not interested in commercial law because it has no place in
and is wholly unrelated to "black culture." An African female profes-
sional assistant at a very progressive mid-sized firm explained that
348. A similar argument is sometimes articulated regarding black lawyers in the United
States. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 508-09.
349. This perception is reflected in a University of Cape Town study of the job search
experiences of black candidates. Barclay, supra note 7, at 24. Several students of color who
participated in that study had been asked about their involvement in politics. For example, one
black female was asked about how she could explain the existence of a black student group at
the University of Cape Town, given "that affirmative action is strongly implemented there." Id.
A large Pretoria firm asked a black female how she could reconcile her privileged private
school education with the struggle to end apartheid. Id.
350. Interview No. 42, supra note 133. The African man was not given an opportunity to
do articles at the firm, and, in fact when he interviewed there again a few years later, he re-
ported again having a similar exchange with the partner. Id.
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blacks usually don't stay at white firms because "[t]heir values, outlooks,
expectations are different to white lawyers. It is about where I grew up,
how I was socialized. Blacks usually don't stay because they don't find
the environment to be right for them. 35'
It is true that many of the younger generation of black lawyers in
South Africa were involved in anti-apartheid activities."' It is also true,
however, that a great number of those who finished their university work
in the mid-1990s were never involved in the struggle in any active way,
or were involved in it prior to their university years.353 After all, the
political battle to end apartheid had already largely been won in the late
1980s and early 1990s, as the generation now in their late twenties and
early thirties were coming of age. Their lack of engagement in politics is
351. Interview No. 59, supra note 39.
352. Interview No. 53, supra note 133 (Indian female candidate attorney who described
her role as an "activist" at the University of Natal in the mid-1990s). More precisely, many of
these lawyers, while relatively junior because they finished their legal educations only as
apartheid was ending, in the early 1990s, were already older than their white counterparts who
were then completing their educations. This is because many of the blacks experienced delays
in completing their education either because universities were closed by political disruptions
or they went into exile during periods of great unrest in the period leading up to apartheid's
demise. Several black lawyers interviewed had been active in the struggle. One had been a
student activist in the Northern Transvaal during his law studies at the University of the North
and had been jailed several times for his activities. Interview No. 52, supra note 282 (African
male). Another had been the national treasurer of the Azanian Student movement while study-
ing at Witwatersrand. Knowing that she was a high-profile police target during periods of
emergency during the late 1980s, she had gone into exile in Zimbabwe in 1986 and had not
returned to South Africa until 1994. Interview No. 59, supra note 39. Another had been an
editor of a black newspaper on the Witwatersrand campus during his law studies; the paper
had been censored during the emergency. Interview No. 34, supra note 49. See also Barclay,
supra note 7, at 3 (discussing the fact that black law graduates are often older than their white
counterparts, likely because of substandard secondary educations, which made their university
studies more challenging, as well as because of the financial inaccessibility which meant that
work was required before study, all resulting in completion of their degrees over a longer
period of time).
353. One young black partner explained that not only had he not been active in the strug-
gle, he had "benefited from apartheid." Interview No. 26, supra note 133. He went on to
explain that his father had worked for a parastatal (state-owned entity) in one of the black
homelands, Boputhatswana, where he attended a multiracial school and "experienced different
races. There was an emphasis on diversity and respect for it." Id. Another black attorney on the
verge of partnership had completed his tertiary education, a B.Juris and an LLB from the Uni-
versity of the Northwest, in Boputhatswana, and had worked there in the insurance industry
for several years before coming to Johannesburg to do his articles at a top-tier firm. Interview
No. 39, supra note 141. He felt that he had been attractive to the firm because his prior profes-
sional career had afforded him opportunities to understand corporate culture. Id. Others were
marginally political in that they identified themselves as either ANC or black consciousness,
but they had not been active in the struggle. Interview No. 47, supra note 71 (African female
identifying herself as formerly more "black power" and saying she now believes conciliation
to be the best path); Interview No. 27, supra note 96 (had been General Secretary of the ANC
in Venda before beginning university, but he said he did not have time to participate in politics
while at university because he was afraid of failing in his studies).
Spring 20021
Michigan Journal of International Law
reflected in the interview data. Many of the younger attorneys
interviewed expressed little or no interest in politics. One Indian attorney
who had studied at an HDU prior to the end of apartheid characterized
the new generation of black lawyers this way: "For black lawyers now,
politics is not part of their life. They study. Different graduates are
coming out of [university] than we were.... Their studies have not been
disrupted by riots. For them, not everything is political.""4
Thus, while many black lawyers are working in the government and
not-for-profit sectors, this does not necessarily support the conclusion
that blacks generally are uninterested in corporate work. Evidence exists
that many young black attorneys are keenly interested in commercial
legal work. First, numerous black law students interview with and sin-
cerely desire jobs with both medium and large commercial firms. For
example, seventy-eight percent of African male students participating in
a 1998 University of Cape Town survey indicated they wished to pursue
careers in commercial law. 11 In discussing their career choices, young
lawyers often acknowledge the excellent training these firms can pro-
vide, particularly to those who aspire to be commercial lawyers.356
Secondly, the interview data are replete with stories of young lawyers
who wish to become commercial lawyers and who, once in these elite
firms, often struggle to be moved from practicing labor law or working
in other marginally commercial practice areas into doing more purely
commercial work.35 Finally, when black lawyers leave commercial law
354. Interview No. 40, supra note 64.
355. The University of Cape Town study showed that more University of Cape Town law
graduates were interested in pursuing careers in commercial law than in any other legal spe-
cialty. Barclay, supra note 7, at 9. Fifty-seven percent of white males ranked commercial law
their first choice, whereas 75% of colored males and females, 100% of Indian males, 46% of
white females and 63% of black females stated a preference for commercial law. Id.
356. Interview No. 25, supra note 133 (emphasizing the excellent training he had re-
ceived as a candidate attorney at one of the top-tier commercial firms, even though he left after
completion of his articles because he believed the firm was racist); Interview No. 29, supra
note 71; Interview No. 43, supra note 140 (acknowledging the excellent training he had re-
ceived at a top-tier firm); Interview No. 47, supra note 71 (stating that at her current firm she
was getting "better exposure, better teaching" because all of the firm's work is "cream"); In-
terview No. 50, supra note 77 (noting that she had chosen to do her articles at Bowman,
Gilfillan because she would get superior training there); Interview No. 70, supra note 299.
357. Several lawyers lamented not having gotten as much commercial law work as they
had hoped. Interview No. 39, supra note 141 (African male had initially been in the firm's
labor law department, but had asked to do more commercial law); Interview No. 29, supra
note 71 (saying she left her firm without ever going into the commercial law department even
though she had wanted to; she had not seen it as appropriate to tell the firm what department
they should place her in); Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (black female candidate attorney
said she chose the top-tier firm where she was doing her articles because she was interested in
commercial law, but that she had initially been "dumped" in the firm's labor and litigation
departments; she was continuing to seek commercial work at the firm). Another black lawyer
said that he had rotated through his firm's aviation, motor vehicle, and commercial depart-
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firms, they often join consulting practices, investment banks, or go in-
house to major South African corporations or to the South African sub-
sidiaries of multinational corporations.3" In short, they take jobs as
commercial lawyers, albeit perhaps less prestigious ones than those with
elite law firms. Indeed, the higher percentage of blacks in government,
not-for-profit, and other non-commercial sectors is surely attributable as
much to the market's effective exclusion of black attorneys from the elite
commercial job market as it is to black attorneys' own true choices.
4. Blacks Are Unwilling to Accept the Deferred Financial Gratification
Associated With Law Firm Partnership
It is very easy for white people to job hop. It is considered 'look-
ing for greener pastures, developing your career.' [The]
perception when blacks do it is that it is 'job hopping'-that it is
about money.
-African professional assistant at a mid-sized white firm...
Some argue that commercial law firms employ few blacks,
particularly at senior levels, because blacks are unwilling to accept the
deferred gratification that success in this setting entails.36 This argument
ments, but ultimately had been assigned to the labor law department, where he did only man-
agement-side work. Interview No. 26, supra note 133. An African male who had spent a
number of years in a top-tier firm practicing labor law was less critical of his firm's failure to
give blacks commercial work when they wanted it. He observed that "no one goes into com-
mercial [law] at the outset when they join the firm." Interview No. 44, supra note 88.
Black attorneys' interest in commercial work has been documented elsewhere. Young
black attorneys entering the profession are eager to practice more than motor vehicle law and
other traditionally "black" fields. Commercial law has been relatively difficult for them to
explore (as explained above). The [Black Lawyers Association] has not neglected reform in
this area: Christine Qunta, the BLA's Western Cape chairperson in 1999, initiated a program
where Sonnenberg, Hoffman, and Galombik (the biggest commercial firm in Cape Town) gave
commercial classes to black attorneys in Cape Town. BROUN, supra note 3, at 216.
358. Interview No. 9, supra note 249 (white male professional assistant telling of Afri-
can male professional assistant who recently left firm to join the South African legal
department of Hewlett Packard in South Africa); Interview No. 21, supra note 88 (telling of
African attorney friends who had left elite mid-sized boutique firms, following their candidate
attorney periods there, in order to join the South African offices of corporations such as British
Petroleum and major South African companies such as Old Mutual Insurance); Interview No.
43, supra note 140 (African male professional assistant left top-tier firm where he had com-
pleted his articles, even though he felt he'd been given excellent opportunities there, in order
to join Brait Investment Bank); Interview No. 44, supra note 88 (junior partner left top-tier
firm to join a division of the largest South African conglomerate); Interview No. 57, supra
note 155 (African female who was leaving her law firm to join Sony Corporation).
359. Interview No. 14, supra note 3.
360. Interview No. 5, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jan. 9, 2001) (white male official of the Law
Society of South Africa) (transcript on file with author) ("blacks are not willing to forego
financial gratification to pay their dues; they want it all now").
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is advanced in particular with respect to monetary compensation,
referring to the fact that candidate attorneys and professional assistants
are very poorly paid by elite law firms in the period leading up to
partnership-more poorly even than in many public sector legal
311positions.
Interestingly, many black attorneys interviewed agreed blacks are of-
ten unwilling to forego better paying jobs over a period of years in
exchange for the prospect of partnership."' Some blacks defended this
363
stance in light of historical and current socioeconomic disparities,
while others observed that the market often judges blacks more harshly
than whites for such "job hopping. '364
In defiance of this image of short-sighted, even greedy, persons of
color are the handful of black attorneys who, both during and following
apartheid and against great odds, have endured years of low-paying, dif-
361ficult, and stressful work in order to become partners in these firms.
One African attorney on the verge of partnership with a top-tier firm had
worked in insurance after finishing his legal studies but prior to begin-
ning his candidate attorney stint. Reflecting on his decision not to leave
the firm to go in-house to a corporation, even though he was still earning
less than he had earned in the insurance business, he said, "I would reach
361. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
362. One African attorney said of blacks, "We still lack the young professionals who
have vision; [black professionals] won't make the sacrifices to be the best." Interview No. 43,
supra note 140.
363. Interview No. 61, supra note 239 (African male reporting that a top-tier firm had
offered him a salaried partnership, and that he had declined, stating that he will never work for
a big white law firm; he also "told them they must change their ways" and reported that the
typical time frame for any attorney to become an equity partner is ten years and that "blacks
won't put up with [waiting] for this period of time").
364. See supra text accompanying note 359 (quoting Interview No. 14). The attorney
went on to criticize her firm for not even attemptirng to compete with other employers in order
to retain talented black attorneys. She spoke, in particular, about the situation of a former
colleague who had then recently left the firm for a high-level government job, suggesting that
even though the firm could not match what the government was offering him, the firm could
have offered increase over his current salary.
[The firm] could not compete with that salary, no, but they could have paid him
more than the lock step.... They need to see [these junior attorneys] and say, "We
understand your financial reality and can do something about it." . . . [He] wasn't
looking for money [to get rich]; he was looking to be able to live. Most attorneys
who leave because of the financial constraints come back after their financial situa-
tion stabilizes. A lot of them want to come back, but it isn't easy .... When you
leave, you are perceived to be burning bridges. There is no encouragement for black
people to stay in the profession. There are good people who have worked in the
firm, who leave after their time as candidate attorneys. Very few of these have their
salaries double.
Interview No. 14, supra note 3.
365. Interview No. 40, supra note 64; Interview No. 44, supra note 88.
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the [compensation] ceiling soon in the corporate world. My years here
will give me independence ... I will plan my own schedule. 36 6 Another
African attorney, a mid-level professional assistant at a mid-sized intel-
lectual property boutique firm, said, "I just love what I'm doing now.
I've had offers from companies paying a little better, to be in-house
counsel. But I prefer working for clients. One has to wait a little longer
to get more money when in a law firm.
3 6 1
While some attorneys of color are persevering the path to partner-
ship, the fact remains that many black lawyers do choose to leave
commercial firms, driven at least in part by financial considerations. It
does not do justice to the multidimensionality of the situation, however,
to attribute the decision to short-sightedness or greed. Indeed, despite
their desire to become partners in these firms, it appears that many black
attorneys are unable to endure the financial deprivations. The socioeco-
nomic legacy of apartheid has left most persons of color less able than
their white counterparts to endure a half-decade or more of poor com-
pensation while they await the pay off of law firm partnership.366 A
significant consideration for many young black attorneys is that they are
expected to support their parents, often laborers and domestic servants
who have no pensions. Many are also expected to pay the cost of educat-
ing younger siblings.
One young African attorney who recently completed his articles at a
top-tier firm had no complaints about the opportunities and training the
firm had provided to him. Indeed, he felt he had been well-mentored and
even favored for high quality, challenging work assignments. Neverthe-
less, like a number of others interviewed, he explained he was preparing
to leave the firm for a better-paying job with an investment bank because
the poor salary the law firm had paid him was inadequate given his fam-
ily's financial situation. He said:
We blacks have the socioeconomic problems, extended families,
you know, high rate of unemployment, which hits blacks more
366. Interview No. 21, supra note 60 (describing lack of opportunity to advance in cor-
porate counsel positions); Interview No. 22, supra note 133 (noting that he had declined
opportunities to join corporate legal departments because of the lack of both sophisticated
training and long-term opportunity there); Interview No. 32, supra note 226 (African female
working in the legal department of large South African corporation was frustrated by lack of
both training and challenging work); Interview No. 39, supra note 141; Interview No. 44,
supra note 88 (noting that once he is "in house" counsel, he will not get to determine which
firm does his employer's legal work).
367. Interview No. 47, supra note 70.
368. Interview No. 77, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (June 15, 1999) (African female associ-
ate partner) (transcript on file with author); Barclay, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that a number
of white law graduates were planning to take off a year or more to travel prior to beginning
their candidate attorney stints, whereas no blacks were in a position to do so).
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than any other racial group in the country, with the financial
problems that we inherit. [W]e have to take our sisters to col-
lege, you know, we have to pay for our student loans. We have to
pay for [accommodation] because most of us blacks come from
rural areas, you know, outside Johannesburg. So we are to pay
for rent, transport costs, you know. So there are a lot of financial
considerations that define a problem, which is very structural,
and which cannot be immediately addressed.
Now, this problem can only be addressed by private companies
[like law firms] that actually help to offer us salaries for the
good of it ... And it doesn't seem like it's ready to be addressed.
My great concerns at the moment are more of a [financial] chal-
lenge than career-wise as it were. The effect, unfortunately, is a
very painful one ... I am aware that I can make a ... very
prominent career [here at the firm]. There are various financial
considerations that push me on a day-by-day basis away from
that dream. The problem I've got at the moment is that I am sit-
ting with student loans. And I have to pay for my college. I have
a family that's huge. This means I've got to make a sacrifice, as
it were, and go look for a good job-a job that could make me
and everyone else that is close to me to survive.
So, it's a huge, huge sacrifice that I have got to make-not be-
cause I want to just have choices, but to survive." 9
VI. A THEORY OF EFFICIENT DISCRIMINATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA'S ELITE LAW FIRMS
The second point is you need to create an environment, particu-
larly within your professional team, that makes [blacks] feel at
home, because if [the firm doesn't] do that, they are going to go.
You may pay them [a competitive salary], but if he's unhappy,
somebody's going to offer him something better.
-African male partner in a mid-sized white firm37°
As observed in Part IV's discussion of two theories associated with
the economics of discrimination, the validity of these theories is not con-
tingent upon the existence of widespread, overt racism. In fact, subtle
predispositions in favor of one group over another frequently are suffi-
369. Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
370. Interview No. 63, supra note 253.
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cient to provide the "grist for the dynamic described. '"37 Although few
studies have undertaken to prove or disprove their existence, some recent
literature does indicate that race-based prejudice and distrust is wide-
spread in South Africa at the turn of the 21st century.372 For purposes of
the following analysis, which theorizes why elite South African firms are
not achieving meaningful racial integration, the existence of racial bias
in South Africa is assumed.
The impediments to racial integration of South Africa's elite law
firms, particularly in partnership ranks, is a web of interrelated factors:
the country's history and politics, the institutional characteristics of law
firms, and the acts of individuals within those institutions. Historical fac-
tors include educational handicaps and socio-economic circumstances
that make it very difficult for many blacks to stay on the poorly-
compensated path to partnership. Still, forces other than historical ones
are surely at play. In addition to feelings of failure arising from their in-
ability to meet their fee targets and to garner good training opportunities
in elite firms, many blacks report experiencing cultural alienation within
these firms. The plenitude of other job opportunities available to black
professionals in the new South Africa is also an impediment to integra-
tion of these firms.3 73 Some of these aspects of the black experience may
be attributed to the racism of individuals within these institutions. Others
may be fairly attributed to institutional structures. These include policies
and practices regarding recruitment and training, which provide oppor-
tunities to conceal discriminatory behavior.374  Thus, while the
underrepresentation of blacks in these firms is frequently attributed to
blacks' own failings or choices, 171 the lack of integration surely also re-
flects decisions and actions of white individuals and the institutions they
371. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 510.
372. See supra note 43 (citing studies); Roberts, supra note 30, at 18 (although black
professionals are finding jobs, their work environments are so stressful due to racial pressures
that they often choose to leave).
373. As commentators observe:
Corporate law firms seem to suffer.., when it comes to losing trained black staff.
No sooner have they served their clerkship and passed their attorney's admission
examination, than they are courted, either by commerce or industry or government.
In the end, the pressure put on them and the stunning offers made, no less than the
glittering career prospects that appear to be on tap, are frequently impossible to ig-
nore.
A Change of Game, supra note 74. This experience is not unique to law firms. See Roberts,
supra note 30.
374. To the extent that organizational characteristics have little or no relationship to pro-
ductivity and yet impede racial integration, failure to change these structures may indicate
racism. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11, at 506-12.
375. See supra notes 338-369 (discussing establishment explanations of why blacks do
not stay at these firms).
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run. This Article constructs a model to explain this lack of integration.
The model takes into account both individual and institutional factors,
while also exploring how these firms can survive in an age when there
appear to be commercial incentives to integrate, but when no single firm
is achieving it at the partnership level.
A. The Role of the Individual: The Black Experience
in Elite Commercial Firms
It is not a firm culture problem. It is down to individuals.
-Indian candidate attorney explaining
why her mid-sized firm was not
perfectly egalitarian
37 6
The interview data indicate that the social, cultural, and professional
discomfort-even alienation-that many black lawyers experience in
traditionally white firms is often a significant, if not decisive, factor driv-
ing their departures from those firms. Given that a goal of this project is
to understand the relationship between institutional racism and individ-
ual racism in elite firms, it is interesting to note many black attorneys
who described what they perceived as racism in their law firms were
quick to attribute the experience to individual behavior, and to specifi-
cally distinguish it from an institutional endorsement or policy of racism.
One colored attorney said that the top-tier firm where he had completed
his articles was conscious of race issues, but the institutional effort and
consciousness was "lost in the day-to-day running. People in power are
completely insensitive" to race issues.37 He elaborated on the need to
view each attorney as an individual, not as a member of a particular race
group.
I was up for promotion. I was told they didn't think I was ready,
that I had to wait six months. I came back to the office ... there
was a memo circulating by the management committee that said,
"we don't think he should be promoted now, but should be pro-
376. Interview No. 53, supra note 133.
377. Interview No. 25, supra note 133. After he and another candidate attorney raised
some issues on behalf of other candidate attorneys, lodging a complaint of racism to the man-
agement committee, they were chastised for suggesting there was any hint of racism in the
firm. A member of the firm's management had responded, "How dare you accuse of me of
racism? Some of my best friends are black" The firm's senior partner had said to a gathering
of candidate attorneys, convened in response to allegations of racism, "You will all become
partners.' The candidate attorney had found this "patronizing," and he had left the firm after
completing his articles there. Id.
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moted with two other black professionals when they come up
[for promotion] next year."378
The attorney interpreted this to mean that the firm saw black profes-
sionals as a homogenous group, rather than as individuals who achieve at
different levels.3 79 Even diversity consultants, he observed, often "stereo-
type concerns.
38 °
Relatively few interviewees told tales of blatant, undeniably racist
behavior in the sense that differential treatment or opportunities were
openly linked to race.38 ' No one suggested that firms have policies of dis-
criminating against blacks. Nevertheless, many black attorneys believed
that, because of their race, their white colleagues overlooked them so-
cially and professionally. They also believed decisionmakers within the
firms had different expectations of attorneys based on their race; thus, as
attorneys of color they were not given equal opportunities to succeed and
develop. Indeed, many black attorneys' complaints regarded omissions
rather than affirmative acts. Attorneys of color cited failures of individu-
als to train, mentor, or otherwise reach out to them. One African female
candidate attorney spoke of feeling invisible. She said, "I'm overlooked.
I don't know why. I struggle for work among the clerks. When three of
the five candidate attorneys went on a course, their work wasn't passed





381. The interview data included only a few tales of openly racist jokes or comments. Id.
(noting that some African colleagues complain about, for example, racist comments being
made in the corridor); Interview No. 67, supra note 141 (noting that partners sometimes
bragged, in the presence of black attorneys, about the firm's "sanctions-busting" efforts during
apartheid).
382. Interview No. 49, supra note 77. At the other end of the spectrum were attorneys of
color who believed they had been favored on the basis of their color. One African professional
assistant who was at a top-tier firm at the time of the interview but who had worked at two
mid-sized white firms before joining her current firm said that she knew she was favored at
her current firm, in terms of getting very good work, because she was black. She characterized
the attorneys at her firm as being "so sensitive," adding, "they don't even yell at the lazy ones."
Interview No. 22, supra note 133. Another African professional assistant analyzed the situa-
tion this way, and drew a more optimistic conclusion.
People complain that blacks don't get work of as high a caliber as whites. This is
for a number of reasons. People from historically disadvantaged institutions don't
have as good a grasp of commercial issues as those who've studied at [the Univer-
sity of Witwatersrand, the prestigious university in Johannesburg]. They experiment
with us to see what we can do. But, if the person is bright enough, he quickly wins
the confidence of the partners to get more interesting work.
Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
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While many young, black attorneys complained about the lack or
quality of work they were getting, many also compared their experiences
favorably to those of black attorneys they knew in other commercial
firms. On the basis of such comparisons, most blacks concluded they
were having better professional experiences than other blacks they knew
who were also working in firms.383 As only one example, an African can-
didate attorney praised her white firm for giving her good training,
adding that candidate attorneys at most other white firms were allowed
only "to park the partner's car and do photocopying."384 Indeed, the
comments of many attorneys of color about their experiences in their
firms revealed conflicting feelings: on the one hand, gratitude for just
being let into these firms, but on the other, resentment about the disparity
in opportunities available to whites compared to those available to
blacks.383 One African woman who had just begun working for a top-tier
firm as a profession assistant bragged about the new firm's "extreme
sensitivity" to race issues, saying, "they don't even yell at the lazy ones."
She explained that some of her black colleagues took for granted the
firm's sensitivity to race, whereas she did not because she had previously
worked for two far less sensitive firms.386 Thus, many of the attorneys
interviewed found ways in which to view their circumstances positively,
even as they were disgruntled with their firms.
383. Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (noting that her friends at another top-tier firm
have it worse than she does: "they are not given work, they sit and read the paper all day").
One African woman who had done her articles at a top-tier firm believed she had been given a
lot of good commercial work, but she noted that many of her black colleagues had not. "One
[black] guy sits in the library and reads newspapers. But some black people get a lot of work,
though it can take a while. You have to prove yourself first by doing menial things with great
enthusiasm and commitment-filing and copying." Interview No. 67, supra note 141.
384. Interview No. 68, supra note 133.
385. See, e.g., Interview No. 22, supra note 133; Interview No. 25, supra note 133; In-
terview No. 59, supra note 39. This phenomenon was also reflected in a 2000 study of race
and gender issues in the attorneys' profession, in which the authors concluded that black can-
didate attorneys believed they were "lucky to have been selected in the first place" for the job.
Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 13. Indeed, to some extent this experience is shared by
all candidate attorneys, and to some extent this mindset is cultivated by all attorneys' firms
because candidate attorneys purportedly are not profit-making labor for law firms. Barclay,
supra note 7.
One attorney spoke of her inability to get quality work after she moved to a white firm
following completion of her articles at a black firm. She said, "I was used to being over-
worked, actually I was overworked. And now this is ... a serious anticlimax. I'm sitting here
doing nothing, and I mean literally nothing. There would be no files. All these people here...
I used to get into their offices to ask for work. All of them. Even if it meant me taking papers
to court." Interview No. 57, supra note 155.
386. Interview No. 22, supra note 133.
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Several black attorneys complained about not being given sufficient
work to meet their fee targets, which effectively set them up for failure.38
One mid-level professional assistant succinctly explained the importance
of billing and fees: "The fee target is an important aspect of succeeding
at any firm. If you are not given sufficient work or are given low quality
work or inadequate training, you will appear to be twiddling your
thumbs. These are the pitfalls for candidate attorneys." 8 An African man
was among those whose experiences were illustrative. He said that for
most of a year he was earning only half of his fee target, which he said
made him the firm's "laughing stock."3 9 A female African candidate at-
torney explained that her target was to bill ninety hours each month, but
that at every weekly meeting she and her male African colleague had to
raise their hands to indicate that they needed more work. She said:
This year has not taught me much. I couldn't open my own prac-
tice now. I feel I have been given crap work. I wake up in the
middle of the night worrying about making my target. This has
made me somewhat bitter. I cannot make my target of [ZAR]
14,500 [per] month while the white girls are easily making
[ZAR] 17,000. No one took me on to be my mentor, but [my fel-
low African candidate attorney] has helped. He has had
arguments with his principal. For several months, he didn't make
his time target. A meeting was called about it ... [T]he only
black partner hasn't looked out for me, even though I was in his
department. [He] seemed concerned, but he never has done any-
thing about it.
I'll stay [at the firm after completing my articles], only for a
while-mainly because I don't have the experience to go. They
have killed my confidence.39
387. Interview No. 39, supra note 141; Interview No. 42, supra note 133. One African
female candidate attorney complained that she repeatedly had to ask for work, while her white
and Indian female colleagues had plenty of work; also noting that when these colleagues went
on a course, she was not given their work to do. Interview No. 49, supra note 77.
388. Interview No. 54, supra note 12.
389. Interview No. 42, supra note 133.
390. Interview No. 49, supra note 77 (African female candidate attorney at top-tier firm).
In addition to the African female interviewed, the firm's five candidate attorneys at the time
included one black male, two white women, and one Indian woman. Id. Another recently
admitted attorney at a different prestigious firm said that her fee target would be ZAR 300,000
for each four-month period. Interview No. 67, supra note 141.
Other attorneys talked about the impact on their confidence of their experiences at white
firms. One said of her former boss at a mid-sized white firm, "He tries to break people's spirit.
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The lack of cultural accommodation by both individual white
attorneys and the firms they comprise was another common complaint
among black attorneys. One white partner acknowledged what she
characterized as a "racial apartness in the firm-an apartheid-that is
what it means, apartness."'39' While many attorneys of color indicated
they made intentional attempts to integrate socially into their white
firms, most acknowledged the difficulty of integration, given differing
cultural norms. One African woman said she always attended firm events
but commented further that she would never invite her white colleagues,
even candidate attorneys, to a "bash" or street party, because she would
have to "baby-sit" them. "[T]hey wouldn't be comfortable there," she
explained.3 92
Again, many attorneys' stories of cultural accommodation or the
lack thereof featured internal inconsistencies: attorneys indicated assimi-
lation in one breath but noted cultural differences in the next.3 93 One
African woman of Zulu ethnicity said that she socialized with colleagues
at her prior firm, a mid-sized boutique. "I was part of them. I was 'them.'
I didn't have a problem at all." But, she later added, "As far as doing
[the] job, it is no problem ... but when it comes to socializing, Zulu are
very polite people. They try to find softer, better words to put things.
With Afrikaans, they can be very sharp. I sometimes think, 'I wouldn't
have put it that way.' 394
Another attorney, this one an African partner at a progressive, mid-
sized white firm similarly contradicted himself. He scoffed initially at
the idea white culture was fundamentally different from black culture
and the notion that his firm reflected the former:
I don't see where the white culture is. I see these things from a
class perspective. We are middle class or working class people-
so [we have] fewer conflicts about race. We are of a common
class, have common values. Some of my best friends are the white
I was so tired [after a while] and said I was leaving. Later, he was much nicer. He wanted me
to doubt myself. I did. My confidence took a knock." Interview No. 22, supra note 133.
391. Interview No. 15, supra note 3 (white female partner who elaborated that there is
"relatively little socializing between blacks and whites" in the firm). A black professional
assistant at a white firm characterized the relations between blacks and whites there as a vir-
tual apartheid. Interview No. 57, supra note 155; see also Interview No. 29, supra note 71
(African female who had completed articles at a mid-sized, predominantly Afrikaans firm said
that her white colleagues did not understand various aspects of black culture, including ances-
tral worship and the practice of men having multiple wives).
392. Interview No. 49, supra note 77.
393. See text accompanying supra note 383.
394. Interview No. 47, supra note 71. She went on to tell of being scolded by a female
Afrikaans partner about chatting with her co-workers in the office kitchen, "If you girls want
to have a tea party, go do it elsewhere." Id.
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people here. People are helluva' conscious here about the need to
bridge gaps. Class explains a lot. Culture-a lot of it is hogwash.
Culture only means so much. People used to ask why I let whites
exploit me [here]. They didn't ask if I had interesting work, if I
was growing intellectually. I cut them out of my circle.395
Later in the interview, however, he expressed offense that few of his
white colleagues had attended the funeral of a long-serving tea lady a
few years earlier. He said, "I was really helluva' angry. In white culture,"
he explained, "funerals are not so important.
3 96
In fact, one of the recurring themes reflecting cultural misunder-
standing in the interview data regarded funeral traditions. Similarly
illustrating the misunderstanding between different race groups on this
topic, a white partner in a top-tier firm told of an African candidate at-
torney whose work quality had suddenly diminished over of a short
period of time. After a few weeks, when the partner ultimately inquired
of the candidate attorney whether there was some problem, the young
African informed the partner his parents had recently been killed in an
automobile accident in KwaZulu-Natal. The candidate attorney ex-
plained he had been reluctant to notify the firm and ask for time off
because of his impression that whites believe blacks often use funerals as
excuses to be absent from work. In explaining his fear, he referred to a
common joke among white South Africans in which one white relates to
another that her domestic servant recently missed work because the em-
ployee's mother had died, but that she was missing work again that day
because "her other mother died."'3 97 Assured by the partner that the firm
would expect an employee to take leave under the circumstances, the
candidate attorney belatedly took time off to be with his grieving fam-
ily.398 The story highlights not only cultural misunderstanding often
attendant the different race groups' attitudes about funerals and family
commitments, but also their distrust of one another.399
Sports and socializing comprised another cultural difference men-
tioned in interviews. While numerous elite firms hold season tickets to
cricket matches for client entertainment purposes, for example, these
firms apparently rarely or never take clients to see soccer, a sport tradi-
tionally associated with the black community. One African woman
395. Interview No. 64, supra note 91.
396. Id.; see also Interview No. 39, supra note 141 (senior African professional assistant
noting that whites do not attribute the same importance to funerals that blacks do).
397. From the African perspective of the extended family, a person often has more than
one mother. Grandmothers, aunts, sisters, and additional wives of the father may all be consid-
ered mothers. See E-mail from Daniel Steenkamp, supra note 3.
398. Interview No. 13, supra note 109.
399. See Gibson & Macdonald, supra note 3, at 33.
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bragged about the white firm she had just joined because they had pur-
chased tickets to a George Benson concert, which she saw as a sign of
racial inclusiveness. Her former firm, she noted, had only taken clients to
see cricket matches.' An Indian professional assistant described the at-
mosphere at her former firm this way, "There is a big cultural gap
manifested, for example, in different attitudes toward work, interest in
rugby versus soccer. The only choice for blacks was to assimilate, to
learn to talk about cricket, for example." 40 ' An African woman who had
just completed her articles at the same firm characterized the firm culture
as "very white male, a white drinking culture. They discuss cricket,
rugby, trout fishing. °402 A few attorneys of color told of taking up golf or
squash, "white sports," in hopes of conforming to the white environment.
While some felt this strategy had aided their integration into their firms,
others felt it had made no difference.
The theme of cultural accommodation was also echoed by several
black attorneys who were generally more optimistic about the prospects
for attorneys of color being integrated into white firms. However, the
basis of these attorneys' optimism was that successful integration re-
quired the attorneys of color to "act white." One colored lawyer said,
"Unless you fit in with the dominant culture in a firm like that, you will
be marginalized, regardless of race, though it is a particular problem for
black professionals. They must demonstrate their ability to fit in.
4 °
1
A few attorneys believed that the passivity associated with black cul-
ture undermined black attorneys in white firms because these firms value
assertiveness. One African professional assistant who was reasonably
positive about her elite firm experience nevertheless said that if she had
it to do over, she would do some things differently. In particular, she
said, "I would stand up for myself more from the start. You've got to be
arrogant, obnoxious, sharp, to be taken seriously in that environment. If
you deal with things in a quiet manner they don't respect you."' ' A white
400. Interview No. 47, supra note 71. An expression from the British colonial period
comes to mind: "The British will allow anyone to play cricket, as long as you play by their
rules."
401. Interview No. 70, supra note 306.
402. Interview No. 67, supra note 141. She went on to say, "You must assimilate into the
WASP culture, even the Jewish and Afrikaans lawyers." Id.
403. One African professional assistant noted that he was "by and large happy at his
firm." Interview No. 39, supra note 141. He elaborated, "I have friends here. I play golf and
squash with friends at this firm. There are people here I would miss if I left." Id. An African
woman at the same firm lamented her exclusion from the firm: "If I were male I could play
golf and participate in their little jokes... I have started watching cricket. I'm learning about
rugby, golf." Interview No. 49, supra note 77.
404. Interview No. 54, supra note 12.
405. Interview No. 67, supra note 141. Elsewhere in the interview she had said, "I was
perceived as being weak. I was told to assert myself more, to increase my profile in the firm,
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partner saw the cultural gap this way: "African culture does not value
self-starting ... [s]o, these young black lawyers sit in their offices, wait-
ing for the work to come to them. This isn't racism; it is just different
cultural expectations. ' 4°
Other attorneys spoke of bridging the cultural gap, and of success-
fully assimilating into their white firms. One African attorney, this one
on the verge of partnership with a top-tier firm, described himself, in the
context of his firm, this way:
Am I too white? I think sometimes that I must be. But, I cannot
see it. It worries me. I have more of the master's characteristics
than the field slave's. I am like the kitchen slave. Why am I ac-
cepted more or less by the firm when other black people are not?
I work hard. I try to meet my [fee] target. Those are the mini-
mum requirements. I try my damnedest to dispel the myth that
black people are incapable of meeting laid-down standards. By
doing that, I am seen as readily acceptable.4°7
Other attorneys, specifically those from relatively privileged back-
grounds, spoke of the ease with which they moved between the separate
worlds of "black" and "white," generally attributing this ease to the
mixed educational opportunities they had been given, including having
attended "white schools" and, in some instances, having studied abroad.
One woman said that she had grown up trying to "integrate into other
worlds," even in high school, when she lived with her maternal grand-
mother in Soweto while attending a mostly white school in
Johannesburg. Several touted the exceptional educational opportunities
they had been given "before their time," so to speak. On this basis, they
saw themselves as competing on a level playing field with their white
with the clients." Id. She went on to say, "My way of fighting was to write memos to the head
of the department. But this was not seen as appropriate-not assertive enough. I should have
threatened to resign." Id. Another African woman said, regarding her experience at a white
firm, "Another thing that white people do is they push you to be strong." Interview No. 57,
supra note 155. A male African professional assistant offered this opinion, "We must not look
to whites to push us; we must initiate." Interview No. 21, supra note 60.
406. Interview No. 55, supra note 3. In a similar vein, another white attorney said,
"Somehow, I think black people would rather leave than complain." Interview No. 9, supra
note 249. He, too, focused on the expectation among blacks that work would simply come to
them, rather than their having to seek it. Id.
407. Interview No. 39, supra note 141. These themes are consistent with what Wilkins
and Gulati have observed about black lawyers in the United States-that many of them adopt
low risk strategies, including not seeking the most challenging work assignments, because of
their fear of failure. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11,
at 574.
408. Interview No. 49, supra note 77. Another said that she was able to "adapt easily" to
white culture, which was one reason her firm had hired her. Interview No. 29, supra note 71.
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colleagues, in terms of both educational foundation and raw intellect. '
Still, despite their comfort with and confidence in the context of a
largely white workplace, many of these attorneys believed that they had
been viewed and treated as outsiders-as inferior-by some of their
peers and managers at the elite law firms where they worked.4t° In short,
they believed that, even as privileged and well-educated blacks, their
careers had suffered as a consequence of bias against persons of color.
B. The Role of the Organization: Bias Disguised
The firm had an industrial psychologist do an analysis ... what
would the firm look like if it were a person rather than an institu-
tion? It would look like an old white man staying in Sandton [a
very wealthy suburb of Johannesburg], an old white man who is
rather stingy.
-African professional assistant describing his top-tier firm
4 11
The experiences discussed above indicate how individual biases
based on race play a significant role in the high attrition rate of black
attorneys from white firms. As in the United States, there is reason to
believe that the institutional characteristics of firms may both facilitate
and disguise discriminatory acts. Firms' long-standing structural features
may help explain the lack of responsiveness to a changed national order,
as it were, to changing times, a changed market. Institutional features
may also contribute to black attrition, even absent any discriminatory
motive.
As Wilkins and Gulati have concluded, a lack of transparency with
respect to hiring decisions may help firms disguise discriminatory be-
havior, such as a preference for average whites over average blacks. In
South Africa, no part of the recruitment process is open to the disciplin-
ing potential of the market because no firm openly declares its minimum
criteria for those it will hire. This does not mean, however, that firms use
the lack of transparency to discriminate by preferring to hire whites
when blacks have very similar credentials. Indeed, the market's incen-
tives may lead some firms to prefer blacks when hiring, even when the
objective credentials of the whites are better. And, of course, all firms
wish to employ the black superstar, the attorney of color who confers all
409. E.g., Interview No. 26, supra note 133; Interview No. 49, supra note 77; Interview
No. 25, supra note 133; Interview No. 70, supra note 305.
410. Interview No. 70, supra note 306.
411. Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
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of the educational advantage and professional contact opportunities of
the best white law graduates, with the added bonus of her color.
The likely role of institutional structures in concealing discrimina-
tion is in the context of training and promotion of attorneys. While the
law firm organizational model that prevails in South Africa provides the
potential for close monitoring and training that would permit attorneys to
develop professionally, this potential is not being realized for the vast
majority of black attorneys, who are not being groomed to be the best
commercial attorneys. In addition, because the worth of junior attorneys
necessarily is assessed subjectively, just as it is in the United States,
there is little basis for the market to conclude that racism is to blame for
a firm's failure to retain or promote an attorney of color.
Indeed, the market is slow to attribute to racism these firms' failure
to train and mentor black attorneys because so many other obvious cul-
prits exist on which to blame the severe black attrition. These alternative
culprits include poor educational foundation and low salaries, which
have a disparate impact on those from previously disadvantaged com-
munities, including many blacks. Articulated in a way that faults blacks,
these culprits include lack of assertiveness, loyalty, and even intelli-
gence. In a similar vein, because an assessment that a black attorney is
underperforming generally confirms the market's expectations, an em-
ployer's racism is perhaps the cause least likely to be blamed for a black
attorney's failure.
There are, of course, a number of actions law firms could take to re-
spond to some of the identified institutional causes of black attrition.
Firms could raise salaries to compete more effectively with public and
private legal employers. They could formalize mentoring relationships
within firms in a way which better monitors interactions between junior
and senior attorneys and ensures, at least to some extent, individual at-
torneys are living up to the firm's stated commitment to train and retain
black lawyers. Firms could formalize the process by which work as-
signments are made to junior attorneys, thereby achieving some
assurance black attorneys receive a fair share of the work, acquire so-
phisticated skills and, ultimately, play a more valuable role in the firm.
Finally, firms could devote more institutional resources to provide a
range of training to enable black attorneys to compete more effectively
with their white counterparts. These could include, for example, oppor-
tunities to improve their English language skills, such as writing
workshops. It could also include exposure to social settings in which
these attorneys may eventually be expected to function, giving them an
opportunity to observe these settings in advance of being expected to
perform within them.
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As Wilkins and Gulati have observed with respect to elite firms in
the United States, to the extent firms retain institutional structures
which facilitate discrimination while serving no rational purpose, ra-
cism may be inferred from the inaction. 42" The same may be true of
South African firms. They can see that black attorneys are slipping
through the proverbial cracks, and their failure to alter institutional
structures to help stem this flow makes their professed commitment to
diversity appear disingenuous.
C. The Failure of the Market: When
No Competitor Is Getting It Right
It is not a coincidence that blacks don't stay [at white commer-
cial firms]. They haven't committed themselves to retaining
black staff-just to training them. They give us exposure we can
use elsewhere.
-African male, formerly a candidate
attorney at a top-tier firm4 3
Given the apparent commercial incentives law firms have to inte-
grate their professional workforces, the question remains why, as
presumptive rational economic actors, these firms have neither achieved
integration nor appear to be moving toward it in any meaningful way. A
number of explanations might be offered for this failure. Each of these is
considered in turn.
1. White Firms Cannot Overcome Their Taste for Discrimination
Their policy is to transfer skills, but they must rely on the indi-
vidual lawyers to do so, and some may resist doing [this].
-African professional assistant commenting
on his top-tier firm44
The assumption that bias based on race exists in South Africa has al-
ready been declared, and it is not a difficult one to defend given the
nation's racial history. The races were separated for all practical pur-
poses under apartheid's separate development mission, which utilized
propaganda that promoted animosity and distrust among the races. Many
South Africans of all races surely internalized these messages to some
extent. It is therefore not surprising that a significant number still view
412. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers?, supra note 11.
413. Interview No. 21, supra note 60.
414. Interview No. 31, supra note 3.
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their compatriots of different races with disrespect and distrust.4 15 One
white attorney at a prestigious all-white boutique firm, explaining why
his firm was not particularly concerned about their lack of black attor-
neys and why they did not consider having partners of color a priority,
emphasized that in a partnership "everyone needs to be able to trust,
have confidence in one another." He implied such trust was not possi-
ble-or at least not the norm-among those of different races in South
Africa.46
Whites' economic self-interest may be another basis for their taste
for discrimination. White attorneys may be reluctant to integrate their
firms and give meaningful training to blacks because they desire to retain
their valuable and sophisticated legal skills for themselves and others in
the white community. While whites wielded both political and economic
power during apartheid, they now hold only the latter and surely do not
wish to undermine it, even in the face of current market incentives to hire
and retain blacks. Thus, the white taste for discrimination is, in a sense,
rational-at least as long as a white partner's self-interest in retaining
skills and clients outweighs his and his firm's interest in garnering the
added business on offer to the truly integrated firm.
Assuming, for the reasons stated, that the taste for discrimination is
great among white South Africans, it is not surprising that their individ-
ual desires to exclude persons of color-or, to state it less pejoratively,
their preference for working with other whites-would sometimes over-
ride the institution's rational recognition of the benefits of employing
and training attorneys of color. As one Indian attorney described the
situation at the elite white firm where she had completed articles:
There was no effort on an individual basis to find common
ground. At the top though, there was clear recognition of a need
to bring blacks into the firm. Whites don't know how to make an
effort.., they should be put in role playing exercises, given sen-
sitivity training. The dominant culture is liberalism-to treat
415. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. One attorney interviewed also spoke
of apartheid's use of race and class to undermine how blacks saw themselves. See Interview
No. 40, supra note 64. In a similar vein, a black professional assistant in one of the more inte-
grated firms noted that black candidate attorneys preferred to work for white professional
assistants rather than to work for her. Interview No. 14, supra note 3.
416. Interview No. 51, supra note 253. See also Mullagee & Kinnes, supra note 7, at 19
(noting that white firms may hire blacks but then "'refuse to allow them to have lunch with
the clients for instance.... because they are unwilling to share the knowledge and network
with black attorneys' ").
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everyone the same, but that 'same' assumes white norms of a
certain class.47
These firms, then, are not necessarily oblivious to or irrational with
respect to the economic implications of their failure to retain attorneys of
color. It may be simply that the collective rationality of a firm and its
management,418 which may have a policy of employing and promoting
black attorneys, is undermined by the deeply held biases and fears of the
individual decisionmakers within the firm. Indeed, it appears most firms
are somewhat schizophrenic in their approach to hiring and retaining
attorneys of color. While a firm's management may articulate a policy
prioritizing it, individuals within the firm often fail to execute the policy.
If a firm's goal is to have more attorneys of color, the firm is likely
to have an easier time monitoring and ensuring their hiring than it is their
retention. Consider, for example, a firm that has set the goal of hiring
more attorneys of color. To achieve this stated goal, the firm may dele-
gate the recruitment function to a committee or to an individual with
specific instructions to hire a certain number of black attorneys. Because
there is a plentiful supply of black law graduates seeking articles in these
firms, hiring blacks will be easy. Further, by relying on a centralized de-
cisionmaker, the firm may hold that decisionmaker, whether individual
or committee, accountable for achieving the goal. Relying on such a de-
cisionmaker who is given a clear goal, the firm may effectively trump
any individuals' taste for discrimination, which might otherwise prevent
its achievement. Thus, the firm is able to meet its goal of hiring attorneys
of color.
Retention, however, is more difficult to achieve, in part because the
training and mentoring on which it depends is more difficult and costly
for a firm to monitor. Unlike hiring, training cannot be centralized be-
cause the firm must rely on numerous individual senior attorneys to
mentor and train junior attorneys. Oversight of an array of such relation-
ships and interactions is not feasible. This makes it easier for individual
whites to act on their taste for discrimination by neglecting black attor-
neys, thus thwarting the stated goal of the firm to retain these attorneys
of color.
Ironically, then, the fact the apprentice training model depends so
heavily on personal relationships may actually impede integration.
417. Interview No. 70, supra note 306. Another stated: "There is a schizophrenia in
places like [my former firm]; sometimes we are mentored, but generally blacks are over-
looked." Interview No. 54, supra note 12.
418. Recent commentators on the South African attorneys' profession have discussed its
increasing profit-making orientation. They have observed a turn away from a professional
ethic to a more commercial-oriented one. See Steenkamp, supra note 7, at 126-27; see also
Matlala, supra note 67, at 43.
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Apartheid's legacy of distrust among the races undermines the estab-
lishment of personal relationships between senior white attorneys and
junior black attorneys. Thus, the most productive training and mentoring
of blacks rests on the very relationships that apartheid has made so diffi-
cult to achieve. Whether conscious or not, these individuals' exercise of
their taste for discrimination will be difficult and costly to detect. Thus, a
firm's policy of retaining black attorneys may be readily thwarted by
individuals' indulgence in a taste for discrimination, leaving firms to
miss opportunities to create a work environment that fosters skills devel-
opment among blacks and, at the same time, enhances black attorneys'
loyalty to the firm.
2. White Firms Don't Believe Blacks Can or Will
Be Integrated into Their Institutions
These firms are a very different culture to what most blacks
know. It is a capitalistic culture, and most blacks don't want to
be part of such an enterprise. The European culture is dominant
in firms like this one. I am not saying it is the correct one, but it
is the culture linked to commerce.
-White male candidate attorney at mid-sized white firm..9
I fear that [my black brothers] will say, "You made it. You're a
coconut [black on the outside, white on the inside]." I don't want
to be a coconut.
-African male law clerk to a Constitutional Court Judge
4 21
Another possible explanation for these elite firms' failure to make a
greater effort to retain blacks is that they do not believe that genuine in-
tegration within these institutions is feasible. They apparently perceive a
vast cultural gap between whites and persons of color, and they believe
that blacks are unwilling or unable to assimilate into their white institu-
tions. In short, firms may believe that the degree of distrust and
misunderstanding between blacks and whites is so great these two
groups cannot in the foreseeable future work side by side as equal col-
leagues.
As noted above, one deterrent to employing attorneys of color is that
they are professionally highly mobile. Firms have difficulty retaining
419. Interview No. 17, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Mar. 19, 1999) (23-year-old white male can-
didate attorney) (transcript on file with author); Interview No. 59, supra note 39 (indicating
that blacks do not stay at white firms because they do not find the environment to be right for
them).
420. Interview No. 27, supra note 96.
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them, which supports the perception that blacks cannot or will not stay at
white firms. One African professional assistant said that her top-tier firm,
if asked, would explain its failure to retain blacks this way: "we recruit a
lot of black people, but then they just go and get head hunted." She took
this to mean the firm had concluded "it doesn't pay to recruit and train
them because they leave, are not loyal." She said attorneys of color "felt
that the firm was not interested in training blacks because it was a re-
volving-door policy of the firm to have us come and go. '42' Another
African who was on the verge of leaving his elite white firm to join an
investment bank, expressed understanding of why firms often do not give
black attorneys the best training. "A person who trains you, who knows
that you are about to leave in a year, may not be very keen to train you in
the same way in which they would train somebody that they knew would
be here to stay.' 422 He went on to say,
Those they expect to stay get better training-whites are ex-
pected to stay; blacks are not. As long as the partners know this
is a long-term relationship with you, they will invest in you-as
in all sorts of relationships. Blacks are often seen as a mercenary
group moving from one institution to another. Human beings are
naturally selfish. Why invest in someone who at the end of the
day will leave the firm?
423
Whether this phenomenon of black attrition supports the widely held
perception that integration cannot be achieved is debatable. It appears
that black attorneys rarely, if ever, are given optimal opportunities to
succeed in these firms. It is therefore perhaps not fair to conclude that
such successes are not possible and that persons of color cannot or will
not be integrated. Indeed, given the incentives whites have to cling to the
status quo and their monopoly on sophisticated legal skills, it is reason-
able to view this explanation with some skepticism.
Nevertheless, a number of attorneys of color made statements that
appear to support this establishment assertion of the impossibility of in-
tegration. A few stated that they have no desire to be integrated culturally
into the white firms where they worked.424 Others, like the one quoted
421. Interview No. 67, supra note 141.
422. Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
423. Id. The attorney went on to say that his firm shotild worry more about whether at-
torneys the firm has trained are getting the "basics" before sending them out to be
"contributor[s] to society." He noted that candidate attorneys trained by the firm are going out
"with the [firm's] name:' implying that the firm's reputation is at stake. He concluded, "there
is a disinvestment in us." Id.
424. Interview No. 31, supra note 3 ("I don't want to be integrated into anything."); In-
terview No. 27, supra note 96 (expressing concern that if he succeeds in a white firm he will
be perceive as a "coconut," white on the inside, black on the outside).
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above, were planning to leave for financial reasons. Still others opined
that the tendency of attorneys of color to "job hop" is overplayed and
that, in fact, given the right opportunities, blacks desire to be part of
421these institutions. Whatever the reality, the widespread perception is
that true integration of persons of color into the professional and social
structures of elite law firms will be difficult to achieve. This perception
may be to blame, at least in part, for firms' lack of genuine efforts in the
face of the task. In short, while paying lip service to the value of diver-
sity, the firms' defeatist attitude about whether meaningful integration is
possible may undermine what efforts they say they are making.
3. White Firms Cannot Justify the Extra Costs of Training
and Assimilating "Atypical" Black Workers
There is a disinvestment in us.
-African male professional assistant
at a top-tier firm
426
In addition to the costs associated with training black attorneys who
are more likely than white attorneys to leave before the firm recoups its
investment in them, other costs associated with employing black attor-
neys may deter firms from making a greater effort to retain them.
Specifically, attorneys of color might be considered "atypical" workers
in the context of the market for South African commercial lawyers be-
cause they are different from the vast majority of professionals employed
in that workplace. Attorneys of color often have different language skills,
and they may bring to the workplace skills that do not, for example,
match their white counterparts' general knowledge of commercial mat-
ters. They may also embrace different cultural traditions. Because of the
perceived or real differences between black and white attorneys, as well
as the significance attributed to those differences, elite commercial law
firms are likely to find it more costly to employ a black attorney than a
white attorney.
Various costs may be associated with efforts to make attorneys of
color more "typical," to confer on them some of the attributes of their
white counterparts. For example, in order for attorneys of color to be
integrated into the elite law firm workplace, some may need assistance
with their English language skills. In addition, given historic disparities
in education and opportunity, workshops or individual mentoring on the
basics of business and commercial law might be useful, even necessary,
425. Interview No. 14, supra note 3.
426. Interview No. 43, supra note 140.
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for these attorneys to "fit in" with their white colleagues. Such mentor-
ing efforts might go not only to substantive law, but also to familiarizing
those from historically disadvantaged backgrounds with the social and
professional norms associated with the law firm setting.
These added costs may help explain why traditionally white firms
don't try harder to retain blacks. Indeed, such costs arguably justify on
rational economic terms a firm's preference for a "typical" white lawyer
over an "atypical" black one. The atypical worker may not have the re-
sources to pay the cost of overcoming the inadequacy-that is, to train or
equip herself to assimilate to the model of the "typical" worker. Alterna-
tively, the worker may choose not to assimilate, even given the tools to
do so, because she sees doing so as violating a sense of cultural identity
or for some other reason. In either case the worker will remain marginal-
ized in the workplace, causing an uncooperative and costly relationship
between typical and atypical workers to persist.
27
Indeed, issues of education and behavior are not the only issues as-
sociated with the presence of blacks in white firms. Equipping blacks to
talk and act like their white counterparts-to assimilate-may be not
only politically incorrect; if achieved it may be only part of the solution.
Just as theorists have argued that productivity may be diminished when
typical workers are less cooperative or even completely uncooperative
with atypical workers,428 white attorneys may choose not to cooperate
with black attorneys in a way that achieves maximum productivity in the
South African workplace. The employment of attorneys of color-even
those who attempt to assimilate and are better equipped to do so-may
alienate white attorneys, causing their motivation and loyalty to the em-
ployer to be diminished by the presence of these atypical colleagues.429
427. See supra text accompanying notes 185-191 (discussing theoretical literature on
worker preferences, culture, and atypical workers). This is not to suggest that the only change
required to make blacks "typical" workers is to achieve parity in terms of educational oppor-
tunities. Even if they speak the same language fluently and attend the same schools and
universities, blacks will not necessarily be seen as fellow "typical" workers by their white
colleagues because of cultural differences that are likely to remain-or at least be perceived to
remain. See Roberts, supra note 30, at 18, 20 (noting the expectation that trainee accountants,
for example, would "conform rigidly to their firms' culture and that people around them
thought and talked in terms of racial stereotypes; "organizations talk about 'our culture' and
look for individuals who fit in with that"); see also Interview No. 70, supra note 306 (noting
that the "dominant culture is liberalism-to treat everyone the same, but that 'same' assumes
white norms of a certain class"); interview No. 54, supra note 12 (observing that the burden is
on black attorneys to demonstrate that they can fit into the dominant white firm culture).
428. See generally text accompanying notes 172-184 (discussing taste discrimination).
429. In a 2001 study, many more whites than blacks expressed concern that racism was
occurring in the guise of affirmative action and "empowerment" plans. S. Afr. Inst. of Race
Relations, supra note 3, at http://www.sairr.org.za/publications/pub/ff/200112/rainbow.htm.
Several black attorneys interviewed also discussed their awareness that their hiring had caused
resentment among their white colleagues. See, e.g., Interview No. 22, supra note 133 (noting
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In sum, white attorneys' taste for discrimination may be played out in a
lack of cooperation with any black professional, no matter how qualified,
no matter how "typical" he or she is on every basis except skin color.
This is especially true given the widespread perception that in this age of
affirmative action in South Africa white workers are being displaced by
less qualified persons of color.43° The resentment and diminution in white
worker morale that accompanies the employment of attorneys of color
may provide sufficient justification-or at least a rationalization-for
some firms to abandon otherwise genuine efforts to hire, train, retain,
and promote black attorneys. Where it does not lead to an abandonment
of such goals, it may nevertheless undermine the commitment to those
goals, or diminish the vigor with which they are pursued.
In short, the costs of employing black attorneys in South Africa may
be sufficiently great to deter elite commercial firms from seriously at-
tempting to retain them, even in the face of market incentives to integrate
their professional workforces. Firms may instead seek to manage the
costs of having black attorneys by hiring so-called "soft blacks," those
blacks who are already closer to the profile of the prototypical commer-
cial attorney by virtue of their education and socialization. At the same
time, these firms believe, perhaps rightly, that they need only a few black
attorneys to satisfy the market's "demand" for diversity. In doing so,
these firms are making only a miniscule contribution to the empower-
ment of black attorneys from previously disadvantaged backgrounds-
and, therefore, to the empowerment of black South Africans generally.
43
'
Somewhat ironically, others have observed that the costs of
discrimination based on race are much higher in South Africa than they
are in the United States.432 However, the costs at issue are not those
related to the presence of atypical workers. Rather, they are cost
variations associated with the supply of and demand for labor. Scholars
like Christopher Ford have noted that, because of a shortage of white
labor, employers during apartheid often sought to employ blacks in
greater numbers and higher positions than South Africa's apartheid-era
laws permitted. On this basis, Ford argues that discrimination is still a
more "expensive good" in South Africa than in the United States. Given
that white men see themselves as an "endangered species" in the new South African work-
place).
430. See Roberts, supra note 30; Interview No. 51, supra note 253 (noting that the ca-
pacity at the Department of Trade and Industry, where he had worked prior to joining his
current firm, was greatly diminished because the best people had taken early retirement, leav-
ing only "dead weight" since the "best people [were] being replaced due to affirmative action
with not well-trained African candidates").
431. Ford, supra note 3, at 2012-13 (citing and discussing extensively THOMAS SOWELL,
PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990)).
432. Id.
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that the vast majority of the population is black, South African
employers experience much greater difficulty in meeting their labor
needs if they discriminate against blacks. 43  He summarizes with these
thoughts on the post-apartheid era:
Today, perhaps the challenges of affirmative action for purposes
of black advancement may be somewhat lessened by employers'
economic incentives to incorporate the non-White eighty-seven
percent of the population more fully into the labor market. The
factor of outright prejudice in employment decisions, at least,
may be somewhat attenuated-though shortages of trained and
experienced candidates will remain a real economic obstacle of
which employers seem quite aware.434
This final sentence highlights the distinction between what Ford de-
scribes generally about the South African labor market and what is borne
out in the interview data about the legal profession. Race discrimination
in the context of the legal profession is not as costly to employers be-
cause there are enough well-educated whites to meet the labor demand.
At the same time, the legal profession requires university degrees, train-
ing, and other manifestations of human capital to which most blacks
have not yet had access. Unlike other employment sectors that will find
discrimination more costly and integration more efficient due to a short-
age of white labor, law firms are more likely to encounter added costs
when they integrate because doing so requires accommodation of atypi-
cal workers. The question remains whether the commercial incentives on
offer to integrated firms are sufficient to defray these costs.
4. The Commercial Incentive to Integrate Is
Not as Great as It Appears
When it comes to diversity, many clients are looking to be satis-
fied. If you have a few token [blacks], that is enough.
-White male professional assistant
433
While a great deal of talk exists in the South African marketplace
about the value of diversity, and while many of those interviewed dis-
cussed the commercial imperative that firms are experiencing to have
"black names on the letterhead," the fact integration is not being
achieved in the mid-level and top ranks of elite law firms necessarily
prompts one to question whether the imperative is as great as the rhetoric
433. Id. at 2012.
434. Id.
435. Interview No. 7, supra note 246.
[Vol. 23:545
No Black Names on the Letterhead?
indicates. It is helpful to recall the two broad categories of procurement
policies aimed at the empowerment of black professionals. The first of
these, generally employed by private sector clients, is reflected in the
oft-asked questions: "What is your empowerment plan? How many PDIs
[previously disadvantaged individuals] do you employ? 436 With this line
of questioning clients are, at a minimum, indicating that they wish to
employ firms who are making some effort to diversify their workforces.
The second category of procurement policy aimed at black empower-
ment or transformation includes the schemes that pair white law firms
with black law firms to complete specific projects, ostensibly in order to
achieve skills transfer from the former to the latter.437
Many large and high profile South African clients now inquire, as a
matter of course, into the empowerment plans of their prospective law
firms. However, some indications exist that these clients are easily satis-
fied by law firms' minimal efforts. One white partner acknowledged the
current client-driven incentives to have black attorneys but indicated that
most clients are satisfied by the practice of hiring a few black attorneys,
even while the employing firm remains essentially unconcerned with
retaining them.438
Even if some private sector clients are not so easily satisfied and
genuinely wish and expect to see firms integrate, the law firms them-
selves are only in competition with one another to achieve a level of
diversity that will satisfy the client. That is, a firm's "empowerment quo-
tient" or performance is not being measured against an ideal standard of
integration because no firm in the market has achieved that standard.
Clients must choose some appropriately skilled firm to do their work,
and if no skilled firm is truly integrated, clients cannot choose a racially
diverse vendor. Rather, clients must choose from an array of vendors
who are doing an equally poor job at integrating their professional work-
forces. As long as no individual firm retains considerably more attorneys
of color than any other, no firm will gain a "diversity advantage" in the
marketplace for sophisticated commercial legal services. Indeed, this
appears to be what is happening in South Africa. No major law firm is
clearly outpacing the others in terms of achieving integration, and there-
fore no firm is gaining a clear commercial advantage on that basis. 39
436. See, e.g., Interview No. 55, supra note 3.
437. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
438. Interview No. 51, supra note 253.
439. The mixed race law firm that appears to be gaining the greatest competitive advan-
tage on the basis of its racial diversity is the Johannesburg office of White & Case LLP.
Interview with Ron Goodman, supra note 128. Although competing only for privatizations and
other highly sophisticated commercial work, White & Case has been remarkably successful at
garnering business, including projects from the South African government, with its three white
partners and nine black associates. Id.
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The other type of procurement scheme employed by many public
sector clients appears similarly ineffective, whether the goal is black em-
powerment through integration, skills transfer, or both. Indeed, those
schemes that pair a black firm with a white firm to accomplish a certain
project arguably serve to promote segregation rather than integration.
Because firms are deemed "white" or "black" based on the race of their
partners, firms with roughly equal numbers of black and white part-
ners-genuinely integrated firms-may qualify to be neither "black"
counsel nor "white" counsel on a given project. That is, those firms with
fewer than half of their partnership comprised of black attorneys appear
to achieve no advantage under such schemes because they are still con-
sidered white firms. Accordingly, they may be considered for the "white
chair" on the project if they have the sophisticated skills to complete the
project and, ostensibly, to transfer to the black firm. Under these
schemes, however, the predominately white firm would be eligible for
the "white chair" on the project even if it had no black attorneys whatso-
ever. Thus, these are essentially "all-or-nothing" schemes that fail to
provide any incentive to integration. Effectively, they reward only the
predominately black firm, which, in the current market, equates to the
all-black firm, and they do so regardless of actual skills acquisition.
These public sector procurement schemes consequently provide little
short-term incentive for attorneys of color to remain in white firms when
they have the opportunity to join black firms and benefit from these
schemes' preference.' Similarly, they provide no incentive for white
firms to cultivate any black partners, short of the black majority that
would consequently render them a "black firm." In short, these schemes
appear to encourage segregation rather than integration. Furthermore,
because most indications are that the pairing schemes are not achieving
meaningful skills transfer from the "haves" to the "have-nots,"'4 they
arguably serve no function beyond a public relations one.
440. What black attorneys lose out on in the long-term, of course, is the acquisition of
skills that would ultimately enable them to complete the work without the assistance of a
white firm. See also Wilkins, Partners Without Power, supra note 164 (hinting that joint ven-
tures in the United States have a similar effect by creating incentives for black partners to
leave white firms and join or form black ones in order to take advantage of this business op-
portunity).
441. See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text. One partner summarized the situa-
tion this way: "Attention is needed from both sides-training black lawyers while sharing
business with them. It is a chicken-and-egg situation ... we cannot brief [them] because [they]
don't have the skills or they don't have the skills because they cannot get the business to develop
them. Where does it end? How do we get them the skills?" Interview No. 40, supra note 64.
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CONCLUSION
You basically are struggling for the other people. Because at
some stage I say why am I putting myself under such enormous
pressure, and I say, if I quit, those first-year law students will
never get into the profession. Let me just stick it out even if I
don't benefit now, they will later respect us, the few, and say
"you people, we can imagine how you must have been working
then." And you're first struggling with money, you have student
loans, you have your sister [to send to school, you have] an
emergency, and now you're another small Mandela.
-African female professional assistant2
Many professional doors have been opened to black attorneys in
post-apartheid South Africa-doors that for decades were closed to them
by virtue of their color. One such opportunity is that of practicing in the
country's elite commercial law firms, a predictable one given the appre-
ciation for racial diversity in the "new South Africa." While black law
graduates are moving into these firms at an unprecedented pace, how-
ever, few are remaining with the firms for more than a couple of years,
often no longer than is required for them to become admitted attorneys.
Early in their legal careers, even in comparison to their white counter-
parts, these black attorneys take full advantage of their mobility in the
current labor market to pursue alternate career opportunities in both the
public and private sectors. Thus the two questions investigated here:
Why is black attrition from white firms so high? And, why in a market
that offers economic incentives to integrate is no firm doing what is nec-
essary to achieve integration by acting to retain the black attorneys?
The answer to the latter question, of course, depends on the answer to
the former, as effective law firm retention efforts will necessarily respond
to the reasons blacks leave. As the interview data indicate, blacks and
whites often have different explanations for the paucity of black attorneys
in the upper ranks of the country's elite commercial law firms. Among
black explanations are a range of structural factors, including very low law
firm salaries and a plenitude of other, often better paying, professional
opportunities. In addition, many blacks experience cultural alienation and
professional isolation in these firms, partly as a consequence of the racist
attitudes of individuals and partly as a consequence of institutional struc-
tures, which permit such biases to go undetected and, therefore,
undeterred.
442. Interview No. 57, supra note 155.
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In particular, many blacks attorneys' decisions to pursue alternate
career paths are driven by their perception of lack of opportunity in these
firms, which is often linked to the lesser training and mentoring black
attorneys get, as compared to their white colleagues. Blacks often
complain, for example, that they are doomed to failure in these institutions
based solely on the lack of work. Many blacks may believe that whites
will never accept them as equal colleagues, as partners. The odds against
attaining partnership may appear so great that the vast majority of black
attorneys are unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to seek it in
earnest. Partnership simply does not look like a plausible bet for them, let
alone a safe one.
The white establishment, not surprisingly, offers an alternative version
of events. They explain that black underrepresentation in these firms is
primarily attributable to black shortcomings, including intellectual inferi-
ority and deficits of human capital, interest, loyalty, and perseverance.
Having considered these competing explanations, one might fairly
conclude that there are both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the
dearth of blacks in South African commercial firms. Rejecting as factually
unsupported the myths of black intellectual inferiority and lack of interest
in commercial law, and putting into proper perspective the handicaps rep-
resented by many blacks' inferior educational opportunity and lack of
exposure to matters of commerce, other explanations must exist for the
failure of firms to retain black attorneys. Certainly, the low salaries that
firms pay to young attorneys, along with the wide range of opportunities
for equal or better-paid jobs in other sectors of the labor market, heighten
the challenge for firms genuinely seeking to retain attorneys of color.
However, if as the interview data and other evidence indicates, many
blacks are interested in commercial legal work and, indeed, are actively
seeking it, more must account for the phenomenon described. This seems
particularly clear if the economic incentives these firms have to retain and
promote black attorneys are as powerful as the rhetoric indicates.
Underrepresentation of blacks in South Africa's elite law firms can be
accounted for in a model that accounts for the interplay of both institu-
tional racism on the one hand and individual racism on the other. Blatantly
racist acts are not required in order for blacks' careers to suffer. Indeed,
their careers may suffer when subtle acts of preferring whites over blacks
go undetected, and therefore undeterred, in the marketplace. Thus, the lack
of transparency resulting from South African firms' institutional structures
and features is also a culprit, protecting firms, as it does, from the theoreti-
cally correcting power of the market.
The interview data and other evidence indicates most large commer-
cial firms are not taking advantage of the opportunity they have to
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discriminate against blacks at the hiring phase. This is likely because of
institutional oversight of the recruitment process, by setting quotas, and
because individuals within firms are not much threatened-if at all-by
the presence of junior black attorneys. These firms' practices around train-
ing and promotion, on the other hand, appear to be a much more
significant part of the discriminatory dynamic. Ample opportunity exists at
those stages for individuals within firms to exercise their taste for dis-
crimination in their day-to-day interactions, and their taste for
discrimination is likely greater because the more highly skilled black at-
torneys become, the greater their threat to the white establishment. While
the opportunity to discriminate is quite clear, what is less certain is why
firms are not doing more to detect and deter such individual acts of dis-
crimination, given what appears to be at stake.
Some combination of four factors likely explains elite firms' failure.
First, there is the taste many white South Africans have for discrimination
and the enormous institutional challenge of curbing it. Just as institutional
structures prevent the market from detecting discrimination, they may also
prevent firms from detecting it from within. It is difficult if not impossible
for firms to monitor all individuals' actions for discriminatory behavior
because of the subjective nature, for example, of assessments about the
quality of a junior attorney's work. Institutional structures could be altered
in an effort to centralize and therefore exert greater control over the train-
ing and mentoring of black attorneys. This could be done with a view to
curbing individuals' acting on their preferences to train attorneys who look
like themselves or, to state it more pejoratively, acting on their desire to
retain for themselves and their "kind" sophisticated and highly valuable
skills. Efforts at greater internal oversight of skills transfer might neverthe-
less prove largely futile. This is because the relationships and experiences
that many blacks need in order to survive in a firm cannot be imposed or
significantly improved simply by virtue of closer institutional oversight. In
short, those averse to mentoring and training blacks are unlikely to be
moved to do a considerably better job at the task by virtue of oversight of
a committee or designated individual seeking to enforce the firm's policy
of skills transfer, retention, and promotion of attorneys of color.
Second, firms may also be failing to act more vigorously to retain
blacks among the ranks of their senior attorneys because they believe
blacks can never be effectively integrated into these white institutions. Re-
lated to this, as well as to the taste for discrimination, is likely a desire by
many whites to maintain the status quo, in part because of the value of the
skills they have long monopolized. To state it cynically and bluntly, in
some ways it is in whites' best interests not to integrate because doing so
represents a relinquishment of economic power.
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Third, also related to this perceived difficulty of achieving integration
is the cost associated with doing so. Firms likely believe that it will be
costly to integrate "atypical" black attorneys because many of them
require more training and mentoring than their "typical" white
counterparts, costs that the firm must bear in order to facilitate blacks'
assimilation. Furthermore, white firms probably are also concerned about
integration costs associated with the diminished morale of white workers
who resent the presence of black attorneys, whom many whites see as
undeserving. All of these costs, however, would seemingly be outweighed
by the commercial rewards of achieving integration that appear to await
any firm that does so.
The fourth factor relates to the reality about those very commercial
rewards. The fact that no elite, historically white firm is clearly on the path
to significant racial integration, however, indicates that the apparent com-
mercial advantage of integration must be little more than that: merely
apparent. Alternatively, it could mean that firms are presently able to sur-
vive in spite of their failure to retain blacks simply because no major firm
in the marketplace is retaining and promoting blacks to a considerably
greater degree than any other. In effect, because no firm is "getting it
right" and scooping up the business advantage that racial integration ap-
pears to offer, firms remain on a level playing field-almost as if by
gentlemen's agreement among themselves-with respect to diversity. Be-
cause no single firm is raising the bar, as it were, other firms are not
compelled to follow, let alone exceed that standard, in order to remain
competitive. All firms are stuck in the pit of mediocrity-if not outright
failure-with respect to racial integration.
Prospects for meaningful racial integration of South Africa's elite
commercial firms look bleak at the turn of the 21st century. While rhetoric
around the value of racial diversity is plentiful, individual and institutional
action that would promote and sustain it in the context of elite law firms is
scarce. The passage of time will be part of the solution, as the socioeco-
nomic and educational legacy of apartheid wanes so that more black law
graduates are better able to compete on a level playing field with their
white counterparts. However, until white firms commit themselves to the
training and retention of black professionals in a more earnest way than
they have so far, the attorneys' profession is destined to remain a highly
segregated one where whites continue to hold a virtual monopoly on the
most elite and valuable skills, and the clients those skills attract.
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APPENDIX A
# Date of Initial Second Second Color/Gender Position
Interview Interview #
I March 17,1999 Colored female law student
2 January 9, 2001 White male LSSA official
3 March 17,1999 White male legal educator
4 March 17,1999 Indian male law student
5 January 9, 2001 White male LSSA official
6 January 9, 2001 White female LSSA official
7 June 15, 1999 White male professional assistant
8 March 17,1999 White female law student
9 June 10, 1999 White male professional assistant
10 July 12,1999 White female legal educator
11 June 23, 1999 White male legal educator
12 March 17,1999 White male law student
13 March 24, 2000 White male partner
14 June 29, 1999 African female professional assistant
15 June 18, 1999 White female partner
16 April 3, 2000 Colored male legal educator
17 March 19,1999 White male candidate attorney
18 March 17, 1999 Colored female law student
19 April 5, 2000 White male public interest
I attorney
20 June 28, 1999 African male partner
21 June 29, 1999 African male former candidate
attorney
22 June 18,1999 March 21,2000 72 African male professional assistant
23 March 15,1999 Indian male former candidate
attorney
24 June 21, 1999 White female government lawyer
25 June 21, 1999 Colored male professional assistant
26 March 18, 1999 African male partner
27 June 21, 1999 African male law clerk to judge
28 June 22, 1999 White male legal educator
29 June, 1999 African female law clerk to judge
30 March 19, 1999 White female judge
31 March 18, 1999 June 15,1999 73 African male candidate attorney
32 July 9,1999 African female corporate legal
department
33 June 15, 1999 African male former candidate
attorney
34 March 16,1999 African male partner
35 June 10, 1999 March 24,2000 74 White male partner
36 March 30, 2000 White male former candidate
attorney
37 July 9, 1999 March 30, 2000 75 White female professional assistant
38 June 16, 1999 White male businessman
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# Date of Initial Second Second Color/Gender Position
Interview Interview #
39 June 29, 1999 March 24, 2000 76 African male professional assistant
40 March 20, 2000 Indian male partner
41 March 17,1999 Indian male judge
42 July 12,1999 African male associate partner
43 July 9, 1999 African male professional assistant
44 June 30,1999 African male former partner
45 March 17, 1999 White female law student
46 March 17, 1999 African female law student
47 March 19, 1999 African female professional assistant
48 March 17,1999 African female law student
49 March 20,1999 African female candidate attorney
50 March 18, 1999 White female partner
51 March 23, 2000 White male partner
52 July 1, 1999 African male former professional
assistant
53 March 16,1999 Indian female candidate attorney
54 March 18,1999 Colored male associate partner
55 April 6, 2000 White male partner
56 June 28,1999 African male professional assistant
57 June 10, 1999 African female professional assistant
58 June 29,1999 African male professional assistant
59 March 16,1999 June 19,1999 77 African female associate partner
60 July 26, 2000 Indian female former professional
assistant
61 June 17,1999 African male former associate
partner
62 March 18, 1999 Indian male associate partner
63 June 28,1999 African male partner
64 March 18, 1999 African male partner
65 January 9, 2001 Indian male LSSA official
66 July 12, 1999 African female candidate attorney
67 July 26, 2000 African female former professional
assistant
68 March 16, 1999 African female candidate attorney
69 March 30, 2000 White male former candidate
attorney
70 March 15, 1999 Indian female associate partner
71 March 17, 1999 Indian female law student
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